
























This thesis addresses two questions. One concerns the metaphysics of emotions and asks 
what kinds of mental states emotions are. The other asks how the metaphysics of 
emotions bears on first and third-personal knowledge of emotions. There are two 
prevailing views on the nature of emotions. They are the perception and cognitive views. 
The perception view argues that emotions are bodily feelings. The cognitive view, by 
contrast, contends that emotions are some sorts of evaluative judgments. I show that 
both views provide inadequate accounts of the nature of emotions. The perception 
view fails to do justice to the fact that emotions may not involve any bodily feeling. The 
cognitive view, by contrast, cannot account for the fact that emotions are states that 
adult humans have in common with infants and animals. 
On the basis of these criticisms, I put forward an alternative account of 
emotions. This involves five main arguments. The first is that emotions are enduring 
non-episodic dispositions that may or may not manifest themselves in experiential 
episodes such as emotional feelings and behaviour episodes such as expressions. The 
second argument is that emotional feelings are perceptions of specific bodily changes 
brought about by emotions. These feelings serve as clues as to what kinds of emotions 
the subject has. The third argument is that expressions are observable manifestations of 
emotions in virtue of which emotions can be perceived and subsequently known, 
directly and non-inferentially, by other people. The fourth argument is that when 
someone has an emotion without feeling it, she can still come to know it by believing 
true ascriptions that other people make about the emotion they perceive in her 
expression. The fifth argument is that full knowledge of emotions requires knowledge 
of the emotion objects.   
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The topic of this thesis is how we come to know our own and other people’s 
emotions. Often the attempt to explain how we know a certain thing requires 
consideration about the nature of that thing. This suggests that an answer to the 
question of how we know emotions requires determining the nature of 
emotions. Authors like William James and Jesse Prinz have put forward a 
perception view according to which emotions are bodily feelings. If this were the 
case, we would then know emotions in the same way as we know other feelings 
and sensations. On the other hand, authors like Robert Solomon and Martha 
Nussbaum have proposed a cognitive view according to which emotions are 
states like judgements. If this were correct, we would then know emotions in the 
same way as we know judgements. 
There is, however, reason to doubt that either view is correct. The 
cognitive view fails to do justice to the fact that higher animals and infants have 
emotions, even though they are not capable of making judgements. The 
perception view, by contrast, confines itself to the claim that everything that 
needs to be explained about emotions can be explained in terms of bodily 
feelings. Although this view has the potential to account for emotions in 
humans as well as in animals, it overlooks the fact that emotions do not 
necessarily involve feelings. This suggests that emotions are not mere bodily 
experiences but another kind of state. So, neither the perception nor the 
cognitive view succeeds in providing a plausible and exhaustive account of 
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emotions. This thesis offers such an account and, further, draws out the 
implications for the problem of knowledge of emotions.  
Some preliminary considerations will help set the scene. Since emotions 
are psychological states, it is tempting to think that empirical psychology is the 
discipline best suited to explain what kinds of states emotions are. This view 
misses the fact that emotions are psychological states we use in everyday folk-
psychological explanations. This means that in order to answer the question 
about the nature of emotions we need to consider how we use emotion concepts 
when we explain our own and other people’s behaviour. This is the approach I 
develop in this thesis. 
It is when we examine ordinary psychological explanations that we begin 
to understand the nature of emotions. One of the most noticeable features is that 
emotions are states we form in relation to objects. For example, when we are 
afraid, we are always afraid of something, even when we do not know what it is 
that we fear. But what kind of relation is there between emotions and their 
objects? It is plausible that, since emotions are neither judgements nor bodily 
feelings, they relate to their objects in a manner that differs from judgements 
and feelings. In particular, judgements are states we form in relation to objects 
for which we have concepts. Emotions, by contrast, are states we also find in 
creatures that do not master concepts. So, it is very unlikely that the way 
emotions relate to their objects will resemble the way judgements relate to their 
objects. Moreover, judgements aim at truth, while emotions do not. This is 
because emotions do not require the sort of assessment that grounds 
judgements – assessment that necessarily requires mastery of the concepts for 
what is assessed. It is equally unpromising to link the way emotions relate to 
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objects to the way feelings have objects. Bodily feelings can be viewed as 
perceptions of bodily states or changes, that is, as states produced by the action 
of certain objects upon some sort of perceptual system. Emotions, by contrast, 
are active states that creatures form in response to objects. 
The view I advocate is that emotions are reactions to objects; reactions 
that do not require the ability to think about such objects. In this respect, 
emotions may resemble perceptions. Yet, they differ from perceptions because 
they are states creatures actively form in response to stimuli. So, like judgements 
emotions are active states and yet, unlike judgements, they do not require the 
ability to think about and evaluate their objects. On this account, emotions are 
reactions creatures actively form in response to objects without needing the 
ability to think about them. 
This does not yet say how we know about emotions. Normally, people 
know their emotions when they feel them. This suggests that feelings play an 
important role in knowledge of emotions. On the other hand, we may know 
other people’s emotions from their expressions, which indicates that behaviour 
is also important to knowledge of emotions. How do these aspects relate to the 
nature of emotions? If emotions are not feelings and yet feelings play an 
important role in knowledge of emotions, then there must be a connection 
between emotions and feelings. My thesis is that emotions are non-episodic 
dispositions that may or may not manifest themselves in episodic states such as 
feelings and expressions. 
This view is justified by the fact that every day psychological 
explanations refer to emotions as two different kinds of states: feelings and 
dispositions. I explain this aspect in terms of emotions being dispositions to 
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undergo characteristic feelings and behaviour. For example, we say that 
someone is reluctant to travel by plane because she fears it. This explanation 
suggests the person has a state that makes her behave in a characteristic way 
and that this state lasts over time. On this basis, I argue that emotions are 
enduring non-episodic states that may or may not manifest themselves in 
episodes such as feelings and behaviour – where the notion of behaviour 
comprises short-term behaviour such as expressions and long-term behaviour 
like the avoidance to travel by plane. In this respect emotions resemble beliefs, 
since beliefs are also enduring non-episodic states. The difference is that beliefs 
manifest themselves in judgements, while emotions manifest themselves in 
feelings and behaviour. Moreover, beliefs aim at truth, while emotions are 
reactions to how things appear to the subject. 
This, however, does not suffice to provide an exhaustive account of 
knowledge of emotions. If we accept that emotions are non-episodic states that 
may or may not manifest themselves in feelings, we also need to accept that we 
may have emotions without them manifesting themselves in emotional feelings. 
So, how do we know emotions in this case? An answer to this question comes 
from everyday experience. We may know our emotions either by understanding 
the content of our thoughts or by listening to what other people say about our 
emotions on the basis of how we look and behave. In the first case, we 
understand that we are (say) sad from the fact that we tend to have thoughts 
that are in some way coloured by sadness. In the other, we come to know that 
we have emotions from what others say about the way we look to them; for 
example when they say “You look upset today.” This presupposes that other 
people can perceive a person’s emotion simply by looking at her expression. On 
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this account, expressions are perceivable manifestations of emotions that can be 
observed from the third-person point of view. In contrast, the bodily changes of 
which emotional feelings are perceptions are manifestations that can be 
perceived from the first-person point of view. 
This bears on the general question of how we know emotions. The 
answer is that emotions are states that have perceivable manifestations. Some of 
these manifestations can be observed by the subject; others can be observed by 
other people. This is consistent with the claim that emotions are enduring non-
episodic states that may or may not manifest themselves in episodes such as 
feelings and expressions. This account shows that the epistemology of emotions 
is entirely dependent on their metaphysics. In other words, how we know 
emotions depends on the kinds of states they are. This is the view I develop 
throughout this thesis. 
Chapter I is devoted to the question of whether emotions are natural 
kinds. I show that folk-psychological emotions are not natural kinds because 
they fail to meet the requirements that a concept or term must meet in order to 
count as a natural kind concept or term. Chapter II present a critical review of 
philosophical theories of emotions. I consider two main views: the cognitive and 
perception views. I show that they are both flawed because they fail to do justice 
to the way folk-psychological emotions work in ordinary psychological 
explanations. Chapter III examines the nature of emotions and presents an 
alternative account to the cognitive and perception views. I show that emotions 
are enduring non-episodic dispositions that creatures form in response to 
objects. Chapter IV concerns manifestations of emotions from the first-person 
point of view. I argue that emotions manifest themselves in emotional feelings 
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which can be viewed as perceptions of specific bodily changes brought about by 
emotions. Chapter V, instead, concerns manifestations of emotions from the 
third-person point of view. I argue that some of the changes of which emotional 
feelings are first-person experiences affect the outwardly observable part of the 
body and can be perceived by other people in the form of expressions of 
emotions. Chapter VI concerns self-knowledge of emotions. I argue that 
emotional feelings may serve as evidence for self-ascriptions of emotions. When 
emotions are not accompanied by such feelings and yet cause bodily changes 
that others can observe from the outside, we may come to know our emotions 









This chapter concerns the question whether the mental states we normally call 
emotions are all states of the same kind. The category of emotions comprises a 
wide range of superficially different states. Philosophers often divide them into 
two main groups: basic emotions and higher emotions.1 Basic emotions are sadness, 
joy, fear, disgust, surprise, and anger. They are found in all cultures. Humans 
have them in common with higher animals like primates. Higher emotions, by 
contrast, are not found in all cultures and seem characteristic only of humans. 
They divide into cognitive emotions and moral emotions. Cognitive emotions are 
envy, jealousy, and pride. Moral emotions are empathy, gratitude, remorse, 
indignation, admiration, resentment, guilt, and shame. Cognitive emotions are 
contrasted with basic ones because they seem to require a cognitive element that 
is absent in basic emotions. Moral emotions are often viewed as a variety of 
cognitive emotions. 
Our emotional vocabulary includes different kinds of states. Fear is a 
different kind of emotion from anger. Anger is a different kind of emotion from 
joy. Joy is a different kind of emotion from surprise, and so on. This is reflected 
by our ordinary psychological explanations. Fear is a state that produces 
characteristic feelings and behaviour in response to characteristic properties of 
                                                 
1 EKMAN 1999.  
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objects and situations. Joy is a different kind of state that produces different 
kinds of feelings and behaviour in response to different properties of objects and 
situations. When someone is afraid we explain her behaviour by means of a 
state that accounts for the kind of behaviour we observe. If the person had been 
in a state of joy, we would have observed a different kind of behaviour. 
Emotions are different kinds of states that account for different kinds of 
behaviour. Yet, we refer to all these states as emotions. What justifies the 
intuition that emotions are determinates of the same determinable kind? 
As I shall argue later on, answering this question is important because a 
philosophical account of emotions that aims to be accurate and comprehensive 
will make claims about the whole category of emotions. It will generalise 
properties of some specific emotions to other mental states in virtue of the fact 
that they also are emotions. In order for this generalisation to be justified, one 
needs to show that the intuition built into our ordinary emotion talk is correct 
and what is true of a specific emotion is true of other emotions. To this end, one 
needs to show that emotions are determinates of the same determinable kind. 
Some preliminary remarks are necessary. According to one philosophical 
view, two things are of the same kind when they are of the same nature or 
essence.2 On this view, in order to be justified in saying that emotions are all 
                                                 
2 PUTNAM 1973, 1975; KRIPKE 1980. This view is strongly realist as it identifies natural kinds with 
constituents of reality. It is worth noting that some empiricist philosophers of science are not at 
ease with this view. In particular, Richard Boyd (BOYD 1991) argues that the theory of natural 
kinds can be made independent from the metaphysical realism advocated by Putnam and 
Kripke. Boyd thinks that rather than making our concepts correspond to the real microstructure 
of the world the empiricist philosopher should construct projectable concepts on the basis of 
adequate theories. This is because only concepts that are projectable play a role in induction or 
explanation. Concepts are designed to pick out categories that have explanatory significance in 
the current best theory of a certain domain. A category brings together objects that share 
correlated properties. The category has what Boyd calls causal homeostasis if the correlation 
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states of the same kind, we need to show that they are all of the same nature. In 
other words, we need to show that emotions are a natural kind. But how do we 
determine the nature of emotions? I will argue that one way of carrying out this 
project would be by means of a psychological theory of emotions. That theory 
would say what the folk-psychological states we call emotions are, and it would 
account for all instances of these states. As I will show, there seems to be no 
single psychological theory capable of accounting for all instances of emotions. 
At best, a psychological theory accounts for a subclass of emotions. 
In particular, I will argue that scepticism about the possibility of 
providing a scientific theory of emotions is justified by general considerations 
about the difference between, at one end of the investigative spectrum, the kinds 
of emotional states that psychology investigates and, at the other end, folk-
psychological emotions. We normally talk in two ways of emotions – as episodes 
and as dispositions.3 I will refer to both emotional episodes and emotional 
                                                                                                                                                
between properties has some underlying explanation that makes it projectable. This is consistent 
with the observation that people do not simply note the existence of clusters of properties. They 
assume that underlying causes produce and explain why properties cluster together. Realist 
philosophers in the Putnam-Kripke tradition may accept this view. Certain concepts are 
projectable because the categories or kinds they refer to are held together by real essences, or so 
the best theory available suggests. Paul Griffiths (GRIFFITHS 1997) applies the empiricist view to 
emotions and describe a subclass of emotion concepts (i.e. basic emotions) as a category with 
causal homeostasis.    
3 The view that emotions are episodes is defended by authors like William James (JAMES 1880, 
1884) and, more recently, Jesse Prinz (PRINZ 2003, 2004a, 2004b). The view that emotions are 
dispositions is defended by Richard Wollheim (WOLLHEIM 1984, 1999, 2003). A further 
distinction between dispositional and standing emotions is discussed by Karen Jones, who 
observes: “It is easy to confuse a standing emotion with a dispositional emotion; nevertheless 
they are not the same thing. This can be seen by considering the difference between two ways of 
grieving for one’s dead child. One father is disposed to grieve for his dead child. Certain 
memories or places call to mind his loss and reawaken his sorrow, but outside these occasions 
his loss does not color his life. Another father, in contrast, has a standing emotion of grief at the 
death of his child. His loss colors his life, leading him to seek out occasions that will call his loss 
vividly to mind, leading him to interpret situations as instantiating loss, and making him 
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dispositions as folk-psychological emotions. Episodes are experiences like a 
sensation of rage, a feeling of fear, or a sensation of disgust. Dispositions are 
enduring non-episodic emotions. One may love or hate a person or a place for 
one’s whole life. One may respect or detest, be envious or jealous of a person for 
years. One may be ashamed or guilty of one’s misconduct for decades. One may 
regret one’s choices for years. Fear of flying may last a lifetime. 
There are two different views on how episodes and dispositions are 
related. Both views assume that one notion can be explained in terms of the 
other. The difference lies in which notion is viewed as more basic. On one view, 
dispositional emotions are explained in terms of recurrent emotional episodes.4 
Fear of flying, for example, is explained as a recurrent feeling of fear that a 
person happens to experience every now and then. On the other view, 
emotional episodes are explained in terms of emotional dispositions which 
manifest themselves in experiential episodes such as feelings and sensations, 
and short-term-behavioural episodes such as smiles of joy and scowls of anger.5 
Emotional dispositions also manifest themselves in long-term behaviour. 
Because of her fear of flying, a person may make choices that have enduring 
consequences for her life. She may decide not to travel abroad and turn down 
job offers that would require her to fly. On the second view, this behaviour is 
not a mere periodical manifestation of the person’s emotion. It expresses her 
concern about flying. Similarly, a dispositional state of anger towards a 
                                                                                                                                                
receptive to feelings of bereavement. If we suppose that this second father merely has a 
disposition to grieve for his dead child we will miss the way in which the more overt incidents 
of grief are held together and made part of the same ongoing psychological phenomenon. 
Occurrent emotions can have long duration without thereby fading into the merely 
dispositional.” (JONES 2004, quoted from manuscript).  
4 See JAMES 1884. 
5 See WOLLHEIM 1999 and HACKER 2006.  
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particular person is not a mere disposition to episodic outbursts of anger and 
feelings of rage, but persistent hostility resting on the subject’s reasons for her 
anger. The view that emotions are dispositions is more plausible. It is, in other 
words, more plausible to explain episodes in terms of underlying dispositions. 
If emotions are a natural kind, there must be a scientific theory which 
says what folk-psychological emotions are and which accounts for all instances 
of them. I will show that psychological theories, though, only account for 
emotional episodes.6 Psychological theories generally start with functional 
definitions of a given mental state. The function of a state is defined as the 
causal role the state plays in mapping inputs onto outputs. Some psychological 
theories then seek to establish the extension of the state by determining which 
brain mechanism or structure uniquely realises the functional role of the state.7 
On this view, a psychological theory of emotions will try to identify the brain 
states that uniquely realise the functional role of emotions. A functional 
description will say that emotions are the sort of states that tend to be caused by 
bodily changes and to cause emotional behaviour. A theory of emotions will 
then try to determine which brain mechanism underpins the production of the 
changes. 
It is worth noting, though, that the functional description above is true of 
emotions only if we assume that when we talk about emotions we refer to 
emotional episodes and nothing else. The same description is not true if we use 
emotion terms to refer both to emotional episodes and to emotions, as we do in 
                                                 
6 Peter M.S. Hacker observes: “Neuroscientific work, influenced by the misconceived Jamesian 
theory of the emotions, has screened out the attitudinal, as well as the motivational, cogitative 
and fantasy aspects of the emotions.” (HACKER 2006: 10). 
7 Of course, this is not true of every psychological theory but only of those that seek to determine 
the neurophysiological bases of psychological phenomena.  
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ordinary emotion talk. On the latter view, when a psychological theory defines 
the nature of emotions, it defines solely emotional episodes; it does not define 
folk-psychological emotions. This suggests that there is no single psychological 
theory solely capable of accounting for the variety of phenomena we refer to by 
emotion terms. I will show that the natural conclusion of this argument is that 
folk-psychological emotions do not form a natural kind. 
This is far from showing that the intuition that emotions are all states of 
the same kind is mistaken. There are other notions of kind beside that of natural 
kind. Philosophers speak of normative kinds,8 human kinds, relevant kinds, and 
social kinds.9 I will argue that emotions are social kinds. Such kinds do not 
identify distinctions in nature. They are arbitrary notions that enable people of 
the same group or community to understand one another. A social kind is, 
therefore, a notion with some explanatory significance. This is born out by the 
fact that having a certain emotion rather than another has consequences for 
one’s behaviour. For example, the fact that someone is happy is likely to 
produce kinds of behaviour that differ from those we would observe if the 
person were sad or angry. When we talk about emotions, we refer to states that 
form a social kind because, although they do not identify any distinction in 
nature, they have some explanatory significance within a certain group or 
community. 
I will structure the discussion in this chapter as follows. First, I will 
discuss how we should conceive of natural kinds. This will allow me to show 
that emotions are not a natural kind because they do not meet the requirements 
that should be set for something to be a natural kind. Second, I will show that 
                                                 
8 GRIFFITHS 2004b. 
9 HACKING 1990. 
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emotions form a social kind. On this basis, I will show that the intuition that 
emotions are states of the same kind is correct.  
 
2. The Semantics of Natural Kind Terms  
 
Natural kinds are phenomena, substances, and individuals that exist in nature. 
Some examples of substances and phenomena that are natural kinds are water, 
gold, chlorine, light, and heat. Individuals that are natural kinds are tigers, dogs, 
cats, eagles, and human beings. Natural kinds are kinds of entities we are 
acquainted with in ordinary life. This state of acquaintance is essentially 
perceptual and involves information from the senses. We see, touch, and taste 
water. We see and touch, but do not taste gold. We smell chlorine. It is through 
information from the senses that we learn how to identify typical instances of 
natural kinds in the environment. 
This is not the whole story about natural kinds though. It is part of our 
ordinary knowledge about (say) water that there are substances that look like 
water, although they are not actually water. On the other hand, specific 
instances of water may not be typical of the kind. For example, water may come 
in a gaseous form. To work out what is and what is not water, we need to know 
something more about water. We need more specific criteria than the ones 
learned through ordinary interactions with typical instances of water. It is at this 
stage that empirical science comes into play. In order to distinguish water from 
what looks like water we need to know what water is. This is something we can 
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determine only through an empirical investigation of water. Not everybody can 
carry out such an investigation; only experts like chemists can.10 
There are, then, two independent bodies of information about the 
substance we call water. On the one hand, there is what we learn through 
interaction with typical instances of water. On the other, there is what scientists 
discover about the nature of water. It is perfectly possible that ordinary people 
ignore what scientists know about the nature of a certain substance. This 
division of knowledge bears on the accuracy of our talk about natural kinds. We 
may refer to a certain substance as water because it looks like water, although it 
is not actually water. It follows from this that our judgments about the 
substance will be false. Scientists are in a position to correct our judgments and 
say of which substances they are true. They can tell when a substance is actually 
water and when it is not. 
The fact that there are two distinct bodies of knowledge about natural 
kinds bears on the semantics of natural kind terms. Some philosophers have 
described this phenomenon by saying that the semantics of natural kind terms 
involves division of the semantic labour. This is to say that there is a difference 
between what ordinary people know about the reference of natural kind terms 
and what experts know about the nature of the substances and individuals these 
terms designate. Knowledge of the reference is acquired through interaction 
with typical instances of a substance. This provides perceptual information 
about what a certain substance typically looks like. This is knowledge of the 
superficial properties of the substance. Consider water. We all know that ‘water’ 
refers to a substance that is transparent, liquid, tasteless, and so on. These are 
                                                 
10 PUTNAM 1973, 1975. 
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properties we experience in our day-to-day interaction with typical instances of 
water. A typical instance of water is a sample of water that possesses all or most 
of the properties that we associate with water. The sort of stuff we find in lakes, 
rivers, oceans is a typical instance of water. 
Knowledge of the extension, in contrast, is acquired through empirical 
research and leads to knowledge of the identifying properties of a substance. 
These properties derive from knowledge of what a given substance is. Water is a 
specific compound of hydrogen and oxygen. This allows us to identify any 
instance of water, including the most unusual ones. Moreover, it allows us to 
explain any property of water from the most evident one, like the fact that water 
is transparent, to the least evident one, like the fact that water conducts 
electricity. Ordinary descriptions of water as the liquid, transparent stuff we 
find in lakes and rivers cannot account for these properties. This is because this 
description does not say what water is, but merely how water normally appears 
to us. It is the experts’ job to come up with an actual definition. As Putnam puts 
it: 
 
The extension of our terms depends upon the actual nature of the 
particular things that serve as paradigms, and this actual nature is not, in 
general, fully known to the speaker. Traditional semantic theory leaves 
out two contributions to the determination of reference – the contribution 
of society and the contribution of the real world; a better semantic theory 
must encompass both.11 
 
                                                 
11 PUTNAM 1973: 161. 
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It is a characteristic of natural kind terms like ‘water’ that people may correctly 
use them without knowing anything about the actual nature of water. Similarly, 
it is possible for experts to determine the nature of water without knowing the 
superficial properties of typical instances of water. This means that knowledge 
of the extension is independent from knowledge of how the reference is fixed. 
At this stage, one may wonder how people can ever refer correctly to instances 
of water without knowing what water is. In reply to such concern, one may 
argue that ordinary people and experts are members of the same linguistic 
community. This means that they can easily interact and people can defer to 
experts when their knowledge of the superficial properties does not suffice to 
determine whether a certain substance is water or not. 
To sum up: a term designates a natural kind when it meets two 
conditions. First, there is a way of fixing the reference. Second, there is a way of 
determining the nature of the referent, which is independent of how the 
reference is fixed. Knowledge of the extension is different from knowledge of 
how the reference is fixed. It concerns the identifying properties of a substance 
or individual, while knowledge of how the reference is fixed concerns the 
superficial properties. The latter kind of knowledge is obtained through 
acquaintance with typical instances of a substance, while the former kind of 
knowledge is obtained through empirical research.  
 
3. The Reference of Emotion Terms 
 
In the previous section, I have shown what the conditions are for a term to 
designate a natural kind. I will now apply these conditions to emotion terms. In 
the attempt at determining whether emotions are a natural kind, one needs to 
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do two things. First, one needs to describe how we fix the reference of emotion 
terms. Second, one needs to show that there is a way of determining the 
extension of emotion terms, which is independent of how we fix the reference. 
The first task involves describing the superficial properties of emotions. These 
are features of emotions we learn through acquaintance with typical instances of 
emotions in ourselves and other people. So, in order to describe how we fix the 
reference of emotion terms, we need to work out what superficial properties we 
use to refer to our own and other people’s emotions. 
The second task involves a totally different procedure. I have shown that 
in the case of terms that designate substances and individuals the extension is 
determined through an empirical theory of what a given substance or individual 
is. It is obvious that emotions are not types of substances or individuals. They 
are mental states. It follows from this that the task of determining the extension 
of emotion terms requires a psychological theory of emotions. This theory will 
have to say which brain mechanisms or structures produce emotions. I will go 
on to describe what form such a theory should have below. But first I will 
discuss how we fix the reference of emotion terms. 
There are, at least, two ways of accounting for how we fix the reference of 
emotion terms. One is offered in an argument by David Lewis.12 The argument 
is a general account of how we define the meaning and reference of mental 
terms. It says that the meaning of mental terms is implicitly defined by the 
causal role they play in ordinary psychological explanations. The other way of 
describing how we fix the reference is tailored on the model of natural kind 
terms. It says that we fix the reference of emotion terms by means of superficial 
                                                 
12 LEWIS 1972. See also LEWIS 1966, 1970. 
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properties of emotions. The latter view has the advantage of accounting for the 
role of subjective experience in fixing the reference of emotion terms. 
Lewis’ argument is based on the idea that our mental terms form the 
conceptual repertoire of a theory we use to understand one another. This theory 
is commonly called folk-psychology or common-sense psychology. Lewis thinks 
that, in general, theories implicitly define the terms they introduce. In light of 
this, Lewis says that folk-psychology implicitly defines mental terms. The 
meaning and reference of these terms is defined by the role they play in 
ordinary psychological explanations. Emotion terms are a subclass of mental 
terms. Therefore, their meaning and reference is implicitly defined by the role 
they play in folk-psychological explanations. 
To support his argument, Lewis presents an example of common-sense 
theory. The theory introduces terms the meaning of which is implicitly defined 
by the role they play in the explanation of a certain phenomenon. The theory in 
question is a story in which a detective gives his account of a crime. The 
detective’s story goes like this:  
 
X, Y, and Z conspired to murder Mr. Body. Seventeen years ago, in the 
gold fields of Uganda, X was Body’s partner…Last week, Y and Z 
conferred in a bar in Reading…Tuesday night at 11:17, Y went to the attic 
and set a time bomb…Seventeen minutes later, X met Z in the billiard 
room and gave him the lead pipe…Just when the bomb went off in the 
attic, X fired three shots into the study through the French windows.13  
 
                                                 
13 LEWIS 1972: 250. 
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The story contains three names ‘X,’ ‘Y,’ and ‘Z,’ for three persons. The detective 
does not know the identity of the three persons, but he thinks he knows the role 
each person had in the crime. The names work like theoretical terms of a theory. 
They are introduced by the story, and their meanings and references are defined 
by the role the three persons, the referents of the names, play in the story. In 
other words, the names are introduced by functional definitions which define 
the occupants of three roles in the story. This provides a way of fixing the 
reference of the names by means of properties of the referents. For example, 
knowing that Y set the bomb gives us a way of identifying one of the three 
conspirators. We learn the meaning and reference of the three names by 
listening to the detective’s story and by understanding the terms by which the 
story is told. 
We understood these terms before the story was presented. The way in 
which we implicitly define the meaning and reference of the names depends on 
three conditions: (i) the causal relations that the names have with each other; (ii) 
the causal relation that they have with the terms we understood prior to the 
story; and (iii) the functional role the named entities play in the explanation of 
the story. 
Suppose that, later, we discover the story is true of three people, Plum, 
Peacocke, and Mustard. This allows us to replace the original theoretical terms 
‘X,’ ‘Y,’ and ‘Z’ with the names of the three people of whom the story is true. 
This means that we can identify the three persons in the detective’s story with 
three real persons. In other words, we can identify the theoretical entities of the 
theory with entities in the world. In this way we come to know exactly who 
committed the crime and what role each person had in the murder. In Lewis’ 
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words, Plum, Peacocke, and Mustard realise the theory devised by the detective. 
Given that they are the only people of which the story is true, they uniquely 
realise the theory. Lewis believes that the same transition occurs when we 
identify terms of one theory with terms of another theory – we discover that the 
terms refer to the same entities. I will come back to this below. 
So, under this account, the meaning and reference of theoretical terms is 
implicitly defined by the role they play in ordinary folk-psychological 
explanations. Since mental terms form the conceptual apparatus of folk-
psychology, their meaning and reference is implicitly defined by the role they 
play in the explanations. The same argument applies to emotion terms, which 
form a subclass of mental terms. This is to say that the meaning and reference of 
emotion terms is implicitly defined by the role they play in the ordinary folk-
psychological explanations. Consider the following explanation. We say that 
someone fled because she feared the dog. The explanation accounts for the 
person’s behaviour by introducing the term ‘fear,’ which refers to a specific kind 
of state. The state is caused by the bodily changes that perception of the dog 
produces. In turn, the state causes the person to flee. ‘Fear’ refers to the state 
caused by the changes that a dangerous stimulus has produced in the body, and 
which has caused fear behaviour. 
This account defines the meaning and reference of the emotion term only 
by drawing on the relation between the input, i.e. the bodily change, and the 
output, the action of fleeing the dog. The definition says nothing about the state 
of fear per se. In particular, it says nothing about how fear feels when one 
experiences it and the role the feeling may play in the explanation. To see why 
this omission is problematic, one should think of stage fright. An actor may turn 
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down job offers because he knows that his stage fright is so overwhelming that 
it would affect his performance. The actor makes some choices because he is 
aware of how powerful the feeling is that his stage fright can bring about. For 
the actor, the reference of ‘stage fright’ is partly fixed by the feeling he 
experiences on stage. This example suggests that an adequate account of the 
meaning and reference of emotion terms may need to account for the subjective 
character of experiencing an emotion. This is consistent with the fact that we 
normally talk of emotions as states that produce characteristic feelings. Lewis’ 
procedure accounts for the reference of emotion only on the basis of behaviour, 
while it does not say anything about the subjective experience of an emotion. To 
get around this difficulty, one may argue that feelings play an important role in 
determining the reference of emotion terms because they may explain how we 
refer to emotions in the first-person case. This introduces the second option for 
describing how we fix the reference of emotion terms. 
As I have outlined, we fix the reference of natural kind terms by means of 
superficial properties of typical instances of substances and individuals. How 
might we apply this technique of reference fixation in the case of emotions? 
Well, emotions are kinds of states that produce characteristic feelings and 
behaviour in response to characteristic stimuli. One may argue that feelings and 
behaviour are superficial properties of emotions, that is, properties we observe 
when we experience our own and other people’s emotions. In the first-person 
case, I experience my emotions through characteristic feelings. In the third-
person case, I experience other people’s emotions when I observe instances of 
characteristic behaviour. It is through these properties that we fix the reference 
of emotion terms. Like any superficial properties, they do not warrant that the 
 29 
reference is correct. The superficial properties of water do not warrant that 
every time we are acquainted with something liquid and transparent and we 
call it ‘water,’ we refer to the right kind of substance. There are substances that 
look like water, although they are not water. In other cases, genuine instances of 
water may lack some or all the superficial properties of water. 
The same consideration applies to emotions. The superficial properties of 
emotions do not warrant that, when we refer to emotions, we succeed in picking 
out states of the right kind. Other mental states may have superficial properties 
similar to emotions. For example, a feeling of deep sadness may feel like a 
general state of pain – a state that is not an emotion at all. Or genuine but 
different emotions may produce feelings that feel alike. For example, some 
episode of anger may feel like sadness. In some cases, the same pattern of 
behaviour may be produced by different emotions or other mental states. 
Crying, for example, may be caused by sadness, happiness, or deep pain. This 
shows that, like any superficial properties, the superficial properties of emotions 
do not warrant that we pick out states of the right kind of state. 
What I have so far observed shows that there are, at least, two ways of 
describing how we fix the reference of emotion terms. On one, the reference is 
implicitly defined by the causal role emotion terms play in ordinary 
psychological explanations. On the other, the reference is fixed by means of 
superficial properties of typical instances of emotions. A term designates a 
natural kind when it meets two conditions. First, there must a way of describing 
how we fix the reference. Second, there must a way of determining the 
extension, which is independent of how we fix the reference. So far, it is clear 
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that there is a way of fixing the reference of emotion terms. The next step is to 
determine whether emotion terms meet the second requirement.  
 
4. The Extension of Emotion Terms 
 
The extension of emotion terms is determined by a psychological theory that 
accounts for all instances of emotions. What form would such theory have? An 
answer to this question comes from Lewis’ argument which we have already 
discussed. His account of the meaning and reference of theoretical terms sets the 
standard for identifying terms of a domain with terms of another domain. The 
detective’s story is an example of identity between entities of a theory and 
entities in the world. The three names ‘X,’ ‘Y,’ and ‘Z’ are theoretical terms that 
name theoretical entities which play specific roles in the detective’s story. When 
we discover that Plum, Peacocke, and Mustard are the people who actually 
realise the theory, we are in a position to identify the theoretical entities 
designated by the three theoretical terms ‘X,’ ‘Y,’ and ‘Z’ with three entities in 
the world. These are three real people that played the exact role the theory 
assigns to the theoretical entities X, Y, and Z. It is at this point that we can say 
that Plum, Peacocke, and Mustard committed the crime. Lewis observes: 
 
[W]hen we learn what sort of states occupy those causal roles definitive 
of mental states we will learn what states the mental states are – exactly 
as we found out who X was when found out that Plum was the man who 
occupied a certain role, and exactly as we found out what light was when 
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we found out that electromagnetic radiation was the phenomenon that 
occupied a certain role.14 
 
This explanation describes what form a psychological theory of emotions should 
have. Such theory must identify which brain mechanisms or structures occupy 
the causal role that folk-psychological emotions play in ordinary psychological 
explanations. In order for the identity to be valid, only one brain mechanism or 
structure can realise the causal role that defines a given emotion. This is to say 
that the same brain mechanism or structure must realise all the explanations in 
which a given emotion term features. Consider the case of fear. The term 
features in many ordinary psychological explanations. We may say that 
someone flees the dog because she is afraid of it. Or we may say that she flees 
because she feels afraid of the animal. These are different instances of fear: one is 
dispositional, the other episodic. We know what fear is when we know what 
brain mechanism or structure occupies the causal role the term ‘fear’ occupies in 
these and other explanations. I have early flagged the claim that psychological 
theories may not be up to the task. This is because there is reason to believe that 
psychological theories of emotions only focus on emotional episodes. Therefore, 
psychological theories fail to account for folk-psychological emotions. To 
support this claim, I will consider two examples. 
To my knowledge there are two theories that explicitly define the nature 
of emotional episodes. One is William James’ theory of emotions.15 It claims that 
emotions are perceptions of specific changes in the body. These perceptions are 
what we commonly call feelings. The other theory is from the neurologist 
                                                 
14 LEWIS 1972: 258. 
15 JAMES 1884. 
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Antonio Damasio.16 On Damasio’s account, emotions are collections of changes 
in the body. The theory distinguishes the emotions themselves (i.e. the changes) 
from the experience of the changes (i.e. the feelings). 
Let us examine James’ theory first. It is both a psychological and 
philosophical theory of the emotions. It is a psychological theory because it 
provides an explanation of which physical states are involved in the production 
of emotions. On the philosophical side, it aims to clarify the role of emotions in 
ordinary psychological explanations. I will focus on the psychological theory. 
The fundamental claim is that there is an important difference between folk-
psychological explanations of emotional behaviour and a scientific explanation 
of the same phenomenon, and that the difference is in the causal order of events. 
Folk-psychological explanations say that someone behaves in a certain way 
because she has a certain emotion. James thinks that, in a scientific explanation, 
the order must be reversed. He writes:  
 
Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a 
bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and 
strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of 
sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately 
induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be 
interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel 
sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we 
                                                 
16 DAMASIO 1994. 
 33 
tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, 
angry, or fearful, as the case may be.17 
 
James’ is an example of a functionalist theory. He believes that the body 
undergoes changes in response to external stimuli. Emotions are perceptions of 
these changes. So, for example, when someone sees a dangerous dog, the visual 
experience causes a specific pattern of change in the body that the person then 
perceives in the form of a feeling of fear. Fear, according to James, is perception 
of a specific pattern of change. If the change occurred without being perceived, 
the person would not feel afraid. 
One may wonder whether undergoing a change without perceiving it 
qualifies as being afraid – namely as having an emotional disposition – instead 
of feeling afraid – namely as experiencing an emotional episode. James’ answer 
is that emotion is the feeling of a bodily change. Therefore, one cannot have an 
emotion without feeling it. On this account, emotions are perceptions of specific 
patterns of changes that arise as responses to perceptions of certain objects or 
situations. A similar theory has been defended, in more recent years, by Jesse 
Prinz, who argues that emotions are perceptions of specific bodily changes that 
evolution has selected to track external conditions.18 
The main problem with James’ theory is that it does not do justice to the 
fact that we use emotion terms to refer to emotional dispositions. Hence, the 
claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body does not account for 
all instances of folk-psychological emotions. This conclusion is open to two 
interpretations. On one, the theory shows that the kind of state we refer to when 
                                                 
17 JAMES 1884: 190.  
18 PRINZ 2004b. For more on Prinz’s theory, see Chapter II.  
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we say that someone has an emotion differs from the kind of state we refer to 
when we say that she feels an emotion. James’ theory will account only for the 
latter kind of state. In this respect James’ is a theory of emotional episodes, 
instead of a theory of emotions. On the other interpretation, when we say that 
someone has an emotion, we mean that she has an emotional episode. This 
interpretation denies that there are emotional dispositions because emotions are 
perceptions of episodic events in the body. The former reading would allow one 
to rescue James’ theory and say that it accounts only for emotional episodes. 
This conciliatory reading, however, does not do justice to the fact that James 
wants his theory to define the nature of emotions. James’ theory sits more 
comfortably with the latter reading. This means that the theory simply fails to 
account for emotional dispositions. And, since emotional dispositions are 
integral to folk-psychological emotions, it follows that James’ is not a theory of 
folk-psychological emotions at all. 
In more recent years, Damasio has revived James’ theory and tried to 
give an alternative account of the nature of emotions. James identifies emotions 
with perceptions of bodily changes. But, for Damasio, emotions are the changes 
themselves: 
 
I see the essence of emotion as the collection of changes in body state that 
are induced in myriad organs by nerve cell terminals, under the control 
of a dedicated brain system, which is responding to the content of 
thoughts relative to a particular entity or event. Many of the changes in 
the body – those in skin color, body posture, and facial expression, for 
instance – are actually perceptible to an external observer…Other 
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changes in body state are perceptible only to the owner of the body in 
which they take place.19  
 
Damasio’s account has the advantage of allowing that emotions can occur in the 
absence of bodily changes when brain centres typically associated with bodily 
changes are active. The brain can enter the kind of state it would enter if bodily 
changes occurred, even when the changes do not actually occur. Damasio calls 
the pathway that leads to the activation of the brain centres in absence of bodily 
changes the ‘as-if loop.’ When this pathway is used, the brain functions as if the 
body had been perturbed by the bodily changes that normally accompany 
emotions. While this view may, prima facie, seem to allow one to account for 
emotional dispositions, in fact this theory is still committed to an episodic 
conception of emotions, which derives directly from James’ theory. This 
becomes apparent in the fact that Damasio explains emotional dispositions as 
resulting from episodic states of the brain, while James explains them as 
resulting from episodic states of the body. So Damasio just locates on the neural 
level what James locates at the level of the body. It is difficult to see how this 
could account for emotional dispositions that, by their very nature, are not 
episodic states. Once again, there seems to be no overlap between folk-
psychological emotions and the kinds of emotions in which psychology and 
neuroscience are interested. 
One may object that when we talk about emotional dispositions we do 
not really talk about emotions; we talk about other kinds of states that we 
mistakenly call emotions. These states are not explained by any fact about the 
                                                 
19 DAMASIO 1994: 139. 
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kinds of emotions empirical science investigates. As a consequence, the belief 
that these dispositional states are emotions is mistaken. On this view, emotions 
are emotional episodes and nothing else. For the sake of argument, I will grant 
this claim and see whether there is evidence that shows that emotional episodes 
are a natural kind. What sort of evidence would we need? It would be evidence 
showing that different emotional episodes are produced by the same brain 
mechanism or structure. For example, it would show that episodes of sadness 
are produced by the same brain mechanism that produces episodes of 
happiness, fear, envy, pride, and so on. This would prove that emotional 
episodes are instances of the same kind of neural state. But evidence from 
neuroscience in fact shows that this is not the case: different emotional episodes 
are not produced by the same brain mechanisms. They are produced by 
different mechanisms. To illustrate, I will review two bodies of evidence. One 
comes from Damasio’s work on the production of different kinds of emotional 
responses. The other is evidence from research on the activation of different 
brain areas in the production of emotional responses. Pet and fMRI data show 
that different areas are involved in such responses. 
Damasio divides emotions into primary and secondary sets. Primary 
emotions include happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and disgust.20 These are also 
known as basic emotions.21 Damasio thinks that primary emotions are those we 
experience early in life and for which there is some sort of preorganised 
mechanism. Secondary emotions are those we experience as adults, whose 
scaffolding has been built on the primary emotions. Secondary emotions include 
                                                 
20 DAMASIO 1994: 149.  
21 Affect program theorists include surprise among the basic emotions.  
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jealousy and envy.22 It is plausible to suppose that these emotions roughly 
correspond to the higher emotions. 
For Damasio, primary emotions are intimately linked with biological 
regulation and survival. We share them with many species of animals. The 
subcortical mechanisms of primary emotions are not only important for basic 
biological regulation (e.g. maintaining homeostatic equilibrium), they also help 
classify features in the external environment as positive or negative. According 
to Damasio, each type of emotion is realised by mechanisms that involve 
different brain areas. Specifically, the limbic system handles primary emotions; 
and a larger mechanism involving the prefrontal and somatosensory systems 
deals with secondary emotions. Unfortunately, Damasio does not provide 
examples of how the two systems produce different types of emotions. He only 
describes how the first mechanism may produce one specific primary emotion: 
fear. According to Damasio:   
 
One possibility…is that we are wired to respond with an emotion, in 
preorganized fashion, when certain features of stimuli in the world or in 
our bodies are perceived, alone or in combination. Example of such 
features include size (as in large animals); large span (as in flying eagles); 
type of motion (as in reptiles); certain sounds (such as growling); certain 
configurations of body state (as in pain felt during a heart attack). Such 
features, individually or conjunctively, would be processed and then 
detected by a component of the brain’s limbic system, say, the amygdala. 
                                                 
22 Damasio observes that James’ theory works well for those emotions we experience early in life 
– i.e. the primary emotions – but it does not do justice to “what Othello goes through in his mind 
before he develops jealousy and anger, or to what Hamlet broods about before exciting his body 
into what he will perceive as disgust.” (DAMASIO 1994: 130). 
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Its neuron nuclei possess a dispositional representation which triggers 
the enactment of a body state of the emotion fear…All that is required is 
that early sensory cortices detect and categorize the key feature or 
features of a given entity (e.g., animal, object), and that structures such as 
the amygdala receive signals concerning their conjunctive presence.23 
   
Damasio supposes that the primary emotions are produced by a mechanism 
that involves the limbic system and the anterior cingulate cortex. Evidence that 
the amygdala plays an important role in the production of primary emotions 
comes from observations in animals and humans. The first hint that the 
amygdala and emotions might be related was found as early as the 1930s in 
subjects who underwent surgical resection of the part of the temporal lobe 
containing the amygdala.24 The surgery produced affective indifference. 
Evidence on the relation between the anterior cingulate and emotions comes 
from the study of people with lesions in and around the anterior cingulate 
cortex. Damasio describes one case he directly observed. The patient, Mrs T., 
suffered from a stroke that produced extensive damage to the dorsal and medial 
regions of the frontal lobe in both hemispheres. After the stroke, Mrs T. became 
motionless and speechless. When asked about her condition, she usually would 
remain silent. There was no way of knowing whether she could not remember 
what happened to her or whether she had recollection but was unwilling to talk 
about it. Months later, as she gradually emerged from her state, she began to 
answer questions about her condition. Damasio remarks that Mrs T. never 
showed worry, fear, or concern for her condition or for anything else for that 
                                                 
23 DAMASIO 1994: 131-2. 
24 DAMASIO 1994: 134. 
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matter. He speculates that the lack of emotional response to her condition was 
due to the fact that the stroke had damaged an area involved in the production 
of emotional responses. On the basis of this and other pieces of evidence, 
Damasio builds his hypothesis that a mechanism involving the limbic system 
and the anterior cingulate cortex underpins primary emotions. 
Damasio thinks that a different mechanism must be involved in the 
production of secondary emotions. He observes that: 
 
[T]he mechanism of primary emotions does not describe the full range of 
emotional behaviors. They are, to be sure, the basic mechanism. 
However, I believe that in terms of an individual's development they are 
followed by mechanisms of secondary emotions, which occur once we 
begin to experience feelings and forming systematic connections between 
categories of objects and situations, on the one hand, and primary emotions, on 
the other. Structures in the limbic system are not sufficient to support the 
process of secondary emotions. The network must be broadened, and it 
requires the agency of prefrontal and of somatosensory cortices.25  
 
A crucial feature of Damasio's overall hypothesis is that secondary emotions 
depend on, and are built from, the mechanisms of primary emotion. In other 
words, “secondary emotions utilize the machinery of primary emotions.”26 He 
writes:  
 
                                                 
25 DAMASIO 1994: 134. 
26 DAMASIO 1994: 137. 
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Nature, with its tinkerish knack for economy, did not select independent 
mechanisms for expressing primary and secondary emotions. It simply 
allowed secondary emotions to be expressed by the same channel already 
prepared to convey primary emotions.27  
 
Secondary emotions are, then, produced by a mechanism that shares some 
elements with the mechanism that produces primary emotions. This is, 
however, far from showing that the two types of emotions are realised by the 
same mechanisms. No matter how small the differences are, the two 
mechanisms are different. In particular, the one for secondary emotions is built 
on that for primary ones but it also requires the activity of other brain areas such 
as the prefrontal and somatosensory cortices. This shows that, even if we were 
willing to say that emotions are episodic states, evidence shows that different 
emotional episodes are produced by, at least, two different brain mechanisms. 
One mechanism produces primary emotions, while the other produces 
secondary emotions. 
One may draw two conclusions from Damasio’s theory. The first is that 
there is evidence suggesting that episodes of primary emotions correlate with a 
mechanism involving the limbic system. The same mechanism does not suffice 
to produce experiences of secondary emotions. Although evidence is not 
conclusive, Damasio shows that two different mechanisms underpin the 
production of different emotional experiences. Moreover, the mechanism for 
primary emotions seems more specific and easier to locate. The mechanism for 
secondary emotions, by contrast, seems more complex and difficult to locate. On 
                                                 
27 DAMASIO 1994: 139. 
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this basis, one may conclude that only episodes of primary emotions form a 
natural kind. 
Paul Griffiths draws a similar conclusion on a different evidential basis.28 
He draws on the work of the psychologist Paul Ekman who identifies six 
emotions – affect programs, in his words – that are universally shared among 
humans.29 They are complex, coordinated, and automated responses to 
environmental situation relevant for an organism. They involve: (a) facial 
expressions, (b) musculoskeletal changes, (c) vocal changes, (d) endocrine 
changes, and (e) autonomic system changes. There is evidence that all the basic 
emotions (the primary emotions in Damasio’s terminology) have these five 
features. Damasio’s work seems to support Griffiths’ conclusion. It is worth 
noting that both Damasio’s and Ekman’s theories are committed to an episodic 
conception of emotions. This means that what they call emotions does not have 
the same extensions as folk-psychological emotions. Therefore, the two theories 
do not show that folk-psychological emotions are a natural kind. They show the 
more limited point that episodes of primary emotions are underpinned by the 
same brain mechanism and that these primary emotions, therefore, may qualify 
as a natural kind. 
The second conclusion that we may draw from Damasio’s work concerns 
the whole class of emotions – primary and secondary in Damasio’s terminology, 
basic and higher emotions in the terminology of Ekman’s affect program theory. 
Damasio’s account shows that, even supposing we were willing to accept that 
emotions are episodic states and nothing else, there is no single brain 
mechanism or structure that uniquely realises episodes of primary and 
                                                 
28 GRIFFITHS 1997: 77-99. 
29 EKMAN et al. 1983. 
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secondary emotions. Primary emotions are mainly produced by activation of the 
amygdala, while secondary emotions involve more complex structure such as 
the prefrontal and somatosensory cortices. It follows from this that episodes of 
primary and secondary emotions do not share the same nature. Therefore, they 
are not a natural kind. 
The same conclusion is supported by PET and fMRI research on the brain 
areas involved in the production of different emotions. There is a convergence 
in lesion and neuroimaging data in the identification of the structures 
underlying positive and negative emotion in the human brain. These studies, 
which have examined episodes of happiness, sadness, fear, anger, anxiety, and 
disgust, typically report increased activation in limbic and paralimbic regions of 
the brain, especially during negative emotional states. These findings are 
consistent with the notion that limbic and paralimbic regions of the brain 
mediate emotional states and the processing of information with affective 
significance. 
Evidence supports the claim that the prefrontal cortex is involved in the 
production of negative emotions such as depression.30 Early studies that 
evaluated mood subsequent to brain damage suggested that patients with 
damage to the left hemisphere, particularly in the prefrontal cortex, were more 
likely to develop depressive symptoms. A common method for the experimental 
production of negative emotion has been to use anxiety-disordered patients 
exposed to stimuli that provoke anxiety like pictures of spiders for spider 
phobics. A study has found that two regions within the prefrontal cortex were 
                                                 
30 DAVIDSON and IRWIN 1999. 
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strongly activated during the experimental provocation of anxiety.31 This 
suggests that the prefrontal cortex is involved in the production of negative 
emotions like anxiety and depression. 
Other imaging studies suggest that the amygdala is involved in the 
production of fear responses. Activation of the amygdala in response to faces 
exhibiting fear has been found with fMRI. Using either pleasant or unpleasant 
pictures or happy and sad faces accompanied by instructions to generate the 
emotion depicted in the faces, researchers found activation in the left amygdala 
during exposure to unpleasant pictures and during generation of a sad mood.32 
Another fMRI study found that, when subjects were presented with pleasant 
and unpleasant pictures, the amygdala was activated only by unpleasant 
pictures.33 The role of the amygdala in fear is confirmed by a study on 
psychopathic subjects.34 Data from the healthy controls confirm that fear 
conditioning involves the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, and 
anterior insula. Psychopathic subjects were significantly different from the 
healthy controls in their activation in all brain regions. The healthy controls 
showed sustained activation of the left amygdala throughout the acquisition of 
fear, whereas psychopathic subjects displayed only right amygdala activation. 
In the direct comparison, the left amygdala of psychopathic subjects was 
significantly less active than that of the healthy controls when acquisition 
occurred. 
Other studies show that the insula and basal ganglia are involved in the 
production of experiences of disgust. Evidence for this claim comes from an 
                                                 
31 RAUCH et al. 1997.  
32 LANE et al. 1997.  
33 IRWIN et al. 1996.   
34 BIRBAUMER et al. 2005. 
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fMRI study of subjects who produced experiences of disgust via recalling 
unpleasant autobiographical memories.35 Researchers observed specific 
activation of the insula, basal ganglia, cingulate cortex, hippocampus, thalamus, 
and primary visual cortex during experience of disgust. It is plausible that the 
activation of some of these areas is due to memory recall. Converging evidence 
on disgust comes from a study on one subject with Huntington’s disease.36 
Some interesting data concern guilt. Guilt is a higher emotion that 
involves the ability of judging that one has done something wrong; it qualifies 
as a secondary emotion in Damasio’s taxonomy. One PET study found that 
episodes of guilt were associated with activity in three paralimbic regions: the 
bilateral anterior temporal poles, the anterior cingulate gyrus, and the left 
anterior insular cortex.37 Activation in anterior insular cortex during episodes of 
guilt is consistent with the theory and data regarding the role this region may 
play in the processing of emotional information. No activation occurred in the 
amygdala or orbitofrontal cortex during episodes of guilt in this study. This 
confirms the hypothesis that the amygdala may be more specifically involved in 
fear and the processing of fear-related stimuli. 
These data, like Damasio’s neuropsychological case studies, suggest that 
different brain mechanisms are involved in the production of different 
emotional episodes. The consequence is that, even if we were willing to 
entertain the idea that emotions are emotional episodes and nothing else, the 
evidence does not support the conclusion that different emotional episodes are 
instances of the same psychological kind. This means that there is not a single 
                                                 
35 FITZGERALD et al. 2004.  
36 CALDER et al. 2000. 
37 SHIN et al. 2000. 
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theory of emotional experience but different theories for different kinds of 
emotional episodes. This confirms that episodes of primary and secondary 
emotions do not form a natural kind. 
To sum up: I have argued that we speak of emotions in two ways – as 
episodes and as dispositions. Psychological theories only account for emotional 
episodes. This is a first reason for thinking that folk-psychological emotions do 
not form a natural kind. I considered the possible objection that one may argue 
that only emotional episodes are actually emotions, while emotional 
dispositions are other kinds of states that we mistakenly call emotions. On this 
view, only emotional episodes are a natural kind. The objection would be 
correct only if there was evidence showing that emotional episodes are all 
instances of the same psychological kind. This would require that they were 
realised by the same brain mechanism or structure. The evidence, however, 
shows the opposite. Different brain areas appear to be involved in the 
production of different emotional episodes. The natural conclusion is that the 
claim that only emotional episodes form a natural kind is false. A more general 
conclusion is that there is no overlap between folk-psychological emotions and 
the kinds of emotions that psychology and neuroscience investigate. The two 
theories are committed to different kinds of entities. And neither is a natural 
kind.  
 
5. Emotions as Social Kinds 
 
The conclusion that emotions are not a natural kind leads to two alternatives. 
On one, we could take an eliminativist position about emotions and say that 
folk-psychological emotions should not be the object of empirical research into 
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the nature of emotions. On the other, we could say that the conclusion that 
emotions are not a natural kind does not entail that they are not a kind of some 
sort. I favour the second alternative, and will argue that they are a social kind. 
Before discussing this claim I will consider the eliminativist option. 
In his book What Emotions Really Are, Paul Griffiths defends an 
eliminativist position about emotions.38 He thinks that emotion terms should be 
eliminated and replaced by more accurate notions. Griffiths’ proposal does not 
aim at reforming our ordinary talk about emotions. It only concerns the domain 
of an empirical science of human emotions. It is in relation to this domain that 
emotion terms should be eliminated. Griffiths bases his proposal on an 
argument about reference. He observes that emotion terms have partial 
reference. A term has partial reference when it refers, at the same time, to two 
different kinds of entities. The term ‘jade’ is the paradigm case of partial 
reference. The term is used as if it were referring to a specific mineral, in the 
same way as ‘diamond’ refers to one – and only one – kind of mineral. 
However, the term ‘jade’ covers two different sorts of minerals: jadeite and 
nephrite. As a consequence, ‘jade’ partially refers to each of these two minerals. 
This means that, for geology or chemistry, the term ‘jade’ does not refer to any 
natural kind. 
According to Griffiths, the same reasoning applies to emotions. The term 
‘fear,’ for example, refers to a wide range of experiences and behaviour, all of 
which are instances of fear. For instance, I may use this term to refer both to a 
state characterised by evident bodily changes such as facial pallor, shaking and 
fast heartbeat and, on the other hand, to long-term behaviour like avoidance, 
                                                 
38 GRIFFITHS 1997, 2004a, 2004b.  
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which does not involve evident changes in the body. The former event is an 
instance of an emotional episode, while the latter is an instance of a 
dispositional emotion. It seems, for Griffiths at least, that there is no similarity 
between the two types of behaviour. From this Griffiths concludes that emotion 
terms have partial reference. They refer to phenomena that have little in 
common apart from our inclination to call them ‘fear.’ This is consistent with the 
claim that folk-psychological emotions do not form a natural kind. Griffiths 
makes a stronger claim though. He maintains that in the same sense that 
geology and chemistry hold that there is no such thing as jade, only jadeite and 
nephrite, for a science of human psychology there is no such a thing as emotion. 
Griffiths’ conclusion is of concern to empirical research into the nature of 
emotions, but not to ordinary emotion talk in which we continue to speak of 
emotions as episodes and as dispositions. The claim that emotions are not a 
natural kind does not entail that they are not a kind at all, because there are 
different notions of kind beside that of natural kind. Philosophers speak of 
normative kinds, human kinds, and social kinds. What kind of kind are 
emotions? I will argue that emotions are a social kind. Social kinds are arbitrary 
distinctions that do not correspond to distinctions in nature. An example is the 
distinction between married man and bachelor. Another example recently 
discussed in social psychology is the distinction between mentally healthy and 
mentally ill people.39 It can be argued that neither of these distinctions 
corresponds to states or properties that exist in nature. They are ways of 
grouping people introduced by convention. In Ian Hacking’s words, they are 
human kinds. Yet, these distinctions play an important role in social and 
                                                 
39 MURPHY and STICH 2000.  
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interpersonal interactions. For example, whether someone is mentally healthy or 
not determines her place in society and how ‘normal’ people relate to her. 
The claim that some folk-psychological concepts can be viewed as a social 
kind has been put forward for the distinction we make between the five senses.40 
Evidence suggests that the five senses do not identify five corresponding 
faculties in the perceptual system. Therefore, the five senses are not natural 
kinds. This does not mean that our practice of distinguishing between five 
senses is mistaken. Philosophers have argued that this practice may be 
explained in terms of convention.41 They point out that if doing something like 
drawing a certain distinction the same way as others do proves useful to each 
member of a community, then we can explain why all community members 
draw the same distinction as the result of a convention. On this account, 
distinguishing five senses is useful insofar as we all make the same distinction. 
The distinction is a convention because it does not identify a distinction in 
nature and it reflects a practice common to all community members. This is in 
line with J.L. Austin’s remark that “our common stock of words embodies all 
the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connections they have 
found worth making, in the lifetimes of many generations.”42 
The same consideration applies to emotions. Our emotion vocabulary has 
remained largely unchanged over the last 2000 years. Only a few notions like 
anxiety and depression have been introduced recently as disciplines like 
psychiatry and psychotherapy have become more accessible to the public. There 
is, of course, reason to believe that the distinction between different kinds of 
                                                 
40 NUDDS 2003, also NUDDS forthcoming . 
41 NUDDS 2003. 
42 AUSTIN 1970: 182. 
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emotions is not as constant as that between the five senses. Additionally, some 
emotion terms that are common in Western societies are not found in non-
Western societies. This phenomenon mostly concerns higher emotions.43 But 
some cultural differences are also found in basic emotions.44 The claim that 
emotions are a social kind does not, however, presuppose that they are found in 
all cultures. The issue at stake is not the universality of emotions, but the reason 
why we group different kinds of states into the category of emotions. A possible 
answer is that, as the five senses, we refer to different kinds of states as emotions 
because this is an implicit convention built into the practice of explaining 
behaviour. We adopt this convention as soon as we start sharing a language 
with other speakers. 
This is not the only explanation available. Social kinds can also be viewed 
as ways of grouping entities according to their function. We call ‘houses’ those 
buildings that have the function of providing shelter. We call ‘cars’ those 
vehicles that have the function of transporting people. We call ‘pets’ those 
animals that have the function of keeping people company. The function of the 
objects explains why we group them in the same category. One may argue that 
we group different kinds of states into the category of emotions because they 
have the same function in folk-psychological explanations. Note that I use the 
                                                 
43 Linguist Anna Wierzbicka has observed that the Polish emotion term ‘tęskić’ has no exact 
equivalent in English. The closest equivalent is the expression ‘to long for.’ But this does not 
capture the exact meaning of the term. One can say in English ‘She longs for peace,’ but one 
cannot express the same thought in Polish using the verb ‘tęskić’; ‘tęskić’ implies distance in 
space, rather like the English word ‘homesick’ does. But ‘tęskić’ is not restricted to separation 
from home. It implies a painful feeling caused by being away (in space) from people or places 
one loves. See WIERZBICKA 1986, 1988. 
44 Linguists have shown that the Ilongot language of the Philippines has no word corresponding 
exactly to the English word anger. The language has another concept, liget, glossed as energy, 
anger, passion, which is not lexicalised in English. See ROSALDO 1980. 
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term ‘function’ here not in the sense of functionalist theories of mind. Rather, by 
‘function’ I mean the contribution that a certain notion makes to the explanation 
of certain phenomena. Emotions are notions we use to explain and understand 
our own and other people’s behaviour. This suggests that they have explanatory 
significance. Emotions allow us to explain behaviour as the result of different 
kinds of mental states. When we say that someone cries because she is sad, we 
explain her behaviour as the result of a specific kind of state. When we say that 
she cries because she is happy, we explain a similar pattern of behaviour as the 
result of a different kind of state. Similar pieces of behaviour can be produced 
by different kinds of emotions and so qualify as different kinds of behaviour. 
Crying in sadness, for example, is a different kind of behaviour from crying in 
happiness. On this account, the function of emotions is to explain behaviour as 




The view so far outlined provides an answer to the question with which I 
opened this chapter – what justifies the intuition that emotions are determinates 
of the same determinable kind? That is, why do we group different kinds of 
states into the category of the emotions? I have considered two possible views. 
On one, emotions are a natural kind. We group them together because they are 
instances of the same psychological kind. This would be a brain mechanism or 
structure that accounts for all instances of emotions. I have shown that this 
answer is unsatisfactory because psychological theories do not account for the 
two kinds of states covered by the folk-psychological notion of emotion – 
emotional dispositions and emotional episodes. Psychological theories only 
 51 
account for emotional episodes. It follows that there is no single theory of 
emotion capable of investigating folk-psychological emotions in their entirety. 
Therefore, folk-psychological emotions are not a natural kind. 
On the other view, the one that I advocate, emotions are a social kind. 
The folk-psychological category of the emotions does not map onto any defined 
scientific category, but we can think of them as mapping instead onto categories 
that have social significance. On this account, we group different kinds of states 
together because of conventions built into our ordinary talk about emotions. 
This convention has the effect that members of the same community explain the 
same phenomena as resulting from the same kinds of states – the emotions. 









In the previous chapter, I showed that we talk of emotions in two ways – as 
episodes and as dispositions. Emotional episodes are feelings and sensations 
like feelings of fear or anger. Emotional dispositions are enduring non-episodic 
states like hating a place, regretting one’s action, or fear of flying. It is plausible 
to think that emotional episodes should be explained in terms of underlying 
emotional dispositions.1 On this account, emotions are dispositional states that 
typically produce emotional episodes such as feelings and behaviour. The 
experiential character, namely the feeling, is probably the most salient feature of 
emotions. This is evident in the fact that we know that we have emotions when 
we feel them. These feelings can be pleasant or unpleasant. When pleasant, we 
enjoy them and want them to last forever; when unpleasant, we dislike them 
and want them to go away. The experiential character is, therefore, the feature 
of emotions that is most likely to capture people’s attention. The experiential 
character of emotions has also drawn the attention of philosophers. The interest 
in the experiential character of emotions has produced a brand of theories that I 
will call the experiential view. They all claim that emotions are some sorts of 
feelings. 
                                                 
1 I will develop this view in Chapter III. 
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These views are problematic because they fail to account for those 
instances of emotions that do not involve feelings and sensations. The fact that 
someone fears flying does not entail that she constantly feels afraid. Her state 
may affect her long-term behaviour and, for example, make her choose to travel 
by train rather than by plane. We normally explain this behaviour in terms of 
emotional dispositions, rather than in terms of emotional feelings. This is an 
example of emotion that does not fit with the claim, defended by the 
experiential view, that emotions are a sort of feelings. Hence, the experiential 
view fails to provide an adequate overall account of folk-psychological 
emotions. 
Their experiential character is not the only feature of emotions that has 
drawn the attention of philosophers. Emotions are in some ways similar to 
evaluative judgements. When someone fears a dog, there is a sense in which she 
evaluates the animal as being dangerous. This shows that emotions have an 
evaluative character. Philosophy generally views evaluations as cognitive states. 
This has led some philosophers to claim that emotions are cognitive states such 
as judgements. Others claim that emotions are not cognitive states, but that 
cognitive states are necessary conditions for emotions. I will refer to this range 
of theories as the cognitive view. 
The cognitive view is challenged by the fact that creatures that do not 
possess cognitive abilities do have emotions. Fear is a state we observe in most 
animals from reptiles to mammals. Basic emotions are found in most primates. 
Infants also have emotions. This suggests that the cognitive view fails to account 
for emotions as states that humans share with other species and infants. An 
adequate account of emotions, by contrast, needs to explain their evaluative 
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character without identifying it with the sort of cognition of which only adult 
humans are capable. 
In this chapter I will critique both the experiential and cognitive views. I 
will show what motivates them, and why they fail to provide satisfactory 
accounts of the emotions. First, I will examine the experiential view. The core 
commitment of the view is the claim that emotions are some kind of feelings. I 
will show that this claim fails to account for emotional dispositions. It follows 
that the experiential view does not account for folk-psychological emotions in 
their entirety, but only for emotional episodes. Second, I will examine the 
cognitive view. Here the core commitment is that emotions are evaluative 
judgements. I will show that this claim is cognitively too demanding and does 
not allow us to explain how infants and animals can have emotions. Finally, I 
will consider Richard Wollheim’s dispositional view of emotions. This discussion 
will prepare the ground for the account of emotions that I will develop in the 
next chapter.   
 
2.1 The Experiential View 
 
Broadly speaking, the experiential view divides into two types. They are the 
sensation view and the perception view. The sensation view claims that emotions 
are feelings or sensations of some sort. The perception view, on the other hand, 
claims that emotions are perceptions of changes or patterns of changes in the 
body. This kind of perception is what we normally call ‘feeling.’ The perception 
view further divides into two types. They are modest and immodest views. A 
modest view holds that everything that needs to be explained about emotions 
can be explained in terms of perceptions of bodily changes. An example of a 
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modest view is William James’ theory of emotions.2 An immodest view, by 
contrast, accepts that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes, but also tries 
to explain the fact that emotions are directed at objects and situations in the 
world. What makes this view immodest is the attempt to account for the fact 
that emotions are directed at objects outside the body and hold the claim, at the 
basis of the modest view, that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes, that 
is, states the objects of which are inside the body. An example of an immodest 
theory is Jesse Prinz’s perceptual theory of emotions.3 I will discuss Prinz’s 
theory after criticising the cognitive view because Prinz proposes his theory as a 
bridge between James’ theory and the cognitive view.  
 
2.2 The Sensation View 
 
The sensation view is similar to adverbialism about perception. Historically, 
adverbialism was proposed as an alternative to the sense-datum theory of 
perception.4 While the sense-datum theory accounts for perceptions by appeal to 
mind-dependent objects, adverbialism characterises perceptions as adverbially 
specifiable modifications of the perceiving subject. An adverbialist account of 
emotions says that emotions are modifications of the subject that can be 
characterized by specialised adverbs. This view has some intuitive appeal. 
Expressions like ‘I feel sad,’ ‘I feel happy,’ and ‘I feel disgusted’ seem to be 
reports of how the subject is differently affected by each experience. So, for 
example, feeling sad is having an experience in which one feels, so to speak, 
                                                 
2 JAMES 1884, 1890. 
3 PRINZ 2004b. 
4 For discussion see MARTIN 1998a. I will discuss adverbialism and the sense-datum theory in 
Chapter IV. 
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sad-ly. On this construal, emotions are states of awareness of properties of the 
experience itself. These properties determine how the experience feels to the 
subject. It is in virtue of these properties that we distinguish between different 
kinds of emotional feelings. A feeling of anxiety, for example, is a sensation in 
which one is aware of feeling anxious-ly. The property of feeling anxious-ly is 
what distinguishes a feeling of anxiety from other feelings. 
The sensation view does justice to some aspects of our pre-theoretical 
understanding of emotional episodes. We tend to think of these experiences as 
feelings and sensations with a characteristic phenomenal character. An episode 
of anger feels the way anger does; a feeling of fear feels the way fear does, and 
so on. The temptation is then to explain why an experience feels a certain way in 
terms of properties of the experience. The main problem with this view is that it 
does not account for the fact that when we feel an emotion, we do not become 
aware of properties of the experience, but of changes in our body. These changes 
are what the emotional episode is an experience of. This is something the 
sensation view does not explain. In contrast, such an explanation is provided by 
the perception view.    
 
2.3 A Modest Perception View – James’ Theory of Emotions  
 
William James’ theory of emotions is an example of a modest perception view. It 
claims that emotions are nothing over and above feelings of changes in the body 
which follow the perception of exciting facts or objects. When someone meets a 
dangerous dog, various changes occur in her body: her heart rate increases, her 
muscles contract, her breathing becomes shorter and quicker. The experience of 
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these changes is what James calls fear. This view is summarised by the following 
claim: 
 
[B]odily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, 
and…our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.”5   
 
James distinguishes two classes of emotions, the standard or coarser emotions on 
the one hand, and the intellectual or subtler emotions on the other. The former are 
those “in which everyone recognizes a strong organic reverberation.”6 In this 
class, James includes surprise, curiosity, rapture, fear, anger, lust, greed as well 
as grief, rage, and love. The class of subtler emotions is the class of “those 
[emotions] whose organic reverberation is less obvious and strong,” and it 
includes “moral, intellectual, and aesthetic feelings,” as well as “feelings of 
pleasure and displeasure, of interest and excitement.”7 
On James’ view, the changes do not occur only inside the body, some 
changes also affect the outwardly visible parts of the body such as the skin and 
facial muscles. The former are changes such as the contraction of the smooth 
muscles of the intestine or increase in heart rate. The latter are changes such as 
facial expressions and complex behavioural episodes such as fleeing a dog. This 
account of the physiology of emotions explains James’ famous phrase: 
 
                                                 
5 JAMES 1884: 189-190. 
6 JAMES 1890: 448. 
7 JAMES 1890: 448. 
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[W]e feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because 
we tremble, and [it is] not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are 
sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be.8  
 
On this view, the change comes first and is a response to the perception of an 
exciting fact or object. Perception of the change follows and can be described as 
a perceptual state the object of which is the change itself. This perceptual state is 
what we call a ‘feeling.’ On this account, saying that “we feel sorry because we 
cry” means that the experience of sorrow is the perception of bodily changes 
that include modifications in the face like those that occur when people cry. The 
experience of these and other changes is the feeling of sorrow. On James’ view, 
the emotion ‘sorrow’ is identified with the feeling of sorrow. 
The reason why this theory qualifies as a perceptual view is that James 
thinks of feelings as perceptual states the objects of which are the bodily changes 
of which feelings are experiences. To put it differently, having an emotional 
episode is having a certain feeling. This is a perceptual state. The object of this 
state is a change in the body.9 There is a further reason for regarding the theory 
as a perceptual view. Perception is by its own nature passive. The physical 
properties of objects impinge upon the senses and thereby cause perceptual 
experiences like seeing a red apple, hearing a tune, tasting a lemon, smelling 
roses, and touching velvet. On James’ view, emotions are perceptions of changes 
in the body. These changes affect the somatosensory system in the same way 
physical properties affect the senses. On this account, emotions are passive 
states resulting from the action of bodily changes upon the somatosensory 
                                                 
8 JAMES 1884: 190. 
9 I present a detailed discussion of the perception view of emotional feelings in Chapter IV.  
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system. It follows from this that emotions and perceptions are alike – they are 
passive states. 
To draw all this together, James provides us with a precise account of the 
aetiology of emotional experience. Emotions are perceptions of patterns of 
change directly caused by perceptions of exciting facts or objects. This account 
implies a specific order of mental events. First there is the experience of the 
exciting fact or object. This is followed by a bodily change. The emotion is 
perception of the change. This is what we call a feeling.  
 
2.4 Problems with James’ Theory 
 
In the previous chapter, I showed that we talk of emotions in two ways – as 
episodes and as dispositions. James’ theory aims to provide a philosophical as 
well as a psychological theory of emotions. It is a philosophical theory because it 
accounts for the role emotions play in ordinary psychological explanations. It is 
a psychological theory because it provides a definition of what kinds of 
psychological states emotions are – they are perceptions of bodily changes. As a 
philosophical theory, James’ fails because it does not account for emotional 
dispositions. These kinds of states are relevant to ordinary psychological 
explanations.10 It follows that, as a philosophical account of emotions, James’ 
theory is inadequate. 
The theory also raises other problems. There is reason to believe that 
emotions are states we actively form in response to stimuli. For example, when 
someone fears a dog, she reacts to it in a specific way – i.e. with fear. Different 
                                                 
10 This view is developed in Chapter III.  
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emotions involve different kinds of reactions.11 Fear would involve a different 
reaction from joy; anger is a different reaction from amusement; and so on. I can 
react to the same object in different ways. For example, the same joke that now 
amuses me would upset me if I were to later become particularly sensitive to the 
joke’s subject. On this view, emotions are reactions we form in response to 
objects and situations in the world. Reactions are, by their very nature, active 
states. 
This suggests that emotions are totally different from perceptions, which 
are passive states we happen to have when physical properties of objects act 
upon the senses. The claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body 
is, therefore, problematic. First, it overlooks the fact that emotions are reactions 
we actively form to objects. Second, it characterises emotions as totally passive 
states. 
Additionally, James’ theory leads to two further problems. Emotions 
have intentionality because reactions are responses to objects and situations in 
the world. When someone fears a dog, the dog is the object of her fear. When she 
is amused by a joke, the joke is the object of her amusement, and so on. 
Emotions also have an evaluative character. When a person fears a dog, she 
evaluates it as a threat or danger. When she is amused by a joke, she evaluates it 
as funny. James’ theory is inadequate to account for either feature. He claims 
that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes. Perception in general is 
directed at the objects of which it is an experience. A visual perception of a red 
apple is directed at the object of which it is an experience – the red apple. As 
perceptions of bodily changes, emotions are directed at the objects of which they 
                                                 
11 I will discuss the idea that emotions are reactions in Chapter III. 
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are experiences, namely the changes in the body. How can this view account for 
the fact that emotions are directed at objects and situations in the world? 
An answer to this question is given by Jesse Prinz. He argues that 
emotions are appraisals of specific properties – core relational themes, in his 
words – of objects and situations through bodily changes that evolution has 
selected to track those properties. I will consider this view in Section 4.1 and 
show that it does not solve the problem raised by James’ theory. The claim that 
emotions are perceptions of bodily changes is simply not sufficient to account 
for the fact that emotions are directed at objects outside the body. 
This has consequences for an adequate characterisation of the evaluative 
character of emotions. Evaluations are active states we form when we assess a 
certain object or situation. Moreover, they are directed at things in the world. A 
theory that conceives of emotions as passive states directed at objects inside the 
body is conceptually ill-suited to account for the evaluative character of 
emotions. 
The preceding observations show that James’ theory is inadequate. To 
reiterate it fails to account for four particular aspects of emotions. First, it 
screens out the fact that we talk about emotions in two ways – as episodes and 
as dispositions. Second, it fails to account for the fact that emotions are reactions 
we actively form in response to objects and situations in the world. Third, it 
cannot deal with the intentionality of emotions. Fourth, it does not explain the 
evaluative character of emotions. The cognitive view tries to account for those 
features of emotions that James’ theory does not explain. Nevertheless, there is 
reason to believe that the cognitive view similarly fails to provide an adequate 
account of emotions. I will discuss the cognitive view in the next two sections.  
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3.1 The Cognitive View 
 
The cognitive view comes in two brands. They are strong and weak cognitivism. 
Strong cognitivism claims that emotions are constituted by cognitive states. 
Weak cognitivism, by contrast, claims that emotions involve cognitive states.12 
This may mean that a cognitive state is a necessary condition for or a necessary 
concomitant of emotions. Philosophers who advocate cognitivism about 
                                                 
12 A form of weak cognitivism is known as the quasi-judgementalist (or neo-judgementalist) 
view of emotions. This is how Michael Brady characterises the contrast between what I call 
‘strong cognitivism’ and what he calls neo-judgementalism: “Judgementalism is a theory which 
proposes a very close link between emotions and evaluative judgements, by claiming that 
emotions simply are – or embody – such judgements…However, judgementalism is committed 
to an implausible account of the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions. Since subjects who suffer 
from recalcitrant emotions do not consciously assent to the judgement that is supposedly 
constitutive of their emotion, judgementalists must maintain that the relevant judgement is 
unconsciously held…In light of this, theorists of emotion have sought to accommodate or 
recognize the close links between emotions and evaluations, but in a way which allows 
emotions and evaluative judgements to diverge or come apart. One attempt to do so, which is 
increasingly prominent in the literature, is to maintain that emotions involve, not evaluative 
judgements, but evaluative perceptions or feelings or construals or thoughts. Such attitudes 
represent the attempt to accommodate the link between emotions and evaluations within ‘a 
broader evaluative view, allowing for propositional attitudes that are weaker than strict belief: 
states of mind, like imagining that danger looms, that involve entertaining a predicative thought 
without assent.’ (Greenspan 1988: 3). On this ‘neojudgementalist’ view, the subject of an 
emotional experience construes or thinks of an object in an evaluative way; this constitutes an 
evaluative ‘take’ on the situation which falls short of fully-fledged evaluative judgement. Now, 
it is not easy to explain the nature of such evaluative construals or thoughts. Nevertheless, there 
are examples which help to illustrate the kind of thing involved in evaluative construal. Thus, I 
might construe a duck-rabbit figure as a duck at one time and as a rabbit at another; I might see 
a face in terms of another, as when I see that my father’s face reflected in my own; I can think of 
a chimpanzee in human terms; I can have the impression that the person behind me in the queue 
is standing too close; and so on. These examples suggest that construals can involve a number of 
different elements gathered from perception, imagination, conception, and thought.” (BRADY 
forthcoming). Advocates of neojudgementalist are Amelie Rorty (RORTY 1978), Cheshire 
Calhoun (Calhoun 1984), Ronald de Sousa (DE SOUSA 1987), Patricia Greenspan (GREENSPAN 
1988), Michael Stocker and Elizabeth Hegeman (STOCKER and HEGEMAN 1996), and Robert 
Roberts (ROBERTS 2003), among others. 
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emotions do not agree over the kind of cognitive state involved in emotions. 
Different states have been proposed as candidates. Jerome Neu suggests that the 
cognitive elements that matter most are thoughts.13 Robert C. Solomon14 and 
Martha Nussbaum15 defend the view that emotions are evaluative judgements. 
Robert Gordon argues that emotions involve knowledge.16 The various views 
share the fundamental idea that emotions necessarily involve cognitive states. 
Judgement is the cognitive state most frequently appealed to in the explanation 
of emotions. Peacocke observes that “[a] persistent trend…holds that emotions 
are judgements of one sort or another.”17 
Robert C. Solomon is the most prominent advocate of strong cognitivism. 
He claims that “the emotion is the judgement, and the intensity of the emotion is 
the personal significance of the judgement.”18 In recent years, he has defended a 
slightly weaker version of this view, claiming that:  
 
[E]motions are like judgments. And emotions necessarily involve 
judgments. Does this entitle me to say that emotions are judgments?…I 
think so. But, of course, an emotion is not a single judgment…An 
emotion is rather a complex of judgments and, sometimes, quite 
sophisticated judgments, such as judgments of responsibility (in shame, 
anger, and embarrassment), or judgments of comparative status (as in 
contempt and resentment).19 
                                                 
13 NEU 1978, 2000. 
14 SOLOMON 1976, 1977, 1980, 2003. 
15 NUSSBAUM 1990, 2001. 
16 GORDON 1969. 
17 PEACOCKE 2003b: 254. 
18 SOLOMON 1977: 47. 
19 SOLOMON 2003: 11. 
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Strong cognitivism is also defended by Martha Nussbaum. She thinks that 
“emotions are forms of evaluative judgements that ascribe to certain things and 
persons outside a person’s own control great importance for the person’s own 
flourishing.”20 The fundamental claim of strong cognitivism is, therefore, that 
emotions are evaluative judgements.21 
What is the motivation for the cognitive view? Cognitivism aims to 
explain two features of emotions. The first is their evaluative character. The 
second is their intentionality. The cognitive view explains the evaluative 
character of emotions by claiming that they are evaluative judgements. These 
kinds of judgements concern specific properties of things, i.e. relational 
properties.22 Consider dangerousness. When something is dangerous, it has a 
property – dangerousness – that relates it to the range of objects that can be 
affected by its dangerousness. Making a judgement is a way of acknowledging 
that an object is dangerous. But fear is also a way of acknowledging that the 
same object is dangerous. The cognitivist claims that judgement and emotion are 
                                                 
20 NUSSBAUM 2001: 22. 
21 One may wonder how cognitivism accounts for the experiential character which is the focus of 
the experiential view. The answer is straightforward. Emotional feelings and sensations are the 
effect of evaluative judgements on the body. This is well summarised by Solomon. He observes: 
“[W]hen we make an emotional judgement, our involvement and excitement is such that it 
stimulates a physiological reaction, the pumping of adrenalin or noradrenalin, for example, with 
the resultant sensations and feelings. [I]ntense feelings are the effect of intense emotions, not 
their essence.” (SOLOMON 1977: 47-8). Cognitivism, therefore, holds that emotions are evaluative 
judgements that produce bodily changes, which underpin the feelings and sensations that 
typically accompany emotions. 
22 See Chapter III.  
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instances of the same cognitive state – the evaluative judgement that the object 
is dangerous.23 
The evaluative character of emotions is sometimes characterised in terms 
of appraisal. For example, William Lyons writes: 
 
[The] core part of an emotion…has three parts, the cognitive part which 
will involve factual judgements which give rise to belief or knowledge, 
the evaluative part which will involve objective evaluations or subjective 
appraisals, and the appetitive part which involve desires stemming from 
the cognitive and appetitive aspects.24 
 
The notion of appraisal comes from the psychological literature on the emotions. 
In general, appraisal theories can be seen as the way psychology explains the 
same features cognitivism is concerned with – the facts that emotions have an 
evaluative character and are directed at objects. In this sense, there is no 
difference between saying that emotions are judgements or appraisals. 
Appraisal theories are relevant to my discussion. Philosophers like Jesse Prinz 
have, in fact, tried to bridge the gap between the perceptual and the cognitive 
view by claiming that emotions are forms of embodied appraisal of specific 
relational properties. For this reason a discussion of the notion of appraisal and 
its relevance to the cognitive view may be helpful. 
                                                 
23 Of course, this is not the only possible explanation. One may argue that the evaluative 
character of emotions can be explained in terms of the intentionality of emotions. On this view, 
it is a feature of the intentional content of emotions that they are evaluative. This explanation 
does not need to suppose that emotions are judgements or other cognitive states. I will discuss 
this view in Chapter III. For now, it suffices to notice that there is a plausible alternative to the 
cognitive view on this issue.  
24 LYONS 1980: 70. 
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The notion of appraisal was introduced in the sixties by the psychologist 
Magda Arnold.25 She characterises it as the process through which the 
significance of a situation for an individual is determined. To appraise 
something is to see it as affecting oneself in some way that matters. According to 
Arnold, all emotions include appraisal judgements – judgements to the effect 
that one is facing a situation that matters to oneself. The notion of appraisal is 
also central to the theory of emotions provided by psychologist Richard 
Lazarus.26 He claims that appraisal is a key part of emotions. This is how Jesse 
Prinz, one of the main defenders of the appraisal theory, presents Lazarus’s 
view: 
 
Emotions…involve feelings or action tendencies triggered by appraisal 
judgements. Each emotion involves the same appraisal ‘dimensions’. 
There are six of these. We ask ourselves: has something relevant to my 
goals occurred? Is it congruent with goals? How is my ego involved? 
Who deserves credit or blame? What coping options are available? And 
what can I expect for the future? Emotions are distinguished by the 
different ways in which these questions can be answered. Anger involves 
the judgments that goals have been violated, that someone else is to 
blame, and that aggression is an available coping option.27 
 
Each emotion is linked to a set of conditions specifying the circumstances under 
which it is appropriate to have the emotion. These conditions specify the 
                                                 
25 ARNOLD 1960. 
26 LAZARUS 1991. 
27 PRINZ 2003: 73. 
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relations in which a person may stand to aspects of a situation. Lazarus calls 
these aspects ‘core relational themes.’ The core relational theme of anger, for 
example, is a demeaning offence against me and mine. The core relational theme 
of fear is immediate, concrete, and overwhelming physical danger. The theme of 
jealousy is spousal infidelity, and so on. “This is not an explicit judgment, but a 
way of capturing the gist of six more specific judgments answering to each 
dimension of appraisal.”28 Appraisal can be described as awareness of the 
specific core relational theme that a certain object or situation instantiates. This 
means that when we become angry we appraise a certain event as offensive; 
when we become afraid we appraise it as dangerous; when we become jealous, 
we appraise it as an infidelity, and so on. 
There is a strong similarity between core relational themes and relational 
properties like dangerousness. These properties are relational because they 
relate the objects that have them to the range of objects that can be affected by 
them. Core relational themes are descriptions of situations in which features of 
objects and situations affect people in virtue of the fact that they relate to 
people’s well-being and survival. One may summarise this view by saying that 
emotions are appraisals of core relational themes. 
The explanation of the intentionality of emotions follows from the 
explanation of the evaluative character. When someone is afraid, there is always 
something she is afraid of. When she is amused, there is always something she 
is amused by. When she is angry, there is always something she is angry at, and 
so on.29 A way of explaining how emotions can be directed at objects is exactly 
by claiming that they are judgements. It is a characteristic of judgements that 
                                                 
28 PRINZ 2003: 73. 
29 I further discuss this view in Chapter III.  
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they are always about objects. These objects can be concrete or abstract. When I 
judge that a mathematical proof is exciting, I make a judgement about an 
abstract object. In contrast, when I judge that my neighbour’s dog is dangerous, 
I make a judgement about a specific object. Saying that emotions are judgements 
therefore explains how emotions can be directed at objects. 
 
3.2 Problems with the Cognitive View 
 
There are various reasons for thinking that the cognitive view does not provide 
an adequate account of emotions. The first and most important is that the view 
is too demanding in cognitive terms. Both philosophical and psychological 
cognitive views share the assumption that the same conceptual repertoire 
necessary for evaluative judgements is necessary for emotions. Judgements only 
appear as premises in inferential reasoning; else they could appear in creatures 
without inferential reasoning. So, it is a condition for being a creature capable of 
making judgements that the creature is also capable of inferential reasoning. Is 
the ability to make inferences a condition for emotions too? The answer is 
clearly no. This becomes apparent in the case of basic emotions. Animals and 
infants have basic emotions such as fear and anger. Yet, they are not capable of 
inferential reasoning. It follows from this that the claim that emotions are 
judgements fails to do justice to the fact that basic emotions are common to 
humans and animals. 
One may object that animals are capable of some sort of judgements. Yet 
the objection rests on a misconception about judgements. Judgements are 
constituted by concepts. According to cognitivists, a state of anger is the 
judgement that someone has offended or wronged one. Thus, if one does not 
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possess the concept ‘offence’ or ‘wrong’ one cannot ever be angry. Animals and 
infants can be angry and yet they do not seem to possess evaluative concepts 
such as ‘wrong.’ If emotions occur in creatures that do not possess sophisticated 
evaluative concepts, then emotions are not evaluative judgements. 
I noted above that one of the motivations for the cognitive view is the 
attempt at explaining the intentionality of emotions. However, the claim that 
emotions are judgements is not necessary to explain how emotions can be 
directed at objects. Perception is also directed at objects and, nonetheless, it does 
not require cognitive states. As Peacocke observes “[a]cknowledgment that the 
emotions have intentional content is entirely consistent with their not being 
judgements.”30 
There are two strong counter-examples to the claim that emotions are 
judgements. They show that we can have emotions that openly run against 
judgements that we make or are disposed to make. One example is the case of 
emotional responses to fictions. The other is the well-known case of recalcitrant 
emotions.31 The two examples are quite similar, but not identical. 
Consider someone who is watching a horror movie. The person knows 
that the movie is fiction. Nevertheless, she becomes and feels afraid whenever 
something exciting happens. This phenomenon has often been explained as 
resulting from the viewer’s identification with characters in the story. In 
contrast, one may suppose that the person becomes afraid because knowing that 
the movie is fiction does not prevent her from becoming afraid. This is a serious 
problem for the view that emotions are evaluative judgements. It is a 
requirement of rationality that a thinker cannot make two contradictory 
                                                 
30 PEACOCKE 2003b: 255.  
31 D’ARMS and JACOBSON 2003; BRADY 2007. 
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conscious judgements and still qualify as rational. If emotions were judgements 
and the viewer judged that what she is watching is fiction, she cannot become 
afraid because, on the cognitive view, fear is the judgement that the movie is 
terrifying. And this runs counter to the judgement that the movie is fiction, 
namely that it is not actually terrifying. 
The case of recalcitrant emotions is similar. A recalcitrant emotion is one 
that is said to conflict with or run counter to evaluative judgement. In particular, 
a recalcitrant emotion is one that persists “despite the agent’s making a 
judgement that is in tension with it…A recalcitrant bout of fear, for example, is 
one where the agent is afraid of something despite believing that it poses little 
or no danger.”32 A typical example of recalcitrant emotion is fear of flying. 
People who are afraid of flying normally accept that flying is much less 
dangerous than other things that they do on a daily basis like driving a car, 
smoking, or having a diet rich in fat. Nevertheless, they continue to fear flying. 
In other words, they judge that flying is not dangerous and, at the same time, 
have an emotion that says the opposite. If emotions were judgements, people 
afraid of flying would count as irrational because they would judge that flying 
is and is not dangerous. The best way of accounting for cases like this is to say 
that emotions are not judgements after all. Rather, they are different kinds of 
states, i.e. non-cognitive states. 
The claim that emotions are judgements is challenged by a considerable 
body of empirical evidence. Robert Zajonc has offered a detailed review of these 
data.33 He observes that emotions are phylogenetically and ontogenetically prior 
to cognition. This appears in the fact that facial expressions of emotions and 
                                                 
32 D’ARMS and JACOBSON 2003: 129.  
33 ZAJONC 1980.  
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emotional behaviours occur in human infants and animals without any reason 
for supposing that there are concomitant cognitions. He then observes that 
emotions and cognitions involve separate neuroanatomical structures. Evidence 
collected through neuroimaging techniques indicates that emotions do not occur 
in areas of the brain where judgement and concept manipulation occur. In 
particular, Zajonc argues that there are direct pathways from most rudimentary 
perceptual centres to centres that initiate the bodily responses associated with 
emotions. If so, those responses can begin before a person has had time to form 
a judgement. 
Zajonc explores the example of taste aversion. Studies show that an 
animal can develop aversion to certain food if it is injected with a nausea-
inducing substance after that food is ingested. Aversion can be established even 
if the nausea-inducing substance is administered while the animal is 
unconscious. Zajonc takes such an unconscious association as evidence for the 
independence of emotion and cognition. He also considers evidence about the 
so-called ‘exposure effect.’ The effect was noted during experiments in which 
participants previously exposed to a stimulus (such as a melody or a shape) at 
intensity below the awareness threshold show preferences for that stimulus over 
alternative stimuli presented at a later time. When asked to choose their 
preferred stimulus from a pair, participants were more likely to choose the one 
to which they had previously been exposed. These results suggest that an 
affective state such as preference can be formed without involving any 
conscious judgement. Like the experiment with the nausea-inducing substance, 
this seems to confirm that emotions may be formed independent of cognition. 
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Zajonc’s final evidence is that emotions can be induced without any prior 
mental state. For example, emotions can be induced by drugs, hormones, and 
electrical stimulation. In some cases, emotions can be induced by changing our 
facial expressions. If a person smiles, her level of happiness is likely to increase. 
In a recent study, Zajonc and colleagues performed a series of experiments 
whose aim was to prove the connection between brain temperature and the 
formation of emotions.34 The hypothesis was that the cooling of some brain areas 
induced by inhaling a bigger volume of air through the nose enhances positive 
affects, whereas the warming induced by a smaller volume of air enhances 
negative affects. The study found that, when subjects arranged their facial 
muscles in fashions analogous to negative emotional expressions, they reported 
experiencing more negative feelings. For instance, the pronunciation of the 
phoneme ü resembles the facial action associated with negative emotions, 
whereas the pronunciation of the phonemes e (as in ‘cheese’) and ah resemble 
facial expressions associated with positive emotions. It turned out that 
pronouncing ü was enjoyed least and put subjects in a negative mood, whereas 
pronouncing the phonemes e and ah were enjoyed most and put subjects in a 
positive mood. 
Some advocates of the cognitive view have tried to reject these counter-
arguments by claiming that emotions involve kinds of judgements that are not 
as accurate and well-grounded as ordinary judgement. Solomon, for example, 
writes:  
 
                                                 
34 ZAJONC et al. 1989.  
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Emotions, we can now see, are rash judgements, something I do, but in 
haste. Accordingly, the evidence upon which I become emotional is 
typically (but not necessarily) incomplete, and my knowledge of what I 
am emotional about is often (but again not necessarily) superficial.35 
 
Unfortunately, saying that emotions may be, or may involve, ill-grounded 
judgements does not avoid the criticism. There is an important difference 
between ill-grounded judgements and the ability to make judgements that are 
ill-grounded. The ability to make judgements is undeniably a cognitive one. If 
someone makes ill-grounded judgements, this does not mean that she is less 
sophisticated in cognitive terms. It means she has not assessed the evidence in 
support of her judgements. In other words, the cognitive abilities required for 
making judgements that turn out to be ill-grounded are exactly the same 
abilities required for making accurate judgements. Therefore, saying either that 
emotions are or involve judgements that are superficial or ill-grounded does not 
avoid the objection that the cognitive view is too demanding in cognitive terms. 
Moreover, the claim that emotions are ill-grounded judgements is at odds 
with the very notion of judgement as it is usually understood – that is, the 
epistemological notion. To say that emotions are ill-grounded judgements 
suggests that such theories are working with an alternative notion of judgement 
that does not fit with the epistemological notion of judgement. This alternative 
notion tries to play down what is usually taken to be a fundamental feature of 
judgement, and that is that judgements involve the assessment of evidence. It is 
                                                 
35 SOLOMON 1980: 262. 
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difficult to see how the sort of evaluative state Solomon has in mind can count 
as judgement once the practice of assessing evidence is suspended or removed. 
To sum up: the cognitive view is an inadequate account of emotions. This 
is because it is too demanding in cognitive terms. Judgements are constituted by 
concepts and feature as premises in inferential arguments. If emotions were 
judgements, it would be a necessary condition for having them that a creature 
possessed evaluative concepts and could draw inferences. This is rebutted by 
the fact that animals and infants have basic emotions, even though they are not 
capable of making judgements. A further argument against the claim that 
emotions are evaluative judgements comes from considerations concerning 
emotional responses to fiction and from recalcitrant emotions. It is a 
requirement of rationality that a thinker cannot make two contradictory 
conscious judgements and still qualify as rational. If emotions are judgements, 
their contents must cohere with the content of other judgements. This is clearly 
denied by emotional responses to fiction and recalcitrant emotions. A body of 
empirical evidence also shows that emotions are not, and do not resemble, 
judgements. It follows that the claim on which the cognitive view rests is simply 
false.  
 
4.1 An Immodest Perception View – Prinz’s Perceptual Theory of Emotions  
 
The cognitive view explains them in terms of evaluative judgements. The 
perception view, by contrast, explains emotions in terms of perception of bodily 
changes. The perception view comes in two types. They are modest and immodest 
views. A modest view holds that everything that needs to be explained about 
emotions can be explained in terms of perception of bodily changes. An example 
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of a modest view is William James’ theory. An immodest view accepts that 
emotions are perceptions of bodily changes, but also seeks to explain the fact 
that emotions are directed at objects in the world. What makes this view 
immodest is the attempt to account for the intentionality of emotions by 
claiming that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes. The challenge for the 
immodest view is to explain how the claim that emotions are perceptual states 
the object of which are bodily changes can explain the fact that emotions are 
directed at objects outside the body. An example of an immodest view is Jesse 
Prinz’s perceptual theory of emotions.36 
Prinz tries to explain the intentionality of emotions by showing that they 
are perceptions of external objects via specific patterns of bodily changes. He 
describes this process in terms of embodied appraisal of core relational themes. 
Prinz regards his theory as an alternative to the cognitive view, which he 
considers too demanding. Accordingly: 
 
The Emotion Problem is essentially a problem about getting meaning on 
the cheap. To solve it, we need a way of showing how emotions can have 
the semantic properties that they seem to have without claiming that 
emotions are judgments.37    
 
Prinz thinks of emotions as kinds of mental states that humans have in common 
with animals. This is confirmed by studies on the continuity between 
chimpanzee and human facial expressions of emotions.38 Even greater 
                                                 
36 PRINZ 2003, 2004a, 2004b. 
37 PRINZ 2003: 78. 
38 CHEVALIER-SKOLNIKOFF 1973. 
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continuities can be found if we look at the bodily expressions of emotions across 
animals with considerably different physical morphology. Darwin observed that 
both humans and other mammals have body hair that bristles when they are 
faced with a threat.39 These data give Prinz reason to conclude that, if emotions 
are common to humans and other mammals, the latter cannot be credited with 
the same cognitive capacities that, on the cognitive view, are necessary for 
emotions. Therefore, Prinz rejects the cognitive view and presents an account 
consistent with James’ claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the 
body. He accepts the appraisal view, but thinks it too cognitively demanding. So 
he tries to embed it within a perception view. The result is a kind of perception 
view involving perception of the relational properties – the core relational 
themes – that, on the cognitive view, we appraise through evaluative 
judgements. 
To support his denial of the cognitive view Prinz shows that emotions are 
prior to cognition. His argument draws on Robert Zajonc’s claims that emotions 
can occur without involving any cognitive states.40 As I have already described, 
Zajonc offers five strands of evidence in favour of this claim. First, he contends 
that emotions are phylogenetically and ontogenetically prior to cognition. 
Second, he claims that emotion and cognition involve separate neuroanatomical 
structures. Third, he claims that appraisals and emotions are sometimes 
uncorrelated. Fourth, he contends that emotions can be formed without any 
appraisal. Finally, he considers evidence that emotions can be induced without 
any prior mental state. Prinz regards the last piece of evidence as the most 
compelling. He concludes that there is strong reason for thinking that most 
                                                 
39 DARWIN 1872. 
40 ZAJONC 1980. 
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emotions are not cognitions, but rather spontaneous responses to stimuli. This is 
consistent with James’ claim that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes 
that arise in response to perception of excitatory objects and situations. Prinz 
fully endorses this view and claims that emotions are a paradigm case of 
automatic response. 
Given the non-cognitive character of emotions he favours, Prinz needs to 
explain how they appraise objects outside the body. To do so, he argues that 
emotions are appraisals of core relational themes via patterns of change and that 
they do not involve cognitive elements. The argument for this view is structured 
as follows. The first move is to defend two claims: (i) emotions are perceptions 
of patterns of change in the body, and (ii) specific patterns of change are 
peculiar to specific emotions. The next move is to defend the claim that bodily 
changes are states whose function is to appraise core relational themes. This 
enables Prinz to conclude that emotions are appraisals of core relational themes 
via patterns of change that are peculiar to specific emotions. 
The claim that emotions are perceptions of patterns of change in the body 
is supported by evidence from studies originally designed to disprove James’ 
theory. The data are open to an interpretation that, according to Prinz, actually 
confirms the correctness of James’ view. In the sixties, G.W. Hohmann carried 
out a series of interviews that involved subjects suffering from serious spinal 
injuries.41 The subjects were asked to compare their present emotional 
experiences to their emotional life before the injury occurred. They reported a 
decrease in the intensity of certain emotions. Moreover, the degree of 
impairment seemed to correlate with the degree of injury; damage to higher 
                                                 
41 HOHMANN 1966. 
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parts of the spinal cord correlated with a decrease in the intensity of emotional 
experience. Prima facie, these results disprove James’ view. Spinal subjects were 
presumed to have no feedback from their bodies and, consequently, to perceive 
no change. The fact that they still experienced emotions was interpreted as a 
counter-example to James’ theory. 
However, the results are open to an alternative interpretation that 
actually confirms James’ theory. Antonio Damasio has noted that spinal cord 
injuries are often incomplete.42 There is reason to believe that information about 
bodily changes in spinal subjects can travel through the blood stream, the vagus 
nerve and cranial nerves that remain intact after the spinal injury. This 
possibility may explain why, despite the spinal injury, the subjects interviewed 
by Hohmann still experienced emotions. And it would also provide a natural 
account of why these emotions were less intensely experienced. Spinal injuries 
do not entirely prevent the body from undergoing some changes. In the light of 
this and other data, Prinz concludes that James’ theory is likely to be correct. 
The next step in Prinz’s strategy is to defend the claim that specific 
patterns are peculiar to specific emotions. Prinz considers an experiment by 
Levenson and colleagues.43 The experiment measured the physiological states 
associated with six different emotions. Subjects were instructed to make faces 
that have been independently found to co-occur with emotions. Subjects were 
then asked to report any emotion they experienced. During this process, heart 
rate, finger temperature, and electrical conductivity of the skin were measured. 
Levenson and colleagues found that there were differences between the changes 
that accompanied happiness and those that accompanied negative emotions. 
                                                 
42 DAMASIO 1999. 
43 LEVENSON et al. 1990. 
 79 
Heart rate acceleration was greater for anger and fear than for happiness. This 
suggests that positive emotions can be physiologically distinguished from 
negative ones. Physiological differences were also found between negative 
emotions. Anger, fear, and sadness all had greater heart rate acceleration than 
disgust. Finger temperature was higher for anger than for fear. On this basis, 
Prinz concludes that specific emotions are perceptions of specific patterns of 
change in the body. 
Prinz then needs to defend the claim that emotions appraise core 
relational themes via specific patterns of change. This is supposed to explain 
what relation there is between emotions and the objects in response to which 
emotions arise. This can be viewed as Prinz’s account of the intentionality of 
emotions. He interprets the appraisal theory as suggesting that emotions are 
reliably caused by instances of core relational themes. For example, danger 
reliably causes fear. This is the starting point from which he builds up his 
account of emotions as embodied appraisals of core relational themes. He 
writes:  
 
Prevailing theories of intentionality that have been developed within the 
philosophy of mind are well suited to this end. These theories were not 
devised to explain emotions. They were devised to explain how concepts 
refer. If such theories do a reasonable job with concepts, then they may 
apply to mental states quite broadly. If they help explain the semantic 
properties of the emotions, then we may have an independently 
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motivated solution to the Emotion Problem. I think that informational 
theories are especially promising. 44  
 
According to such theories, a mental state gets its intentional content in virtue of 
being reliably caused or having the function of being reliably caused by 
something.45 For example, the concept of dog is acquired as a response to 
encounters with dogs and its function is that of tracking any further encounters 
with dogs. The concept represents that by which it is reliably caused. As 
constituted by concepts, mental states more generally are amenable to the same 
account, and Prinz applies this view to emotions: 
 
According to Jamesian theories, emotions are the internal states that 
register bodily changes. On the face of it, these states represent bodily 
changes if they represent anything at all…Such states are reliably set off 
by patterned changes in the body. But is it their function to detect such 
changes? Why did we develop minds that detect patterned bodily 
changes? Why do body-pattern detecting states get set up and why do 
they persist? An obvious answer is that these patterns happen to occur 
under conditions that are important to us. The patterns associated with 
fear (such as fight preparation or freezing) happen to occur when we are 
facing immediate physical dangers. Danger is, thus, another reliable 
cause of the inner states that register fleeing or freezing patterns. And it is 
a cause that has especially good claim to being the one for which such 
states are attained in the first place. We come to be good body pattern 
                                                 
44 PRINZ 2003: 78. 
45 DRETSKE 1981, 1988. 
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detectors (through evolution and learning), because body patterns co-
occur with matters of grave concern. States that register body changes 
may represent the more abstract relational properties that induce those 
changes in us.46  
 
Prinz’s argument can be summarised as follows. Emotions are perceptions of 
changes in the body. Specific patterns of changes are peculiar to specific 
emotions. Instances of core relational themes reliably cause patterns of change. 
A mental state gets its intentional content in virtue of being reliably caused by 
something. So emotions get their intentional content in virtue of being 
perceptions of specific patterns of changes reliably caused by instances of core 
relational themes. The bodily change represents the core relational theme that 
reliably causes it. On this account, the core relational themes can be viewed as 
the intentional content of emotions. Consider fear. We are wired to undergo a 
bodily change under a variety of dangerous conditions. These conditions are 
instances of the core relational theme of fear. Fear is perception of the specific 
pattern of change that represents this core relational theme. The intentional 
content of fear is, therefore, the core relational theme that reliably causes the 
pattern of change we normally perceive when we feel afraid. On this basis, Prinz 
concludes that emotions are perceptions of patterns of change that represent 




                                                 
46 PRINZ 2003: 79. 
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4.2 Problems with Prinz’s Theory  
 
Prinz presents his theory as a version of James’ theory, which, as we know, fails 
to account for emotional dispositions. Prima facie, Prinz manages to avoid this 
criticism as follows:  
 
Most mental state types have both dispositional and occurrent forms…I 
regard long-standing emotions as dispositions. That I love my spouse all 
the time is an enduring disposition to have occurrent states of love…An 
occurrent state of love is an embodied reaction of the kind one has when 
one encounters the object of one’s love…I would add that long-standing 
love does not count as love unless it carries a disposition to such 
embodied states. If someone says, ‘I love my spouse, but I never 
experience flutters or giddiness or cuddly tenderness in relation to him’ 
we would doubt her sincerity. As with itches, standing emotions are 
parasitic on their embodied manifestations.47  
 
The problem with this account is that it explains emotional dispositions in terms 
of emotional episodes, while it is more plausible to explain episodes in terms of 
dispositions. So, Prinz’s move is highly counterintuitive. Moreover, in the 
passage above, he seems to allow that some emotions are dispositions. It is, 
however, difficult to see how this concession can fit in with the claim that 
emotions are episodic states. The friction is made explicit in the following claim 
by Prinz himself: “All emotions are nothing more than embodied appraisal or 
                                                 
47 PRINZ 2003: 83. 
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dispositions to embodied appraisals.”48 Saying that a certain state is an episode 
or a disposition suggests that the same state may be of two different kinds. This 
seems to conflict with Prinz’s claim that emotions are episodic states. Moreover, 
Prinz thinks that only some emotions are dispositions. He observes that 
“[d]isembodied emotions include calm passions, such as loneliness or aesthetic 
appreciation, and long-standing emotions, such as the enduring love one feels 
for a spouse.”49 This view implies that basic emotions cannot be dispositions, 
only higher emotions like love can. This is clearly false as basic emotions are 
dispositional states. For example, one may be angry with someone for days or 
months. 
The second problem with Prinz’s theory is closely related to what I have 
just observed. His view does not account for those emotions – the calm passions, 
as he calls them – that often do not involve any bodily change. They are higher 
emotions like resentment, regret, and envy. Prinz is likely to object that higher 
emotions are not the focus of his research. He is interested in those emotions 
that humans and animals share, namely basic emotions. The objection is sound, 
but it does not avoid the criticism that his theory fails to account for emotional 
dispositions. 
A further problem derives from the claim that emotions are perceptions 
of specific patterns of changes. This claim leads to a conception of emotions as 
passive states. Prinz brings into his account the passivity of two states: 
perception and feelings. He claims that emotions are the appraisal of core 
relational themes via bodily changes. On this account, the core relational themes 
act upon one’s senses and cause specific patterns of change the function of 
                                                 
48 PRINZ 2003: 84. 
49 PRINZ 2003: 82. 
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which is tracking instances of core relational themes. This is analogous to what 
happens in perception where the physical properties of objects impinge upon 
the senses and thereby produce states of the perceptual system. The second 
element of passivity consists in the role of feelings. Prinz shares James’ view that 
emotions are feelings, which are perceptions of changes in the body. These 
changes impinge upon the system dedicated to monitoring the state of the body 
– the somatosensory system – and cause specific states of the system. Bodily 
feelings supervene on these states. This is also analogous to what happens in 
perception where perceptual experiences supervene on states of the perceptual 
system. On this account, an emotional episode is the result of two factors that 
act upon one’s perceptual system. On one hand, there is the appraisal of the core 
relational theme via patterns of bodily change. On the other, there is the 
perception of the patterns. Emotions are the result of these two states. The 
upshot is an account that, on one hand, emphasises the passivity of emotions 
and, on the other, disregards the fact that emotions are reactions to objects. 
There is one last objection. Prinz’s theory has the explicit purpose of 
bridging the gap between the perception and cognitive views. In particular, it 
wants to overcome the limits of James’ theory and explain how emotions can be 
directed at objects outside the body. Yet Prinz thinks of emotions as embodied 
appraisals of core relational themes. It is difficult to see how this view can 
account for the fact that emotions are directed at specific objects. Consider fear of 
an aggressive dog. Prinz speculates that the danger is appraised through a 
specific pattern of change. The same modification is supposed to occur any time 
one is presented with a danger. This means that the pattern of change that 
occurs is the same no matter whether one fears a dog, death, or the prospect of a 
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third world war. How can this physiological mechanism represent the 
specificity of the objects of fear? Prinz answers that representing emotion objects 
is the function of other states causally related to emotions, such as beliefs. But 
this answer fails to do justice to the pre-theoretical intuitions that emotions do 
have objects. In contrast, the view suggests that the intentionality of emotions 
should be explained in terms of the intentionality of other mental states. But this 
seems highly unsatisfying. It follows that Prinz’s theory does not provide a 
satisfactory account of emotions.  
 
5. Wollheim’s Dispositional View 
 
In Chapter 1, I have suggested that emotions should be viewed as dispositional 
rather than episodic states. This view has been defended by authors such as 
P.M.S. Hacker,50 Amelie Rorty,51 and Malcolm Budd.52 The most eminent 
advocate of the dispositional view is, however, Richard Wollheim. In his book 
On the Emotions,53 he defends the view that emotions are enduring dispositional 
states. He distinguishes emotions from those states which make up what 
William James called ‘the stream of consciousness.’54 States of the latter kind are 
episodic states such as perceptions, feelings, and thoughts. In contrast, emotions 
are mental dispositions, that is, in Wollheim’s words, “underlying modifications 
of the mind which are possessed of intentionality but not of subjectivity. They 
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 HACKER on-line paper.  
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 RORTY 1978.  
52
 BUDD 1985.  
53
 WOLLHEIM 1999. See also WOLLHEIM 2003.   
54
 The idea that emotions are not part of the stream of consciousness has recently been defended by 
Michael Martin in conferences and seminars at the University of California, Berkley.  
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have histories of some richness, and they endure for some period of time up to 
the lifespan of the person to whom they belong.”55 
 Wollheim offers two arguments – a positive and a negative one – in 
support of the claim that emotions are dispositions. The positive argument is 
that thinking of emotions as dispositions does justice to the common intuitions 
that emotions have histories. The negative argument is that if we think of 
emotions as episodic states like, say, bodily feelings, we will then be unable to 
account for those aspects of emotions that are essentially related their 
dispositional character like, for example, the impact that emotions have upon 
our lives. I will review the two arguments in detail. 
One may wonder why viewing emotions as dispositions should do 
justice to the intuition just mentioned. The answer is straightforward. The states 
of which the stream of consciousness is made are episodic states like perceptions 
and thoughts. It is a characteristic of these states that they do not last over time. 
In contrast, emotions exhibit a totally different behaviour: they endure. The 
property of enduring is characteristic of non-episodic states such as beliefs, 
desires, and intentions. These states are commonly described as dispositions. 
Emotions appear to behave in the same way as dispositions do. So, emotions 
should be regarded as dispositions. Wollheim fleshes out this idea by saying 
that dispositions typically have histories. Since emotions also have histories, 
emotions too are dispositions.  
I will clarify this point with two examples. Imagine I believe that my 
neighbour’s dog is dangerous. My belief is the result of a childhood trauma. The 
belief lasts unchanged for many years, until one day I change my mind after a 
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 JAMES 1880: Ch. IX. 
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friendly encounter with the dog in which I find the courage to pet the animal. 
My old belief thus fades away and is replaced by a new one with a different 
content. This is the history of a specific belief of mine. Wollheim’s point is that 
emotions behave very much in the same way. Imagine I fear the dog. My 
emotion too is the result of a childhood trauma. It then lasts for several years 
until I find the courage to pet the animal and overcome my fear. The emotion 
then fades away. This example suggests that emotions behave in similar ways to 
dispositions. This behaviour is different from that of episodic states, the 
duration of which is typically limited in time. On this account, we should view 
emotions as dispositional states because they behave very much like typical 
dispositions such as beliefs.  
Let us now consider the negative argument. Wollheim writes: 
 
[I]f we do not follow this line of thinking, if instead we make 
emotions out of those mental states which we otherwise think of as 
either initiating or manifesting emotions [e.g. episodic states like 
feelings and perceptions], they, the mental states, show their 
inadequacy in that, in two respects, they are fatally dependent upon 
the very dispositions that they are now displacing.56 
 
The argument can be put in the following terms. If we think of emotions as 
episodic states like, say, feelings, we will then be unable to account for 
those aspects of emotions that are essentially related their dispositional 
character. Wollheim has in mind one aspect in particular: the importance 
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that emotions have in our lives. This aspect becomes clear when we 
consider the impact that emotions may have upon our lives in terms of 
decision-making and long-term behaviour. Wollheim clarifies this thought 
with the following example. A man has a deep fear of disagreement with 
anyone whom he loves. He knows that any time a disagreement occurs, he 
will feel a tightening of his throat and the urge to walk away. It is plausible 
to think that the man will organise his life around this fear by avoiding any 
disagreement with his relatives and friends. The man’s life will then be 
marked by evasiveness. Wollheim thinks that the feeling and urge are not 
sufficient to explain the man’s evasiveness. He observes: 
 
Phenomenologically such an experience is disagreeable enough, but 
surely, if the man as he well might, arranges the whole of his life 
around this fear, it cannot be simply so as to avoid this experience: it 
is only by invoking the disposition that we can account for the 
evasiveness of his life. The avoidance of a visceral feeling is not 
explanatorily adequate, so the feeling cannot take over the place of 
the emotions.57   
 
Unfortunately, Wollheim does not explain why the feeling is not 
explanatorily adequate. A possible explanation is that Wollheim views 
emotions as states directed at objects in the world. These objects explain 
emotions themselves and the characteristic behaviour emotions produce. 
So, disagreements are the objects of the man’s fear. It is in relation to these 
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objects that his fear becomes something important and pervasive in his life. 
Feelings, by contrast, are explanatorily inadequate because they are not 
directed at objects in the world. They are experiences of states and changes 
in the body. As such, they cannot explain why someone avoids 
disagreements with relatives and friends. Feelings therefore fail to account 
for the impact that emotions have upon our lives.  
To recapitulate then, Wollheim puts forward two arguments, a 
positive and a negative one, in support of the claim that emotions are 
dispositional states. The positive argument is that only this view can do 
justice to the common intuition that emotions have histories. The negative 
argument is that only if we think of emotions as dispositions, can we 
account for the impact that emotions have upon our lives.   
Wollheim’s account is interesting and sophisticated and, yet, it does 
not seem to take into account an important aspect of the phenomenology 
of emotions. Emotions are states we normally know through feelings. For 
example, I know that I am sad when I feel sad. Wollheim seems, however, 
to think that the feeling itself is something I understand only when I 
recognise its relationship with the underlying emotions.58 Although this is 
possible, it does not seem to be the common case. Normally, we feel 
emotional and this gives us reason to think that we are being emotional 
about something.59 So, the main problem with Wollheim’s view is that it 
does not do justice to the fact that emotions do manifest themselves in the 
stream of consciousness through feelings and this is the primary source of 
knowledge about our emotions. This suggests that Wollheim fails to 
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provide a satisfactory account of the relation between emotions and 
consciousness and how this bears on the epistemology of emotions. I will 
come back to this point in Chapter 3.   
 
6. Conclusion  
  
We have seen that James argues that emotions are episodic states constituted by 
perceptions of bodily changes. The cognitive view, by contrast, argues that 
emotions are episodic states constituted by evaluative judgements. Finally, 
Prinz argues that emotions are episodic states constituted by perception of 
patterns of bodily change that represent core relational themes. 
Each view sheds light upon different aspects of emotions, but also raises 
various concerns. James’ theory provides a satisfactory account of the 
physiology of emotions, but its reduction of emotions to the perception of bodily 
changes is problematic because emotions cannot always be explained in terms of 
bodily changes. The cognitive view accounts for the evaluative character of 
emotions, but it presupposes a cognitive repertoire that is too demanding. 
Prinz’s theory tries to bridge the gap between the two views. But the theory is 
entirely committed to the idea that emotions are passive episodic states. This 
overlooks the fact that emotions are reactions to objects.  
 I have shown that Richard Wollheim’s account of emotions offers 
an alternative to the perception view by claiming that emotions are dispositions. 
In the next chapter, I will argue that emotions are dispositional states the 
formation of which does not require the sort of cognitive abilities that the 









In the previous chapters, I have shown that different theories explain specific 
aspects of emotions, but fail to give an exhaustive overall account. An adequate 
account, by contrast, needs to do two things. First, it must explain as many 
aspects of emotions as possible. Second, it must say what kinds of states 
emotions are. In this chapter, I will present a view that meets these 
requirements. 
My starting point is the uncontroversial claim that, unlike beliefs, 
emotions are kinds of states common to humans and animals. It is an equally 
uncontroversial claim that animals are not capable of conceptual thought. It 
follows that emotions do not necessarily require the ability of conceptual 
thought. This conclusion is in line with the rejection of the cognitive view I 
outlined the previous chapter. However, emotions are not the only states 
common to humans and animals. Perception is found in all animal species. This 
may tempt one to conclude that emotions and perceptions are states of the same 
kind – that is, passive states produced by the action of external stimuli upon a 
creature’s perceptual system. This view is advocated by William James and Jesse 
Prinz. It is, however, a misleading picture. The fact that both emotions and 
perceptions are common to humans and animals does not imply that they are 
states of the same kind. There is a way of conceiving emotions as active states 
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that humans and animals form in response to stimuli from the environment. 
This is the view I will advocate here. I will argue that emotions are reactions to 
objects. This view has the potential to account for most aspects of emotions such 
as the fact that they can be appropriate or inappropriate, justified or unjustified; 
that they produce feelings and behaviour; that they have objects. 
In Chapter I, I observed that it is a characteristic of ordinary emotion talk 
that we speak of emotions in two ways – as episodes and as dispositions. My 
view also account for this aspect. The claim that emotions are reactions does not 
commit us to the idea that they are episodes. This leaves open the possibility to 
conceive them as dispositions to undergo episodes. I will show that this view is 
supported by how we use emotion concepts in ordinary folk-psychological 
explanations. To this end, I will consider two claims folk-psychology makes 
about emotions. One says that emotions are states we feel in the body;1 the other 
that emotions affect behaviour.2 I will show the two claims imply a conception 
of emotions as enduring non-episodic reactions that may manifest themselves in 
experiences and behaviour. 
This view is open to a major objection. Emotions are not the only affective 
states that may manifest themselves in experiences and behaviour.3 Moods and 
personality traits, for example, often manifest themselves in the same way. I will 
show that the objection is flawed because emotions are essentially different from 
moods and personality traits. Emotions are always directed at objects, while 
moods are not. Personality traits, on the other hand, do not actually manifest 
                                                 
1 JAMES 1880, 1884; PRINZ 2004b. 
2 LYONS 1978. 
3 Karen Jones observes: “The domain of the affective includes at least occurrent emotions, 
dispositional emotions, character traits (if such there be), sentiments, moods and some reflex 
responses like the startle response. (Some theorists also add pleasure and pain and drives like 
hunger.)” (JONES 2004, quoted from the manuscript). 
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themselves in experiences and behaviour, but in the tendency of general 
patterns of behaviour to reoccur. This picture provides an exhaustive account of 
emotions and an adequate description of how they work in ordinary folk-
psychological explanations. Most importantly, it answers the metaphysical 
question of what kinds of states emotions are. 
 
2. Emotions as Reactions 
 
Reactions are states we actively form in response to stimuli from the 
environment. The first example of reactions that comes to mind is that of 
transitive feelings like sensations of cold and warmth. However, there is a sense 
in which feelings are not reactions. They are the result of modifications in our 
body caused by external conditions like cold and heat. This means they are 
passive states we experience when our body undergoes some changes. It follows 
that transitive feelings and sensations are not reactions because they are not 
actively formed. 
Other states that may be viewed as reactions are intentional attitudes like 
beliefs, desires, intentions, wants, and so on. These are states we actively form in 
response to reasons. We believe something when we have reason for taking it as 
being the case. We desire something when we have reason for thinking it is 
desirable, and so on. There is reason to believe that emotions, likewise, are 
reactions. We normally think of emotions as states we form in response to 
objects and situations in the world. Fear of darkness, for example, may be 
formed in response to the experience of walking in the darkness. Similarly, fear 
of a dog may be formed in response to an encounter with the dog. However, 
emotions differ from intentional attitudes in that they are not formed in 
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response to reasons, but in response to objects. This view is justified by the fact 
that emotions are found not only in adult humans, but also in infants and 
animals.4 It is fairly uncontroversial that infants and animals are not capable of 
conceptual thought. Susan Hurley has observed that to be credited with 
conceptual thought a creature must fulfil requirements of ‘maximal inferential 
promiscuity’ with respect to its thought contents.5 The same idea is expressed by 
Evans’ ‘generality constraint.’6 A mental state qualifies as a thought that ‘a is F’ 
when it is possible for the subject to decompose that state into re-combinable 
ingredients and form with such ingredients mental states of two sorts: states 
which predicate of ‘a’ any property G the subject can conceive of, and states 
which predicate F of any object ‘b’ of which the subject can conceive. This is the 
ability to have the concept of a particular object ‘a’ and the ability to have the 
concept of a particular property ‘F.’ There is no evidence that infants and 
animals meet such strong requirements.7 
It follows that if emotions are common to humans and animals, then it is 
not a necessary condition for forming them that creatures have the ability to 
                                                 
4 This is consistent with the fact that we often explain children’s and animals’ behaviour in terms 
of emotions like anger, fear, sadness, joy. This is something more than a form of projectivism. 
For example, empirical evidence confirms the continuity between chimpanzee and human facial 
expressions of emotions (CHEVALIER-SKOLNIKOFF 1973). Continuities are also found in species 
with physical morphology considerably different from human morphology. Darwin, for 
example, observes that the bristling of body hairs is an expression of fear in humans and 
primates, but also in dogs.  
5 HURLEY 2003. 
6 EVANS 1982. 
7 Philip Pettit has argued that the behaviour of non-linguistic animals suggests that they are 
capable of believing universal propositions of the type ‘All xs are G’ in sensu diviso, that is, case 
by case, even if they do not master the concepts of x or G, and thus cannot believe the same 
universal proposition in sensu composito, that is, as a general principle. (Quoted in SALMELA 2006: 
388). 
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think about the stimuli in response to which emotions are produced.8 This view 
is supported by empirical evidence. I have already reviewed some of these data 
in the previous chapter. Evidence collected through neuroimaging techniques 
indicates that emotions do not occur in areas of the brain where judgement and 
concept manipulation occur.9 In particular, LeDoux has demonstrated that fear 
can be elicited directly in the amygdala without involving the neo-cortex, which 
is assumed to be involved in the production of conceptual thought.10 These data 
are consistent with the idea that emotions are a specific form of information 
processing. In particular, some psychologists and neuroscientists have supposed 
that emotions are ways of processing information which we have inherited from 
our evolutionary ancestors. These processes are realised in phylogenetically 
ancient anatomical regions surrounding the brainstem.11 
Secondly, there is evidence that emotions can be formed without any 
judgement.12 This is confirmed by the exposure effect. The effect has been noted 
during experiments in which participants previously exposed to a stimulus such 
as a melody or a shape at intensity below the threshold for awareness show 
                                                 
8 This is in line with Griffiths’ and Scarantino’s remark that “[t]he ability to emote is not to be 
explained in terms of linguaform propositional attitudes and their use in practical and 
theoretical inferences. Instead, the contentfulness of emotions emerges from the fact that they 
enable dexterous interactions with the environment. Importantly, when ascribing this form of 
emotional content to an organism we are entitled to use concepts not possessed by the organism 
having the emotion, a standard condition for labeling a form of mental content as non-
conceptual…” (GRIFFITHS and SCARANTINO forthcoming: 8, quoted from manuscript). 
9 ZAJONC 1980.   
10 LEDOUX 1993. 
11 Paul D. Maclean in a series of publications from the 1950s to the 1980s called these regions ‘the 
limbic brain.’ Joseph LeDoux (LEDOUX 1996) regards the limbic brain concept as more or less 
anatomically and functionally meaningless. Jaak Panksepp (PANKSEPP 1998) accepts that 
MacLean’s concept of an ‘emotional brain’ is oversimplified, but defends the underlying concept 
that emotion represents an ancient form of information processing that we share with many 
other species. 
12 ZAJONC 1980.   
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preferences for that stimulus over alternative stimuli presented at a later time. 
When asked to choose from a pair the stimulus that they preferred, participants 
were more likely to choose the one to which they had previously been exposed. 
These results suggest that an emotion such as liking can be formed without 
involving any conscious judgement. 
Finally, evidence shows that emotions can be induced without any prior 
mental state.13 Zajonc and colleagues have performed a series of experiments 
which found that, when subjects arranged their facial muscles in fashions 
analogous to negative emotional expressions, they reported experiencing more 
negative moods.14 For instance, the pronunciation of the phoneme ü resembles 
the facial action associated with negative emotions, whereas the pronunciation 
of the phonemes e (as in ‘cheese’) and ah resemble facial expressions associated 
with positive emotions. It turns out that pronouncing ü is enjoyed least and puts 
subjects in a negative mood, whereas pronouncing the phonemes e and ah is 
enjoyed the most and put subjects in a positive mood. 
This body of evidence confirms that conceptual thoughts like judgements 
are not necessary to form emotions. A natural reply is that this conclusion is true 
of basic emotions, but not of higher emotions like guilt, shame, resentment, 
envy, and embarrassment. This is because it is widely accepted that higher 
emotions require evaluative judgements. However, there is no actual argument 
in support of this view. In fact, evidence shows that higher emotions, like basic 
ones, can be formed in circumstances in which no conceptual thought seems to 
occur. In a recent paper,15 Griffiths and Scarantino report studies16 showing that, 
                                                 
13 ZAJONC 1985; ZAJONC et al. 1989. 
14 ZAJONC et al. 1997. 
15 GRIFFITHS and SCARANTINO forthcoming. 
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although embarrassment has usually been associated with the recognition of 
personal failure, embarrassment can be elicited simply by being pointed at in 
public, or being praised in public. Embarrassment can thus occur as a result of 
mere unwanted attention. They conclude that, from this perspective, 
embarrassment may be available to pre-linguistic children. This is confirmed by 
a study showing the combination of coy smiles and gaze aversion in two-month 
old infants.17 This suggests that primitive forms of embarrassment may emerge 
before the cognitive capacities generally assumed to underlie them are actually 
developed. 
What I have so far observed suggests that emotions are reactions that do 
not require the ability of thinking about the stimuli in response to which 
emotions are formed. Here, one may wonder what advantage there is in 
describing emotions as reactions. The answer is that viewing them as reactions 
allows us to explain most aspects of emotions: emotions are positive or negative, 
appropriate or inappropriate, justified and unjustified; they produce feelings 
and behaviour; they have objects. I will examine each of these in turn, starting 
with the distinction between positive and negative emotions. 
Reactions can be positive or negative. For example, someone may react in 
a positive or a negative way to the announcement that she is pregnant. If 
emotions are reactions, they also must be positive and negative. This is 
confirmed by the ordinary practice of distinguishing between positive and 
negative emotions. This distinction can be interpreted in two different and 
mutually compatible ways. One is that positive emotions are reactions to 
attractive stimuli, while negative emotions are reactions to aversive stimuli. 
                                                                                                                                                
16 PARKINSON et al. 2005. 
17 REDDY 2000.  
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Amusement at a funny joke is a reaction to a positive stimulus, while anger at 
an insult in a reaction to a negative one. The other is that positive emotions 
produce pleasant feelings and sensations, while negative emotions produce 
unpleasant feelings and sensations. Fear and anger are typical examples of 
negative emotions because they are responses to aversive stimuli that may 
produce unpleasant sensations. Amusement, by contrast, is a reaction to 
positive stimuli that produces pleasant sensations. Philosophers sometimes 
characterise this distinction in terms of the affective character of emotions. 
Christopher Peacocke observes that “[t]he distinctive affect of an emotion for its 
expereincer is pleasant or unpleasant, and the affect – or at least its cause – 
influences the character of the subject’s thoughts and moods.”18 
Another feature of reactions is that they are appropriate or inappropriate. 
Appropriateness is a semantic feature. It concerns the relation between reactions 
and the objects at which reactions are directed. In other words, appropriateness 
concerns the relation between reactions and how the world turns out to be. This 
means that the possibility of a reaction being appropriate is completely 
independent from the subject’s ability to think about the reaction as being 
appropriate to a certain stimulus. If emotions are reactions, they also must be 
assessable in terms of appropriateness.19 Emotions are appropriate when they 
are the right kinds of reactions to certain objects or situations. For example, fear 
                                                 
18 PEACOCKE 2003b: 253. 
19 A natural way of understanding the claim that emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate 
is to say that they are evaluations. This view is upheld by many philosophers.19 Christopher 
Peacocke, for example, observes: “[t]he representational content of an emotion seems always to 
involve an evaluative notion.” (PEACOCKE 2003b: 253). The notion of evaluation is generally 
viewed as having a cognitive connotation. However, emotions are states we find in infants and 
animals as well as in adult humans. This is one of the reasons I have raised against the claim that 
emotions are judgements. So, if emotions are evaluations, they are kinds of evaluations that do 
not require cognitive abilities.  
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of darkness is appropriate because darkness is a phenomenon that makes 
creatures more vulnerable to attacks from other creatures. There are two ways in 
which emotions can be inappropriate. One is when the emotion is the wrong 
kind of reaction to a certain object. This is the case with anger at someone’s 
death. This emotion is inappropriate because it is not the right way of reacting 
to a death. The other is when the emotion is a reaction to a property or object 
that is not actually instantiated. Imagine a child afraid of darkness in her own 
bedroom. This emotion is inappropriate because it is a reaction to something 
which is not actually dangerous as we can assume that a child’s bedroom is a 
safe place (or, at least, safer than, say, a wood at night). The emotion is, 
however, justified because the child imagines that ghosts may emerge from the 
darkness. It is worth noting that non-existent entities like ghosts count as objects 
for emotions because they are intentional objects. 
This remark introduces the issue of justification. Reactions are states we 
form in relation to objects. These objects and their properties explain why 
creatures have certain reactions. On this account, reactions can be justified or 
unjustified. If emotions are reactions, they also are justified or unjustified. They 
are justified when there are objects that explain them. These objects are the 
things in reactions to which emotions are formed. They can be existing objects 
like darkness or intentional objects like ghosts. Fear of darkness is justified by 
the fact one is presented with a dark space or room. The same emotion is 
justified when darkness is not real but imaginary. For example, one may fear the 
idea of walking along a dark lane at night. Here darkness is an intentional object 
because it is not experienced but imagined. Like in the child’s example above, 
this emotion is justified by its object – an intentional one, in this case – but it is 
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also inappropriate because there is nothing actually dangerous in the idea of 
walking along a dark lane. On this account, emotions are justified when they are 
reactions to existing objects presented in perception or to intentional objects 
represented in thoughts, hallucinations, and dreams. 
It is worth noting that, as in the case of appropriateness, the fact that an 
emotion is justified does not depend on the subject’s ability to think about and 
assess the object in response to which the emotion is formed. For example, fear 
of natural phenomena like darkness, fire, lightening, and thunder is justified by 
the fact that they are frightening. The ability to respond to frightening stimuli 
does not require the further ability of thinking of such stimuli as potentially 
dangerous or harmful. 
Now, in what circumstances are emotions unjustified? Emotions are 
unjustified when there are no objects in reaction to which they are formed. In 
other words, unjustified emotions are objectless reactions. Ordinary folk-
psychological talk refers to these kinds of emotions as moods. Moods are, in 
fact, affective states that are not directed at any specific objects.20 On this 
account, they are unjustified emotions. This is consistent with the fact that we 
                                                 
20 A similar, although more sophisticated, account of moods is given by Karen Jones. She 
observes: “Occurrent emotions, whether episodic or standing, need to be differentiated from 
moods. Depression and melancholia are moods, despair and grief emotions. However, while we 
can easily give clear cut examples of the difference between emotions and moods, the distinction 
is not always easily drawn and admits of fuzzy boundaries. Emotions shade off into moods as 
the object towards which the emotion is directed becomes increasingly vague and the affective 
response becomes increasingly global in its scope. What differentiates emotions from moods 
thus seems to be the degree to which the affective state is object focused. I can be depressed 
about the prospect of becoming unemployed and my depression, so long as it stays object 
focused, will be an emotion. However, such depression rarely does remain object-focused and 
readily spills over to the depressed’s undifferentiated way of seeing the world in which 
everything is leaden and grey and devoid of hope. My focus is on how to generate an account of 
the rationality conditions for occurrent emotions, both episodic and standing.” (JONES 2004, 
quoted from manuscript). 
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explain our own and other people’s behaviour in terms of moods when we do 
not know what objects explain their behaviour. For example, when we do not 
know why we feel low, we say we are in a bad mood, rather than that we are 
sad. Explanations in terms of emotions make reference to specific objects (e.g. 
what one is sad about); explanations in terms of moods, by contrast, do not 
make reference to any specific object. I will come back to this point below. 
Moods are typically caused by physical states and conditions. Evidence 
to this effect is shown by Zajonc’s experiment on the relation between facial 
expressions and moods. Depression, for example, is described as a mood rather 
than as an emotion. Psychologists and neurologists agree that depression is 
often caused by an electrochemical imbalance in the brain. Premenstrual 
syndrome is another physiological state that may cause moods like depression 
or aggressiveness. Drugs and alcohol too are invoked to explain unjustified 
emotional reactions. This view is consistent with the common practice of 
explaining unjustified emotional behaviour in young children in terms of 
physical or physiological conditions. For example, we say young children are 
tired, hungry, or that they need a change. 
The project of determining the nature of emotions involves making clear 
what relation there is between emotions and things in the world. I have argued 
that emotions are reactions that do not require one to understand the reasons 
why one reacts with a certain emotion to a certain object. This is compatible 
with the possibility that the emotion is appropriate or inappropriate. 
Appropriateness tells us in which circumstances a given emotion is the right 
kind of reaction to how things are in the world. This does not mean that 
emotions aim at truth like beliefs do. Beliefs aim at truth because they ought to 
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be true. This is evident in the fact that as soon as there is evidence that a certain 
belief is false, it should be dismissed. In contrast, emotions do not aim at truth 
because they are not revised in the light of evidence. This is clear in the case of 
recalcitrant emotions like fear of flying where evidence that flying is not 
dangerous does not prevent one from fearing it. On this basis, philosophers 
often compare emotions to the Müller–Lyer illusion, and argue that emotions 
may persist in the face of better evidence, in the same way as perception that the 
two lines differ in length survives the belief that the lines are of the same 
length.21 This shows that, like perception,22 emotion is not an attitude of 
regarding something as true, but an attitude of regarding something as seeming 
to be true, that is, as appearing a certain way. 
Another reason for claiming that emotions do not aim at truth is that they 
do not require the ability of conceptual thought. States that aim at truth require 
the ability to assess reasons for taking something, rather than something else, as 
being the case. This requires understanding of the reasons which, in turn, 
involves possession of the relevant concepts. Emotions, by contrast, are formed 
even when the emotion subject lacks the concepts necessary to understand the 
reasons why she has formed a certain emotion in response to a certain stimulus. 
This prevents emotions from being states that aim at truth. Along these lines, 
Griffiths and Scarantino observe:  
 
[A] phobic can reconcile the conceptual thought that the object of their 
phobia is completely harmless with utter terror towards it. The 
traditional cognitivist must assimilate phobias either to inconsistent 
                                                 
21 D’ARMS and JACOBSON 2000, 2003; DÖRING 2003; SALMELA 2006; BRADY 2007. 
22 CRANE 1992. 
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beliefs or to self-deceit. In the case of fear at least, there is good scientific 
reason to believe that phobias result neither from logical error, nor from 
self-deceit, but from the neural architecture of the emotion system. By 
means of ingenious lesion studies, LeDoux has demonstrated that fear 
can be elicited in a reflex-like fashion through a neural low road that 
projects along a subcortical pathway directly to the amygdala and 
bypasses the neo-cortex (LeDoux, 1993). Since full-blown conceptual 
thought is generally assumed to involve the neo-cortex, this appears to be 
strong evidence that such conceptual thought is not essential for fear…23 
 
On this account, a creature forms an emotion when she reacts to how things 
appear to her, not to how things are. This is compatible both with the possibility 
that, on some occasions, things are as they appear to be and with the possibility 
that, on other occasions, they are not. 
These considerations introduce a further issue. If emotions are reactions 
that do not require conceptual thought, it is possible that emotions are formed in 
reaction to properties to which creatures are naturally sensitive, that is, 
properties the recognition of which does not require background knowledge but 
only adequate sensitivity. This is in line with what Damasio observes about the 
kinds of stimuli the limbic system processes when it produces fear responses: 
 
One possibility…is that we are wired to respond with an emotion, in 
preorganized fashion, when certain features of stimuli in the world or in 
our bodies are perceived, alone or in combination. Example of such 
                                                 
23 GRIFFITHS and SCARANTINO forthcoming: page 9, quoted from manuscript.  
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features include size (as in large animals); large span (as in flying eagles); 
type of motion (as in reptiles); certain sounds (such as growling); certain 
configurations of body state (as in pain felt during a heart attack).24 
 
On this account, we form emotions as reactions to features of the environment 
to which we are naturally sensitive. They are physical features such as size, 
speed, pitch, and so on. This explains why creatures like infants and animals 
that are unable to draw inferences from background knowledge are, 
nonetheless, capable of emotional reactions. 
This does not rule out the possibility that learning and background 
knowledge can make animals and humans sensitive to other features. For 
example, knowledge about the dangerousness of guns makes humans sensitive 
to them. Animals may also learn that some objects have positive or negative 
properties. Bear cubs, for example, learn what animals are dangerous by 
observing the adult bears. On this account, there are two kinds of properties in 
reaction to which humans and animals form emotions. One kind is physical 
properties to which humans and animals are naturally sensitive. The other kind 
is features to which they can learn to be sensitive. 
It is worth noting that not all individuals of the same kind are sensitive to 
the same properties in the same way. The same dog that I fear may not be feared 
by his master. The same joke that I think is hilarious may not amuse another 
person. The same movie that I think is scary may not scare another person. The 
same smell that disgusts me may not disgust another, and so on.25 In humans, 
                                                 
24 DAMASIO 1994: 131-2. 
25 An accurate description of this phenomenon is given by Mark Johnston. He writes: “[W]hen I 
find that others are unmoved by what I see as ethereally beautiful then my choices are quite 
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this difference can be explained as a question of evaluation. Evaluations are 
ways of seeing things determined by background knowledge. Someone with 
background knowledge about coins will see a certain coin as valuable or rare. 
Someone else without such knowledge will see it just as a coin. The same 
applies to emotions. Not everybody will fear the dog that I fear because not 
everybody will evaluate it as dangerous. This is because each person may have 
different sensitivity to the danger that the dog instantiates. The difference may 
depend on variations in background knowledge. I may be very sensitive to it 
because I had a bad experience in my childhood. The dog’s master, instead, may 
be insensitive because he knows the animal. The dog’s trainer may also be 
insensitive but for another reason: he is used to dealing with dogs. This does not 
mean that the dog is not dangerous. The dog may be genuinely dangerous 
without this implying that everybody is sensitive to it in the same way. In other 
words, we need to distinguish the property from the reaction to the property. 
On this account, emotions are subjective reactions to properties of objects.26 
                                                                                                                                                
differently constrained. I can try to get them to see it too, and be moved appropriately. If I fail, 
then I am left with two hypotheses. Either I have things wrong, say because of sentimentality or 
some distorting mood that I was in, so that I then withdraw the judgement of beauty, and say 
instead that it merely seemed ethereally beautiful at the time. Or I conclude that the others are 
just blind to this kind of beauty. If I draw this second conclusion I then might give voice to my 
self-confident stance by saying ‘I find it ethereally beautiful.’ But one thing I am not in a position 
to say is that it’s ethereally beautiful for me, where this is understood on the model of 
‘pleasantly hallucinogenic for me.’ I’m not in a position to say that, because it would be at odds 
with the concept of ethereal beauty.” (JOHNSTON 2001: 199).  
26 Some philosophers call these properties values (MCDOWELL 1998d, 1998e; MULLIGAN 1998; 
TAPPOLET 2005) or value properties (MULLIGAN 1998). Others follow the terminology introduced 
by the appraisal theory and describe the situations in which these properties are instantiated as 
core relational themes (PRINZ 2004b). They are relational properties. What makes them relational 
is that they are features that relate the objects that have them to the range of entities that can be 
affected by these features. Consider the following example: guns are dangerous. Dangerousness 
is a relational property because things are dangerous for other things. Guns may, in fact, injure 
or kill people, and damage or destroy objects. So, when we say that guns are dangerous we say 
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This does not mean that emotions are always subjective. If we think of 
emotions as states that regulate our interaction with the environment, we can 
see that creatures of the same kind need to react in the same way to the same 
stimuli in order to survive. This is true of some specific stimuli that represent 
objective challenges to certain creatures. For example, darkness is an aversive 
property for all those creatures that cannot see in the darkness. This suggests 
that although emotions are reactions and reactions are subjective, there are 
stimuli to which all creatures of the same kind need to react in the same way in 
order to survive. This is consistent with Damasio’s remark that creatures with 
similar brain structures are naturally sensitive to the same physical features like 
size and speed. 
To conclude, it may help to compare my view with other accounts of 
emotions. The cognitive view argues that emotions are evaluative judgements. 
However, emotions are states that humans share with animals. Animals are not 
capable of conceptual thought, which is required for judgement. It follows that 
emotions cannot be judgements. They are reactions to objects, which do not 
require the ability of conceptual thought. The perception view, by contrast, 
argues that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes. However, emotions are 
reactions creatures actively form in response to stimuli. It follows that emotions 
are not perceptions because perceptions are, by their own nature, passive. 
One may still claim that my view has some similarity with Prinz’s 
perceptual theory of emotions. Prinz argues that emotions are states that 
humans share with animals. He also thinks that conceptual thought is not a 
necessary condition for emotions. The problem with his view is that it is 
                                                                                                                                                
that they have a kind of property – dangerousness – that relates them to the range of objects that 
can be affected by it.  
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committed to an episodic conception of emotions. Moreover, it conceives them 
as entirely passive states that creatures experience when specific patterns of 
changes are produced by perception of relational properties. The fact that 
emotions and perceptions are common to humans and animals does not imply 
that they are states of the same kind. The thrust of my argument is that emotions 
are active states that creatures form as reactions to stimuli. My view is, 
therefore, different from Prinz’s perceptual theory.  
 
3. “Emotions are states that we feel in the body” 
 
The view outlined above is not sufficient to determine what kinds of states 
emotions are. Reactions can, in fact, be viewed as episodes or dispositions. In 
order to clarify the metaphysics of emotions we need to determine what kind of 
states they are. A way of addressing this issue is to look at how folk-psychology 
conceives emotions. A claim that people often make about emotions is that they 
are states we feel in the body. This is confirmed by the fact that we think of 
emotions as states we may feel in the whole body or in specific body parts. Fear, 
sadness, surprise, and happiness are emotions we may feel in the whole body. 
In contrast, disgust and anxiety are emotions we may feel in specific body parts. 
Disgust, for example, is an emotion we may feel in the mouth or stomach. 
Anxiety is an emotion we may experience like a sensation of pressure on the 
chest. This is not a definition of where we feel specific emotions. Different 
emotions may be felt in different locations. Moreover, there is evidence that 
cultural differences affect how people think of emotions in relation to the body.27 
                                                 
27 BREUGELMANS et al. 2005. 
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What matters to my argument is that we can derive a conception of emotions 
from ordinary emotion talk. The fact that when we talk about emotions we often 
refer to bodily feelings and sensations, suggests that we think of emotions as 
kinds of states we feel in the body. 
Emotions are not the only states we feel in the body though. There are 
other states we can describe in the same way. They are pains, sensations of cold 
and warmth, sensations of pressure, sensations of pleasure, sensations of hunger 
or satisfaction, and so on. We also think of desires as states we may feel in the 
body. There is, however, an intuitive difference between these states. They feel 
different. How I feel when I am afraid is different from how I feel when I am in 
pain, when I am cold, or hungry. The claim that emotions are something we feel 
in the body is, therefore, consistent with the idea that they are not generic 
feelings; they are specific feelings that differ from other kinds of feelings.28 
These remarks bear on the question of what reasons we have for saying 
that emotions are states we feel in the body. The claim is justified by the fact that 
the main and most direct way of knowing our emotions is through feelings. I 
know that I am afraid, when I feel afraid. I know that I am happy, when I feel 
happy. I know that I am angry, when I feel angry, and so on. The claim that 
emotions are states we may feel in the body is therefore a claim about how we 
normally come to know our emotions.29 Of course, this is not the only way in 
which we come to know them. We can learn about our emotions by observing 
our own behaviour (e.g. when I see that my fingers tremble), by listening to 
what others say about our emotions (e.g. when someone says that I look 
                                                 
28 For more detailed discussion of the notion of feeling see Chapter IV.  
29 I will come back to this topic in Chapter VI.  
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worried),30 or by noticing that we tend to have specific thoughts about a given 
subject matter (e.g. when I keep thinking about a certain upsetting event).31 On 
this account, saying that emotions are states we feel in the body is saying that 
we normally come to know what kinds of emotions we have from the kinds of 
feelings we experience. 
In the previous chapters, I have observed that we talk of emotions in two 
ways – as episodes and as dispositions. Emotional episodes are feelings, while 
dispositions are non-episodic states. This means that it is not always true that 
we feel emotions. How does this conclusion fit in with the folk-psychological 
claim that emotions are states we feel in the body? There are two ways of 
combining the two claims. One is to say that emotions and feelings are two 
different kinds of emotional phenomena. The other is to say that emotions may 
or may not be felt. 
The first way is advocated by Prinz. He thinks that some emotions are 
episodes of embodied appraisals, while others are dispositions. He writes: 
“[d]isembodied emotions include calm passions, such as loneliness or aesthetic 
appreciation, and long-standing emotions, such as the enduring love one feels 
for a spouse.”32 The problem with this view is that it explains the fact that it is 
not always true that we feel emotions by drawing a distinction between kinds of 
emotions we feel, and kinds we do not feel (i.e. what he calls ‘disembodied 
emotions’). The distinction is, however, dubious. It is clear that, on some 
occasions, we feel in love or lonely. It follows that there is no reason for thinking 
                                                 
30 I expand on this idea in Chapters V and VI. 
31 I further discuss this view in Chapters V and VI. 
32 PRINZ 2003: 82. 
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that there are some specific emotions we do not feel. Therefore, Prinz’s 
argument fails to explain why it is not always true that we feel emotions. 
The other way of combining the two claims is to say that emotions are 
states that we may or may not feel. This is to say that emotions are dispositions 
that may or may not manifest themselves in emotional episodes such as feelings 
and sensations. This explains why it is not always true that we feel emotions. 
The view is also consistent with the folk-psychological claim that emotions are 
states we feel in the body because, as dispositions, emotions have the potential 
to manifest themselves in feelings. 
How does this view fit in with the claim that emotions are reactions to 
objects? The notion of reaction does not make any commitment to the nature of 
reactions. They can be episodic or non-episodic states. Episodic reactions are, for 
example, bodily conditions like anaphylactic shock, fever, or skin rash. They are 
reactions because they are responses to infections or substances to which the 
body is sensitive. They are episodic because it is possible to say when they begin 
and when they cease. Non-episodic reactions are intentional attitudes and 
emotions. They are reactions because they are formed in response to 
propositions or objects, although emotions differ from intentional attitudes in 
the fact that they are not formed for reasons. Intentional attitudes are non-
episodic reactions because they last over time. It is plausible to assume that the 
same is true of emotions even though this is something that my argument has 
not yet established. For now it is sufficient to say that emotions are non-episodic 
reactions because they may or may not manifest themselves in emotional 
episodes. 
 111 
To sum up the point made in this section then: I opened my discussion 
with the claim that emotions are something we feel in the body. This claim is 
justified by the fact that, in most cases, we know that we have emotions from the 
fact that we feel them. I have shown that if we want to do justice to the fact that 
we talk of emotions in two ways, we cannot confine ourselves to the claim that 
emotions are episodes because it does not explain why some emotions are 
unfelt. The best way of accounting for this phenomenon is the claim that 
emotions are dispositions that may or may not manifest themselves in episodes. 
This account does not suffice to provide an exhaustive account of 
emotions because it does not explain the fact that emotions may last over time. 
This aspect is the main argument against James’ and Prinz’s view that emotions 
are episodic states. It is, therefore, a feature that an adequate account of 
emotions must explain. The cognitive view explains it by saying that emotions 
are or involve beliefs, which are enduring states. This explanation is, however, 
inadequate because it accounts for the enduring character of emotions in terms 
of the enduring character of belief, while it is clear that emotions are not and do 
not resemble beliefs. It follows that an exhaustive account of the enduring 
character of emotions must not appeal to beliefs. In the next section, I will show 
that emotions are enduring states, that is, they last over time. I will support this 
claim by showing how emotions factor in the production and explanation of 
long-term emotional behaviour.  
 
4. “Emotions affect behaviour” 
 
Folk-psychology says that emotions affect behaviour. This is a fairly 
uncontroversial claim as we normally think of emotions as states that produce 
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behaviour. When I fear a dog, I scream and flee. When I am angry, I scowl and 
slam a door. When I am happy, I smile and run. These examples show that 
emotions produce two types of behaviour: expressions and short-term actions. 
Emotions may also produce long-term behaviour such as the enduring 
avoidance of the dog or, in the case of a person who fears flying, avoidance of 
plane travel (in order to avoid confusion with emotion that produces this 
pattern of behaviour, I will refer to it as ‘refusal to fly’). So, there are three kinds 
of behaviour emotions produce: expressions like screaming or scowling, short-
term action like fleeing or running, and long-term patterns of behaviour like 
avoiding a dog or refusing to fly. 
In the previous section, I have shown that emotions are dispositions that 
manifest themselves in episodic states such as feelings and sensations. Short-
term actions can be viewed as another kind of episodic states in which emotions 
manifest themselves. An argument for this view comes from considerations 
about the physiology of emotional feelings and behaviour. Feelings can be 
described as the results of bodily changes produced by emotions. An argument 
in the same line is that short-term actions like fleeing or running can be 
described as the outwardly observable part of the same changes that underpin 
the feelings. This means that the same bodily changes the subject experiences in 
the form of feelings can be seen by an observer as short-term actions. I will 
return to this point in chapters four and five. For now it suffices to say that 
feelings and behaviour are manifestations of emotions. 
There is an important difference between expressions, on the one hand, 
and short and long-term behaviour, on the other. Expressions are characteristic 
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manifestations of emotions.33 An expression that shows a certain emotion can 
only be explained by the fact that there is an emotion of which it is the 
expression, unless we have reason to suppose that the expression is contrived. 
In contrast, short and long-term behaviour is not as characteristic because it can 
be explained by other mental states besides emotions. In particular, it can be 
explained by beliefs or combinations of beliefs and desires. For example, I flee 
the dog because I believe it is the best way of not being bitten. For the same 
reason, I continue to avoid the animal for a long period. To show that emotions 
are enduring states we need to show two things: first, that they explain long-
term behaviour and, second, that the same behaviour cannot be explained in 
terms of beliefs. In other words, we need to show that there are long-term 
behavioural patterns that only emotions explain. This will confirm that emotions 
are enduring states. 
There are all sorts of long-term behaviour. Someone working on her 
Ph.D. is an example. An explanation for the fact that this behaviour lasts over 
time is that she believes that a Ph.D. will get her a good job, and she desires a 
good job. One can also say that she continues to work on her Ph.D. because she 
enjoys it. But, the best explanation is the one in terms of belief. This is because 
the doctoral candidate may continue to work on her thesis, even though she no 
longer enjoys it, just because she believes it will get her a good job and she 
desires it. In this case, enjoyment alone is not sufficient to explain her behaviour 
because it does not explain why she continues to work on her Ph.D. even 
though she no longer enjoys it. 
                                                 
33 I discuss this view in Chapter V. 
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In other cases the reverse is true and belief alone is not sufficient to 
explain the enduring character of behaviour. Consider someone who refuses to 
travel by plane. This pattern of behaviour involves many different actions that 
last over time. First of all, the person refuses to fly when she has the 
opportunity. Typically, she chooses to travel by train whenever this is an option. 
She also gives up plans because they require her to fly. For the same reason she 
turns down invitations and job opportunities, and so on. A possible explanation 
is that the person refuses to travel by plane because she believes it is dangerous. 
This explanation is similar to someone refusing to drink wine because she 
believes it causes her terrible headaches. 
Prima facie, the explanation in terms of the belief that flying is dangerous 
is perfectly adequate. The same explanation, however, proves inadequate when 
we try to explain some features of the person’s behaviour such as the fact that 
she continues to refuse to fly after being given evidence that flying is safe or, at 
least, no more dangerous than other things she does on a regular basis. Now, if 
the person’s behaviour were caused by the belief that flying is dangerous, it 
would be rational to expect that her behaviour would change as soon as she is 
given evidence to the contrary. This is because it is an essential feature of beliefs 
that they are revised in light of further evidence – provided that the agent is 
rational. As we have seen, however, the person does not change her behaviour 
and still refuses to fly. She behaves differently in the wine example where she 
changes behaviour as soon as she is given evidence that it is not wine that 
causes her headaches, but the cheese she eats with wine. Why does she change 
her behaviour in one, but not in the other? 
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The most natural explanation is that this subject’s behaviour does not 
change because the mental state that underlies it has not changed either. This 
means that she still believes that flying is dangerous. How do we explain this 
given that she has been given evidence that flying is safe? There are three 
possible explanations, but they are not all equally good. I take a good 
psychological explanation to be one that does not ascribe false beliefs to an 
agent when she has been given the chance to revise them in light of further 
evidence. This notion of good explanation is fully consistent with the charity 
principle. The first explanation is that she believes the evidence, but also 
continues to believe that flying is dangerous and this is the reason why she does 
not change her behaviour. This is not a good explanation because it implies that 
the person believes that flying is both dangerous and not dangerous. This means 
that she believes something that is false, even though she is given evidence of 
the opposite. This violates the requirement for being a good explanation 
mentioned above. 
The second explanation is that the person does not change her behaviour 
because she does actually believe the evidence, but holds on to her belief that 
flying is dangerous. This is a poor explanation for the same reason as before. It 
implies that the person believes something that is false, even though she is given 
evidence of the opposite. It follows that this too violates the requirements for 
being a good explanation. 
The third is the best explanation. It says that the person does not change 
her behaviour because she is afraid of flying. There are three reasons for 
thinking that this is the best explanation. First, both explanations in terms of 
belief have failed. Second, it is consistent with the ordinary folk-psychological 
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explanation that people refuse to fly because they fear it. Third, it allows that the 
person revises her belief in light of new evidence. But how does the explanation 
account for the fact that the person believes that flying is not dangerous and, 
nonetheless, she fears it? I have shown that emotions are reactions we form 
without the help of reasons. Beliefs, by contrast, are formed for reasons such as 
evidence that flying is not dangerous. It follows that the person may believe that 
flying is not dangerous, and also have a fear of flying. The two states are not in 
contradiction because one is formed for reasons, while the other is not. This 
provides a straightforward explanation of the reason why the person does not 
change her behaviour. 
How do these consideration bear on the question of whether emotions 
are enduring states? Our initial assumption was that the refusal to fly is a long-
term behavioural pattern. This means that it is produced by an enduring mental 
state. We normally explain long-term behaviour in terms of beliefs because they 
are enduring mental states. I have shown that we cannot explain the person’s 
refusal to flying in terms of belief because the explanation would not meet the 
requirement for being a good psychological explanation. Any account in terms 
of belief would, in fact, ascribe a false belief to the person who refuses to fly. 
This would infringe the charity principle. It follows from this that we need to 
provide an explanation that does not appeal to belief. The most natural choice is 
an explanation in terms of fear because it is the explanation that folk-psychology 
normally gives to patterns of behaviour like that in question. This is also the best 
explanation because it does not ascribe any false belief to the agent. It follows 
that an emotion like fear can produce long-term behaviour. The natural 
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conclusion is that the reason why emotions can produce long-term behaviour is 
that they are enduring states. 
What I have so far observed shows that emotions are enduring non-
episodic reactions that may manifest themselves in experiences and behaviour. 
This view faces one last objection. That is, emotions are not the only affective 
states that may manifest themselves in experiences and behaviour. Moods and 
personality traits seem to work in the same way. I will refer to this as the mood-
personality view. In order to prove that my account above is correct, I will show 
that this objection is ill-grounded. In particular, I will show that emotions are 
always directed at objects, while moods are objectless states. I will then argue 
that personality traits do not actually manifest themselves in experiences and 
behaviour, but in the tendency of states and patterns of behaviour to reoccur. 
The discussion is structured as follows. In the next section I provide an 
argument for the claim that emotions always have objects. In Section 6, I reject 
the claim that emotions and moods are alike. In the same section, I provide an 
argument against the objection that emotions and personality traits are also 
alike.   
 
5. Emotions and Objects 
 
I have shown that, when they are justified, emotions are reactions to objects. It 
follows that justified emotions always have objects. Not everybody, though, 
agrees on that. Some philosophers object that it is not true that emotions always 
have objects.34 They support the objection with the example of objectless 
                                                 
34 See THALBERG 1964 and LAMB 1987. 
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depression or anxiety. I will show that the objection is flawed. In particular, I 
will argue that emotion objects play an essential role in ordinary folk-
psychological explanations and that it is only in relation to objects that 
emotional behaviour becomes fully intelligible. On this account, the question of 
whether emotions have objects must be distinguished from the question 
whether we know what the emotion objects are. 
People tend confuse the emotion object with the emotion cause. It is 
certainly true that, in some cases, to identify the cause of an emotion is to 
identify its object. But this is not true in general. The object of an emotion might 
lie in the future like when I am worried about my appointment next week with 
the dentist. Or the cause of an emotion might be a past event which is too 
remote from the present manifestation of the emotion to be regarded as its 
object. For example, my fear of dogs may have been caused by a childhood 
encounter with a big German shepherd. This dog is no longer the object of my 
fear because when I fear a dog, I fear a specific dog; usually, one that is in my 
vicinity. In some cases, the cause of the emotion might be something completely 
unrelated to its object. Being drunk or on drugs can make me obnoxious and 
hate my friends. So the fact that we can identify the cause of an emotion does 
not entail that we can identify what the emotion is about. 
What does the claim that emotions always have objects say about 
emotions? The answer rests on the way we explain emotional behaviour. In 
most cases, the explanation of emotional behaviour involves reference to objects. 
It is in relation to the emotion objects that emotional behaviour becomes 
intelligible to those who try to explain it. For example, we explain someone’s 
fear of flying by making reference to the object of her fear – the experience or the 
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idea of flying. Similarly, we explain why someone looks angry and shouts at her 
interlocutor by supposing that she is reacting to something the other person 
said. These examples show that emotion objects are relevant to ordinary 
psychological explanations. 
This does not suffice to show that emotion objects are essential to 
explanations. Would an explanation of emotional behaviour that does not make 
reference to the emotion object have the same explanatory significance as one 
that makes reference? There are many examples of explanations that do not 
make reference to the emotion object because the object cannot be known. 
Consider facial expressions. We generally explain them in terms of the emotions 
they express without making reference to the emotion objects. We say that 
people scowl in anger, cry in sadness, or smile in delight without knowing what 
the emotion object is. This does not make the explanation less informative. The 
fact remains that this is consistent with the possibility of improving our 
understanding by asking the person what she is angry, sad, or delighted about. 
This shows that it is always possible to improve our understanding of 
expressive behaviour by making reference to the objects of the expressed 
emotions. In some case, we do not even need to ask the subject what her 
emotion is about. We can observe the situation in which the expression occurs 
and observe the relation between the expression and the emotion object.35 
                                                 
35 This is particularly clear in the case of joint attention. Joint attention occurs when two people 
both attend to interesting objects and events in their environment. If someone were present 
when I saw the beetle and had become afraid of it, she would be in a position to perceive both 
my emotion and its object by jointly attending the emotion in my expression and the object in 
relation to which the emotion arose. Of course, this is not always possible as the object of the 
emotion may vanish before the observer can see it. But it is in principle possible that when the 
emotion is caused by a perception, an observer could perceive the emotion, its object, and the 
relation between the two. The latter can be perceived, for example, by observing that the 
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Prima facie, the case of facial expressions suggests that emotion objects 
are not essential to ordinary explanations of emotional behaviour. One should 
bear in mind, though, that facial expressions are a specific kind of emotional 
behaviour. There is a sense in which they are not behaviour in the same way as 
short and long-term behaviour are. Expressions are characteristic manifestations 
of emotions. A facial expression that shows a certain emotion can only be 
explained by the fact that there is an emotion of which the expression is the 
manifestation, unless we have reason to suppose that the expression is 
contrived. Short-term behavioural episodes and long-term behaviour are not as 
characteristic. Consider behavioural patterns that are not expressions like the 
refusal to fly. Explanations that do not make reference to the emotion objects 
would say that the person refuses to fly because she is afraid. This does not say 
what she is afraid of. It could be that she is afraid of suffering from motion 
sickness, or that she is afraid of leaving home, or that she is afraid of staying 
away from her family. 
On this account, saying that the person refuses to fly because she is afraid 
does not provide a full explanation of her behaviour. The same pattern of 
behaviour is amenable to numerous different explanations in terms of possible 
objects of fear. This shows that in the attempt at making the person’s behaviour 
intelligible we need to make reference to things of which she can possibly be 
afraid. In other words, as soon as we try to make emotional behaviour 
intelligible we try to explain it in relation to objects. This confirms that objects 
are essentially involved in explanations of emotional behaviour. It is essential to 
good explanations of emotional behaviour that they make reference to emotion 
                                                                                                                                                
emotion occurred at the same time that a certain object appeared. For further discussion see 
Chapters V and VI. 
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objects. This is because it is a characteristic of emotions that they are always 
directed at objects. 
Prima facie, the claim that emotions are always directed at objects is 
challenged by the case of objectless emotions such as objectless depression and 
anxiety. The claim is, however, false. There are three arguments against the 
claim. First, it is dubious that depression is an emotion. Psychologists usually 
describe it as a mood. However, for the sake of argument, I will grant that 
depression is an emotion. Second, the claim is committed to the idea that 
emotion objects must be definite and concrete entities such as a dog or gun. The 
natural consequence of this view is that if an emotion fails to have a definite 
object, it must have no object at all. This does not take into account that 
emotions are also directed at abstract entities. Third, there is an important 
difference between an emotion being objectless and not knowing what the 
emotion object is. I will show that those emotions we tend to regard as objectless 
are actually emotions that have objects that we do not know. But, before this, I 
will show that emotions can be directed at abstract entities. I will consider the 
case of objectless anxiety, which I do not regard as a mood. 
When suffering from anxiety, people behave in characteristic ways. They 
become alarmed; they worry about trivial things; they fear changes and 
novelties. This behavioural pattern is often described as existential anxiety, 
namely, anxiety about life as it is. When we characterise anxiety in this way, we 
interpret people’s behaviour in relation to what seems to be the issue at the basis 
of their condition: the difficulty to accept life as it is with all its complexity and 
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indeterminacy. In other words, life is the object of anxiety.36 The point is that the 
object of this emotion is not a specific concrete object. It is an abstract object. 
Armed with this analysis, we can see that any emotions are directed at 
abstract objects. We may fear death or the possibility of a third world war. We 
may long for true love. We may enjoy the beauty of a mathematical proof. We 
may be sad about the idea that human kind will die out one day. Emotion 
objects can also be properties. I may dislike the colour of a certain dress; I may 
be disgusted at the bad smell emanating from a basket of mouldy fruit; I may be 
offended by the way someone has spoken to me. These considerations show that 
the objection that there are objectless emotions is false. The objection rests on a 
narrow conception of what kinds of entities can be the objects of emotions. 
I will now consider the second argument. The fact that emotions have 
objects does not imply that the emotion subjects always know the emotion 
objects. This view is stressed by Tim Crane: 
 
Everyone will agree that there is such a thing as being anxious and yet 
not being able to give an answer to the question ‘what are you anxious 
about?’. But this by itself does not show that anxiety can lack 
intentionality. For one thing, we have just seen that asking ‘what is X 
about?’ is not always the most uncontroversial way of deciding whether 
                                                 
36 Jean-Paul Sartre’s account of melancholy runs along similar lines. He writes: “My melancholy 
is a method of suppressing the obligation to look for…new ways [to realise the potentialities of 
the world] by transforming the present structure of the world, replacing it with a totally 
undifferentiated structure…In other words, lacking both the ability and the will to carry out the 
projects I formerly entertained, I behave in such a manner that the universe requires nothing 
more from me. This one can only do by acting upon oneself, by ‘lowering the flame of life to a 
pin-point’ – and the noetic correlate of this attitude is what we call Bleakness: the universe is 
bleak; that is, of undifferentiated structure.” (SARTRE 1939/1971: 68-9). 
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X is intentional. And more importantly, it should not be a condition of a 
state’s being intentional that the subject of that state must be able to 
express what the state’s content is, or even which kind of state it is. Every 
theory of intentionality must allow that subjects are not always the best 
authorities on all the contents of their minds.37 
 
On this account, the fact that an emotion has an object is compatible with the 
possibility that the subject does not know what the emotion object is. This is an 
epistemic not a metaphysical problem. There is reason to believe that 
knowledge of emotion objects often depends on the subject’s understanding of 
what is going on in her life as well as on self-understanding. The latter involves 
the ability of relating the emotion she feels to other mental states of hers as well 
as to her bodily and linguistic behaviour. For example, someone may 
understand that she is upset about a discussion she had with a friend because 
she obsessively goes back, in her thought, to the conversation. Hanna Pickard 
has argued that a way of explaining the intentionality of emotions is, in fact, in 
terms of understanding of the reason why someone has the emotion she feels.38 
People experience objectless emotions when they lack understanding of the 
experiential situations they face in their lives. If they lack such an 
understanding, there is no way for them to identify the objects at which the 
emotions they feel are directed. On this view, emotions always have objects. The 
fact that, on some occasions, we do not know these objects is an epistemic 
problem not a feature of the metaphysics of emotions. 
                                                 
37 CRANE 1998: 8, quoted from manuscript. 
38 PICKARD 2003. 
 124 
To sum up then: emotions always have objects. They play an essential 
role in the explanation of emotional behaviour. This is evident in the fact that it 
is when we make reference to emotion objects that emotional behaviour 
becomes fully intelligible. How does this conclusion bear on the objection that 
emotions are not the only affective states that may manifest themselves in 
experiences and behaviour, given that moods and personality traits may also 
manifest themselves in the same way? While it is clear that emotions always 
have objects, the same is not true of moods. Personality traits, on the other hand, 
do not actually manifest themselves in experiences and behaviour, but in the 
tendency of states and patterns of behaviour to reoccur. It follows that moods 
and personality traits are different from emotions. I will present the arguments 
for these conclusions in the next section.  
 
6. Emotions, Moods, and Personality Traits 
 
In Section 1, I have argued that we give the term ‘moods’ to those emotions 
which are unjustified and which are not directed at objects. In the previous 
section, I have argued that emotions always have objects. It follows that moods 
are not emotions, but another kind of affective state. This would be sufficient to 
refute the objection that emotions and moods are states of the same kind. The 
advocate of the mood-personality view may still object that emotions and 
moods explain behaviour in the same way – for example, she may argue that 
there is no difference between saying that one is sad and saying that one is in a 
bad mood. It follows that the fact that emotions are directed at objects, while 
moods are not, does not constitute a substantial difference between the two 
states. I will show that the mood-personality view is wrong. Objects play an 
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essential role in psychological explanations. In particular, explanations in terms 
of emotions are remarkably more precise and informative than explanations in 
terms of moods. 
To see this, consider again the refusal to travel by plane. The advocate of 
the mood-personality view claims that this behaviour is explained by the fact 
that the person is in a fearful mood. In contrast, I claim that it is explained by the 
fact that she is afraid of flying. It is clear that the explanation in terms of fear 
makes reference to a specific object (i.e. the idea or experience of flying), while 
the explanation in terms of a fearful mood does not make reference to any 
object. This is consistent with what I have observed about the metaphysics of 
emotions: they are reactions to objects. Moods, by contrast, are enduring 
affective states directed at no specific objects. They often originate from physical 
conditions of the body like fatigue, premenstrual syndrome, electrochemical 
unbalances in the brain, or the use of drugs and alcohol. 
My opponent may object that it is not necessarily true that moods have 
no objects. For example, the idea of flying can be one of the objects of the 
person’s fearful mood. Of course, she may fear many other things besides flying, 
but it is clear that the idea of flying is one of the things her fearful mood is 
about. Prima facie, the objection is sound. The person’s mood can be directed at 
different objects in the same way as her fear can be directed at different things. 
However, there is a difference between saying, on one hand, that a fearful mood 
can be directed at all sorts of things and, on the other, saying that fear can be 
directed at different things. The point is that the same mood can be directed at 
all sorts of things at once, while the same emotion cannot be directed at different 
objects at once. On this account, someone who is in a bad mood can complain 
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about the weather, the political situation, the cost of living, her partner, her job, 
and so on. In contrast, someone who is annoyed or upset is annoyed or upset 
about one specific thing. In other words, while emotions are directed at specific 
objects, moods are directed at all sorts of objects at once. 
This characteristic of moods depends on the fact that, as unjustified 
affective states, they challenge our self-understanding. There is, in fact, a sense 
in which we do not understand moods entirely. This is because we are not 
always in a position to relate our moods to the underlying physical or 
physiological causes that produce them. A way of dealing with such lack of self-
understanding is to assign putative objects to our moods. Consider the 
following example. Lack of sugar makes me grumpy and obnoxious. On my 
way home, I get annoyed at people on the tram when they push me to reach the 
door. The point is that my fellow commuters are behaving in a normal fashion. 
My reaction is due to my bad mood, not due to their behaviour. People become 
the object of my mood because this helps me to make sense of a state that I 
would not otherwise understand. On this account, there is a specific reason why 
moods may be directed at all sorts of objects. It is a characteristic of moods that 
they lack objects and thereby raise a problem to our self-understanding. A way 
of dealing with this is to assign putative objects to them. 
These considerations bear on the role of objects in psychological 
explanations. When we explain people’s behaviour in terms of moods, it is 
because we do not know what objects justify the behaviour. Accounts in terms 
of moods allow us to provide general explanations of fairly general patterns of 
behaviour. For instance, say we encounter an acquaintance who is behaving in 
an unusually unwelcoming and unfriendly manner. Since we do not know why 
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she is unfriendly, we tend to explain her behaviour by saying that she is in a bad 
mood. This does not mean that her behaviour cannot be explained in terms of a 
reaction to a specific object. The point is that we do not know this object. Since 
explanations by emotions make reference to objects, we opt for an explanation 
in terms of mood because it does not need to refer to a specific object. 
This shows that the two types of explanations have different degrees of 
precision. The explanation in terms of emotion is more precise because it 
actually justifies emotional behaviour by making reference to the object in 
reaction to which the emotion is formed. The explanation in terms of mood, by 
contrast, is less precise because it does not make reference to any specific object. 
Therefore, the claim that emotions and moods are similar because they explain 
behaviour in the same way is false. Moods and emotions are different kinds of 
states that lead to different kinds of psychological explanations.39 
I will now consider personality traits. Some preliminary remarks may 
help to set the stage. Personality traits are features of our psychological make-
                                                 
39 Despite their differences, moods and emotions are causally related. Psychological evidence 
suggests that moods may second the occurrence of some emotions, rather than others. In 
particular, Vincent Nowlis (NOWLIS 1963) has suggested that moods are higher-order 
dispositions, while emotions are lower-order dispositions. This is in line with the fact that 
negative moods may facilitate states of anger, frustration, discomfort, and sense of failure. This 
suggests that emotions can be formed within general frames of mind – they are moods. In 
discussing Nowlis’ view, Paul Griffiths observes: “Moods are dispositions to have 
emotions…An angry mood is a disposition to get angry easily. Anger itself is a disposition to all 
sorts of behaviors and mental state changes. To take another example, being a depressive is 
possessing marked disposition to become depressed. Becoming depressed would be an 
alteration in dispositions to have such emotions as joy and sadness.” (GRIFFITHS 1997: 249). 
Moods may make us more sensitive to some properties of objects and situations that we would 
not notice otherwise. For example, being in a grumpy mood may make me more sensitive to 
aversive stimuli that I normally overlook. On this account, moods affect our sensitivity to the 
world and lead us to prime some features of the world rather than others. This is consistent with 
psychological data showing that people in a depressed mood tend to prime stimuli that confirm 
their state rather than positive or rewarding stimuli which might disconfirm their mind-state.  
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up. They can be divided into two classes. The first is constituted by traits that 
explain people’s tendency to have specific emotions. They are traits like 
fearfulness, anxiousness, resentfulness, optimism, nervousness, or 
hypochondria. Fearfulness, for example, explains the fact that one has a strong 
tendency to fear or worry about anything dangerous or challenging. The second 
class of personality traits is constituted by traits that explain people’s tendency 
to behave in specific ways. They are bravery, generosity, fastidiousness, 
precision, and so on. Generosity, for example, explains the fact that one has a 
strong tendency to help and support those who are in need. 
The advocate of the mood-personality view claims that there are three 
reasons for thinking that emotions and personality traits are states of the same 
kind. First, personality traits are reactions to positive or negative events in one’s 
life. For example, a person may be a pessimist because she has gone through 
many negative experiences in her life. Second, personality traits are enduring 
non-episodic states that may manifest themselves in experiences and behaviour. 
A shy person, for example, may feel awkward and behave in an odd way on 
public occasions. Third, personality traits may have objects. In the case of 
shyness, for example, other people are the object at which the trait is directed. In 
the case of pessimism, in contrast, abstract entities like ‘life’ or the ‘future’ are 
the objects at which the trait is directed. 
There are various arguments against the mood-personality view. First, it 
is not always true that personality traits are reactions to experiences and events 
in one’s life. We normally think of shyness, for example, as a congenital trait. 
Some infants appear shy and withdrawn; others appear friendly and engaging. 
Other personality traits like pessimism or assertiveness are, indeed, features that 
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people acquire in reaction to how they are raised, educated, or to what they 
went through in life. This shows that it is not always true that personality traits 
are reactions. They can be reactions as well as congenital features. In contrast, 
emotions are reactions. This is the first reason to conclude that emotions and 
personality traits are not alike. 
The main argument against the mood-personality view concerns the 
claim that personality traits manifest themselves in experiences and behaviour. 
This claim is dubious. Personality traits can be viewed as dispositions to form 
emotions and moods, which manifest themselves in experiences and behaviour. 
Personality traits explain why certain specific moods and emotions tend to 
reoccur more frequently than others. For example, pessimism explains why 
some people are more inclined to become sad or depressed than others. On this 
account, personality traits do not actually manifest themselves in experiences 
and behaviour. They manifest themselves in the tendency of certain patterns of 
behaviour to recur. Such patterns are explained by those moods and emotions 
which personality traits facilitate. This is the main reason for concluding that 
emotions and personality traits are not states of the same kind. 
To sum up: emotions, moods and personality traits are different kinds of 
enduring non-episodic affective states. Emotions are reactions to specific objects 
that manifest themselves in experiences and behaviour. Moods are, instead, 
objectless. Personality traits are different in two respects. Firstly, they are not 
always reactions since they can be congenital. Secondly, they do not manifest 
themselves in experiences and behaviour, but in the tendency of certain patterns 






I have shown that emotions are different from all those states to which they are 
frequently compared. They differ from beliefs and judgements because 
emotions do not require the ability of conceptual thought. They differ from 
perceptual experiences because emotions are active states. They differ from 
moods because emotions have specific objects. Finally, they differ from 
personality traits because emotions are reactions which manifest themselves in 
experiences and behaviour. This allows me to conclude that emotions are sui 









In the previous chapter, I argued that emotions are enduring non-episodic 
reactions that may or may not manifest themselves in emotional experiences 
and behaviour. In this chapter, I will discuss the notion of emotional experience. 
An emotional experience is what a person feels when she experiences an 
emotion − e.g. what she feels when she is afraid. Therefore, emotional 
experiences are bodily feelings. 
The notion of bodily feeling is often ill-understood. Many philosophers 
contrast bodily feelings with perceptions of the external world. They do this 
because they think that bodily feelings do not provide one with awareness of 
anything independent of those feelings. In contrast, perceptions provide one 
with awareness of objects the existence of which is independent of the perceiver. 
For this reason, many philosophers have argued that although feelings are 
experiences, they are not forms of awareness of anything independent of them. I 
shall refer to this conception as the sensation view.1 
This is not, however, the only possible way of viewing feelings. An 
alternative view is that they are perceptions of one’s body. I shall refer to this as 
                                                 
1 In recent years this view has been defended by McGinn (MCGINN 1982) and John Searle 
(SEARLE 1983). For discussion see CRANE 1998 and MARTIN 1998c. 
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the perception view.2 Emotional feelings are just another type of bodily feelings. 
This means that they also can be viewed as perceptions of the body. I support 
this view. In particular, I will argue that emotional feelings are perceptions of 
specific bodily changes brought about by the action of emotions upon the body. 
These changes are the objects of which emotional feelings are experiences. For 
example, a feeling of anger is perception of a pattern of change that is peculiar 
to anger. In contrast, a feeling of sadness is perception of a pattern of change 
that is peculiar to sadness. On this account, each emotional feeling is perception 
of a specific change in the body. 
I will structure the discussion as follows. First, I will present the sensation 
view and explain why it is inadequate as an account of feelings. Second, I will 
present the perception view and explain why it is preferable to the sensation 
view. On this basis, I will provide a perceptual account of emotional feelings. 
This will involve a discussion of the varieties of perceptual error in emotional 
feelings. I will then address the question of what distinguish emotional from 
non-emotional feelings. Finally, I will discuss emotional feelings of higher 
emotions and show that the kind of perception they involve is different from the 
kind of perception involved in feelings of basic emotions.  
 
2. The Sensation View  
 
Bodily feelings are normally caused by states within one’s body. They typically 
serve as signs for these states. Cramps, for example, signal damage to a specific 
                                                 
2 This view further divides into a representational account and a naïve realist account of feelings. 
Defenders of the representational account are ARMSTRONG 1962, 1968; PITCHER 1970; TYE 1997, 
2006a, 2006b. Defenders of the naïve realist account are MARTIN 1992, 1995, 1998c and PICKARD 
2004, among others. For discussion see AYDEDE 2005. 
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part of the body. Similarly, thirst signals that one’s body is dehydrated. It is not 
always the case that feelings signal the bodily states to which they are typically 
associated. One can feel thirsty even when one’s body is not dehydrated.3 
Feelings have locations within one’s body. They can have specific location like 
when one feels a pain in one’s knee. But they can also suffuse body parts like 
when one has cold feet. Some feelings are associated with the body without 
having location like when one feels fatigued. Other feelings occur in body parts 
different from those where their actual causes are located, as in the case of 
referred pain.4 
Feelings are also what we experience in the grip of emotions. A feeling of 
anger is what someone experiences when she is angry, and anger manifests 
itself in experience by affecting the body. Emotional feelings often lack location. 
Happiness, for example, may feel like a general feeling of elation. This does not 
apply to all emotional feelings though. Some feelings perfuse body parts. Rage 
may feel like a sensation of warmth in the face. Others have specific locations. 
Disgust may feel like a sensation of nausea in the gut. Anxiety may feel like a 
sensation of pressure or constriction in the chest. 
What puzzles philosophers about feelings is that, unlike perceptions, 
they do not always allow us to draw a distinction between the feeling and the 
object of which the feeling is an experience. This distinction is applicable only to 
a small group of feelings. We can distinguish between warmth and sensation of 
warmth, pressure and sensation of pressure. For warmth and pressure can exist 
in the absence of a sentient subject. The same distinction does not apply to 
                                                 
3 Brain tumours may cause one to feel thirsty even after drinking water in large quantities.     
4 For instance, inflammations of the stomach mucosa like gastritis may cause pain in the upper 
back.  
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feelings like pains, itches, and tickles. A pain is something that cannot exist in 
the absence of someone who is in pain. The same consideration carries over to 
emotional feelings. A feeling of fear is something that cannot exist in the absence 
of someone who is afraid. 
On this basis, some philosophers have proposed what I have called the 
sensation view. This view contrasts bodily feelings with perceptions, which are 
typically directed at external objects. Unlike perceptions, bodily feelings are 
viewed as subjective states, which are not directed at objects that exist 
independently of the sentient subject. 
There are various brands of sensation view. One is the so-called act–object 
view.5 It claims that, in having bodily feelings, there is a genuine object of 
awareness, even if it depends for its existence on the subject’s awareness of it. 
On this view, the objects of awareness are mental entities. A version of the view 
is the sense-datum theory.6 The theory was originally proposed as an account of 
perception, but it may be easily adjusted to bodily feelings. The core 
commitment of the theory is that perception is an act directed at objects. So, 
perception is a relational state that links the perceiver to the objects of 
perception. These are not physical objects, but experiential intermediaries of 
which we are directly aware and that resemble external objects. Sense-datum 
theorists conceive these intermediaries as mental objects internal to one’s 
consciousness. The theory appeals to intermediaries in order to account for non-
veridical perceptions like hallucinations. When someone hallucinates a certain 
object, she is presented with a sense-datum that resembles a physical object, but 
                                                 
5 JACKSON 1977. 
6 MOORE 1905; RUSSELL 1912; BROAD 1925; PRICE 1932; AUSTIN 1962. For discussion see CRANE 
2000 and MARTIN 2002, 2004. 
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which is not caused by any physical object in the world. 
An account of bodily feelings in line with the sense-datum theory says 
that feelings are mental objects the existence of which depends on their being 
felt by a sensing subject. The difference between feelings and perception is that 
feelings are not taken to resemble anything in the physical world. They are not 
intermediaries but mental objects on their own, internal to one’s consciousness. 
This view also accounts for emotional feelings which are taken to be 
inner mental entities present to one’s consciousness. What distinguishes them 
from feelings and sensations that do not manifest emotions is how they feel. So, 
for example, a feeling of anger is a mental object that feels different from other 
feelings and sensations. 
Some philosophers reject the idea that feelings and sensations are states 
of awareness of mental objects. This view is also known as the no-object view7. 
Like the sense-datum theory, the view was originally proposed as an account of 
perception. It denies that there is any distinction between the act of perceiving 
and what is perceived. A specific version of the view is known as adverbialism.8 It 
denies that in perception one is related to objects of any sort. It maintains that 
perceptions are to be understood as describing how we perceive something, 
rather than what we perceive. On this view, perceptions are modifications of the 
perceiver that can be characterised by specialised adverbs specifying how the 
perceiver is ‘appeared-to.’ Visual perception, for example, is an experience in 
which the perceiver is aware of properties that make her experience a visual 
perception. So, for example, when one sees a red tomato, one has an experience 
in which one is aware of properties that make the experience a visual perception 
                                                 
7 MARTIN 1998c. 
8 DUCASSE 1942; CHISHOLM 1966; TYE 1984a, 1984b. For discussion see MARTIN 1998a. 
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of a red tomato. These are properties such as seeing red-ly and round-ly. 
An adverbialist account of feelings and sensations says that they are 
modifications of the subject that can be characterised in terms of specialised 
adverbs. If a sensation of pain is just a painful sensation, then feeling pain may 
just be to have a certain sort of sensation, a painful one, or to feel in a certain 
way – painfully, for example. What is felt exists just in case one has the feeling, 
because it is a way in which one feels. This view has some intuitive appeal. 
Expressions like ‘I feel cold,’ ‘I am in pain,’ and ‘I feel miserable’ seem to report 
how the subject is affected by each experience. So, for example, feeling cold is 
having an experience in which one feels, so to speak, cold-ly. 
On this construal, feelings are states of awareness of properties of 
experience and not of properties of the body. These properties do not only 
determine how the experience feels, but also where the experience is felt. So, 
having cold feet is being aware of properties that make one feel cold-ly and, as it 
were, feet-ly. This view also applies to emotional feelings. A feeling of anger, for 
example, is a sensation in which one is aware of feeling angry-ly. This property 
distinguishes a feeling of anger from other emotional feeling in which one is 
affected differently. 
The sensation view raises the following problem. It is uncontroversial 
that bodily feelings and sensations are experiences. A natural way of 
understanding experience is as states of awareness of objects in the world. The 
sensation view, by contrast, conceives of feelings and sensations as awareness of 
mental objects or of properties of experiences. This view, therefore, fails to do 
justice to the idea that, as experiences, feelings and sensations provide one with 
awareness of objects that exist independently of one’s awareness of them. 
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This view appears even more problematic when we consider what it is 
that we know through bodily feelings and sensations. Experience is often a 
source of knowledge about the world. But if we conceive of bodily feelings as 
experiences in which one becomes aware of objects and properties internal to 
one’s mind, it follows that they do not provide knowledge of anything in the 
world. At best, they provide knowledge of one’s own mind. This challenges the 
idea that experience is a source of knowledge about the world. 
The perception view offers a solution to these problems. Its thrust is the 
idea that the body and what happens within the body are things that are parts 
of the physical world like chairs, houses, and mountains. And like we perceive 
chairs, houses, and mountains, we also perceive our body and what goes on in 
it. I will discuss this view and its relevance to a plausible account of emotional 
feelings in the next section.  
 
3.1 The Perception View  
 
The perception view says that in having a feeling one comes to be aware of one’s 
body. When I feel pain in my knee, it is my knee that hurts in some way. The 
location of the feeling is the body part of which I am aware when I feel pain. The 
view denies that feelings are mental objects by arguing that the body parts of 
which we are aware in feelings are parts of the world. As Mike Martin puts it: 
 
One’s ankles, toes or teeth are no less part of the objective world than are 
tables and chairs, so bodily sensations cannot be purely subjective states 
of mind which give one awareness of nothing independent of them. 
Rather, having sensations gives one an awareness of an item in the 
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objective world: one’s body.9 
 
Some philosophers have claimed that feelings are just a form of perception of 
one’s body.10 For example, pain is perception of located tissue damage. This 
view is difficult to defend because, in ordinary perception, there is a difference 
between the properties perceived and the experience of them. For example, a 
round plate may look elliptical. In this case there is a difference between the 
property perceived (i.e. the object’s being round) and how the property appears 
to a perceiver (i.e. its looking elliptical). It is difficult to draw the same 
distinction with feelings. While we can say that the plate looks elliptical even 
though it is not, we cannot say that a pain seems to hurt, even though it does 
not. This is apparent in the case of pains located in phantom-limbs. These 
feelings appear to be located in body parts that no longer exist; yet, nonetheless, 
they still hurt. 
Another reason for thinking that a purely perceptual account of bodily 
feelings is not plausible is that, while some aspects of feelings can be treated as 
perceptions of the body or body parts, other aspects cannot be ascribed to the 
body. For example, when I feel a burning sensation in my stomach, there is no 
objective feature of my stomach corresponding to the fact that it feels as if it is 
burning. My stomach might well be irritated, but this does not explain why it 
feels as if it is burning, rather than achy. Similarly, when I have the illusory 
sensation that an insect is crawling on my back, there is no objective feature of 
my back corresponding to the fact that it feels as though as insect is crawling on 
it. The feature belongs to my state of awareness and not to my body as an object 
                                                 
9 MARTIN 1998c. 
10 TYE 1997, 2006a, 2006b.  
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of my awareness. I will come back to this point in Section 5. 
Some philosophers argue that the implausibility of a purely perceptual 
model of bodily feelings need not lead us to reject the idea that feelings and 
sensations are forms of awareness of one’s body. In particular, Mike Martin 
points out that supposing that sensation is a form of awareness of one’s body 
fits very well with the fact that we feel the locations of sensations to be locations 
within the body, and not within other parts of space.11 This is true even of 
phantom-limb pains. These pains do not feel located out in empty space, but in 
an apparent limb which extends beyond the point of amputation.  
This view also applies to emotional feelings. Most feelings that manifest 
emotions do not have bodily location. This is not true of all emotional feelings as 
some feelings perfuse body parts. Others have specific locations. So, although 
most emotional feelings do not have location, this should not be viewed as a 
distinctive feature of emotional feelings. Like other bodily sensations, they are 
states of awareness of one’s body (e.g. when I feel happy) or body parts (e.g. 
when I feel nauseous and the sensation is located in my stomach). 
It is clear that the body and body parts are not the only objects of which 
we are aware in emotional feelings. When someone feels angry, she perceives 
various modifications in her body. She feels her heart racing, her face flushing, 
her muscles contracting, and so on. This suggests that she perceives not only her 
body itself but also changes within it. William James claims that emotions are 
perceptions of changes in the body, and these perceptions are what we call 
‘feelings.’12 I have shown that this claim is false because emotions are not 
feelings. But if we interpret it as a claim about the nature of emotional 
                                                 
11 MARTIN 1992, 1995, 1998c; PICKARD 2004. 
12 JAMES 1884: 189-90. 
 140 
experience rather than about the nature of emotions, the claim puts forward a 
perceptual account of emotional feelings, which says that emotional feelings are 
perceptions of changes in the body. James goes beyond this claim and gives an 
account of the nature of the changes. He thinks they are modifications in the 
inner organs produced by the activity of the autonomous nervous system in 
reaction to stimuli from the environment. Emotional feelings are, therefore, 
perceptions of autonomic changes. This view is summarised in the following 
passage from James’ paper What is an Emotions? 
 
That the heart-beats and the rhythm of breathing play a leading part in all 
emotions whatsoever, is a matter too notorious for proof. And what is 
really equally prominent, but less likely to be admitted until special 
attention is drawn to the fact, is the continuous co-operation of the 
voluntary muscles in our emotional states. Even when no change of 
outward attitude is produced, their inward tension alters to suit each 
varying mood, and is felt as a difference of tone or of strain. In depression 
the flexors tend to prevail; in elation or belligerent excitement the 
extensors take the lead. And the various permutations and combinations 
of which these organic activities are susceptible, make it abstractly 
possible that no shade of emotion, however slight, should be without a 
bodily reverberation as unique, when taken in its totality, as is the mental 
mood itself.13 
 
On this account, emotions produce autonomic changes of which emotional 
                                                 
13 JAMES 1884: 192. 
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feelings are perceptions. In other words, the changes are the objects of which 
emotional feelings are experiences. The first objection to this view is that we do 
not perceive bodily changes through a dedicated sense organ, while it is 
through the senses that we perceive physical objects. There are two arguments 
against the objection. 
The first is that, in general, perception can be characterised as 
phenomenal awareness of objects without making reference to the sense organ 
involved in experiencing objects. In some cases it is not clear which sense 
provides us with awareness of a certain object or property. Think of wine 
tasting, for example. Sometimes we try wines that taste like strawberries. It is 
natural to say that it is through the taste that we perceive the flavour. Yet, the 
same flavour disappears or diminishes if we sip the wine while holding our 
nose. This seems to suggest that it was through the smell that we perceive the 
flavour. Yet, we cannot deny that the wine still has an aftertaste like 
strawberries. In this case, it is not clear which sense provide us with awareness 
of the strawberry flavour. Perhaps both senses are involved in perception of the 
flavour. Or perhaps only one sense actually perceives the flavour, while the 
other is in some way biased. What is clear is that, regardless of the details, we 
are aware of the flavour. This example shows that considerations about the 
senses are not essential to explain how we gain awareness of objects. This 
suggests, in turn, that even if we had no answer to the question of what sense 
organ makes us aware of bodily changes, we could not deny that we are aware 
of them. This is confirmed by the fact that we feel them.  
The second objection to the view that the changes are the objects of which 
emotional feelings are experiences is that, at any rate, a sense modality is 
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actually involved in perception of bodily changes, even though it is not one of 
the five senses. The modality is known as interoception.14 Again, James is the 
first to offer an account of how interoception operates in awareness of the bodily 
changes emotions bring about. He writes:  
 
If we suppose [the brain’s] cortex to contain centres for the perception of 
changes in each special sense-organ…and to contain absolutely nothing 
else, we still have a scheme perfectly capable of representing the process 
of the emotions. An object falls on a sense-organ and is apperceived by 
the appropriate cortical centre; or else the latter, excited in some other 
way, gives rise to an idea of the same object. Quick as a flash, the reflex 
currents pass down through their pre-ordained channels, alter the 
condition of muscle, skin and viscus; and these alterations, apperceived 
like the original object, in as many specific portions of the cortex, combine 
with it in consciousness and transform it from an object-simply-
apprehended into an object-emotionally-felt.15  
 
On this account, bodily changes are the objects of which emotional feelings are 
experiences. This is analogous to ordinary perception where physical objects are 
the objects of which ordinary perceptions are experiences. 
These considerations may not be sufficient to convince the opponent of 
my view that emotional feelings are perceptions of bodily changes. In particular, 
there is one further objection the opponent is likely to raise. It says that the 
objects of perception are entities located in a public space – the world – to which 
                                                 
14 For a contemporary discussion of the notion of interoception see CAMERON 2001 and 2002. 
15 JAMES 1884: 203. 
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anyone can gain access. In contrast, the objects of emotional feelings are located 
within the body. This makes them private because no one apart from the subject 
has access to them. There are two arguments against the objection. The first 
questions the idea that the changes are actually confined within the body. The 
second questions the idea that only the subject can perceive them. I will discuss 
each response in detail. 
In the previous chapter, I have argued that feelings and expressions can 
be viewed as different appearances of the same pattern of bodily change. An 
emotional feeling is how the change appears to the subject, while an expression 
is how the same change appears to the observer. On this account, the changes of 
which emotional feelings are perceptions do not occur only inside the body. 
They also affect the outwardly visible part of the body like the face, skin, 
posture, and hair. When this is the case, the same change that the subject 
experiences as a certain emotional feeling may appear to the observer as the 
expression of a certain emotion by the subject. For example, if I touch someone’s 
cold and sweaty hands I perceive part of the same change she experiences as 
nervousness. On this account, bodily changes are not confined within one’s 
body. They can actually be observed from the outside. This is the first argument 
against the objection that bodily changes are private objects. 
The second argument challenges the idea that only the subject can 
perceive the changes. I have shown that we can perceive the changes in 
someone else’s body simply by observing how they affect the outwardly visible 
part of her body, as occurs if I touch someone’s cold and sweaty hands. The 
same is true of other senses. By hearing someone’s shaky voice I may perceive 
part of the change she experiences as fear. By seeing the scowl on her face I may 
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perceive part of the change she experiences as anger, and so on. Smell and taste 
seem less relevant to perception of changes in other people’s bodies. This can be 
explained as the result of our evolutionary history as well as of social 
conventions. This does not apply to animals that can smell and taste the changes 
emotions produce in other animals (e.g. skunks and green shield bugs). These 
examples show that the subject is not the only one to perceive the changes 
emotions produce by acting upon the body. 
Of course, it is not always the case that emotions affect the outwardly 
observable part of the body. For example, someone may feel angry without 
showing any outer sign of it because she has learned how to suppress or conceal 
her emotions. This does not mean we cannot possibly observe them. We can 
perceive someone else’s excitement by taking her pulse or by listening to her 
heart beat with a stethoscope. One may object that in these cases we do not 
perceive the change directly because we use a tool. However, tools can be 
viewed as extensions of the senses that allow us to gain phenomenal awareness 
of the same changes that others experience as emotional feelings. On this 
account, both the subject and the observer are phenomenally aware of the same 
object – that is, the same bodily change – even though the perceptual modalities 
are different since the observer listens to the heart beat with a stethoscope, while 
the subject feels it. This situation is not uncommon. When I listen to someone 
playing the piano, I perceive the same notes that she reads on the score 
(provided that she is a good player). Therefore, the two arguments show that 
bodily changes are not private objects and that the subject is not the only one 




3.2 The Phenomenal Character of Emotional Feelings  
 
What I have so far observed confirms that emotional feelings are perceptions of 
bodily changes. One may reasonably wonder what relation there is between 
such a change and the phenomenal character of an emotional feeling. A possible 
answer is that it is the same relation that exists between perceptions and the 
objects of which perceptions are experiences. An experience of a round object is 
a perception of an object that is round – provided that one’s visual system and 
the visual conditions are normal. The object’s being round is responsible for the 
fact that the object looks round to one. In other words, the object’s properties 
explain the phenomenal character of the experience. 
Some theories of perception distinguish between two types of properties 
of experience.16 They are observational and non-observational properties. Each 
property features in a specific kind of experience: observational properties 
features in what are sometimes called ‘observations,’17 while non-observational 
properties feature in experiences of objects that are represented as specific kinds 
of objects. It is possible for both properties to feature in the same experience. 
Observational properties of experience correspond to features of the world that 
perceivers can experience solely in virtue of the fact their perceptual system 
functions to detect such features. It is not a condition for experiencing 
observational properties that the subject has background knowledge about the 
world. This is to say that possession of concepts is not a condition for this kind 
                                                 
16 PEACOCKE 1983, 1992, 2003a, 2003b, 2007. For discussion see MACDONALD 1998. 
17 PEACOCKE 1983: Ch. 4.  
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of experience. Paradigms of observational properties are properties of the visual 
field like shape, size, distance, mutual location, colour, speed, and so on. 
Non-observational properties of the experience, by contrast, correspond 
to features of the world that perceivers can experience in virtue of what they 
know about the world; that is, when they master the relevant concepts. 
Examples of non-observational properties are the property of being a 
strawberry, a dog, a television, a car, a mountain, or a cathode ray tube. I will 
further discuss this topic in the next chapter. 
There is reason to believe that perception of changes brought about by 
emotions is independent of background knowledge. In other words, it is 
perception of observational properties of the changes. An argument for this 
claim draws on evidence that six basic emotions are shown by the same 
expressions in all cultures. In the 1960s, psychologists Paul Ekman18 and Carroll 
Izard19 interviewed members of diverse Western and non-Western literate 
cultures. The subjects were asked to choose the emotion terms which, in their 
language, corresponded to photographs of Caucasian individuals who 
expressed emotions with their faces. Izard and Ekman each showed different 
photographs, gave the subjects different lists of emotion terms and examined 
people in different cultures. They obtained consistent evidence of agreement in 
the labelling of the facial expressions of six basic emotions: anger, disgust, fear, 
joy, sadness, and surprise. To rule out the possibility that such agreement could 
result from imitations and cultural contamination, Ekman extended the findings 
to a preliterate culture in New Guinea whose members could not have learned 
                                                 
18 EKMAN et al. 1969, 1971. 
19 IZARD 1971. 
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the meaning of expressions from other cultures.20 He found that New Guinea 
aboriginals were capable of recognising the six basic emotions in pictures of 
Caucasian individuals who expressed these emotions in their faces. 
These data show that perception of emotions in other people’s 
expressions is independent of background knowledge about emotions. If this 
were not the case, we could not explain why individuals with different social 
and cultural background perceive the same emotions in the same arrangements 
of facial muscles – i.e. in the same facial expressions. The argument for this 
conclusion is as follows. A perceiver sees a square when her perceptual system 
is sensitive to square objects. Different perceivers can see the same square 
because they share the same perceptual system. Perceivers with and without 
knowledge about squares can all perceive the square because the only necessary 
condition for perceiving a square is that the perceiver’s perceptual system is 
sensitive to square objects. The same argument applies to expressions of 
emotions. Individuals from different cultures have different background 
knowledge about all sorts of things including emotions. But individuals with 
different background knowledge see the same emotions in the same 
arrangement of facial muscles. This is because their ability to see emotions does 
not depend on background knowledge about emotions, but on their perceptual 
system.21 I will come back to this point, and the results from Ekman’s and 
Izard’s research, in the next chapter. 
How does this argument bear on the kind of perception involved in 
emotional feelings? I have shown that an expression is the outwardly observable 
part of the overall change of which an emotional feeling is an experience. This is 
                                                 
20 EKMAN and FRIESEN 1971. 
21 I will discuss this view in Chapter V. 
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to say that seeing an expression of (say) sadness, and feeling sad is having an 
experience of the same kind of change even though in the first case the 
expression is located in another person’s body, while in the second the feeling is 
located in one’s own body. Evidence shows that background knowledge is not 
necessary to perceive basic emotions in other people’s expressions. This 
indicates that background knowledge is not necessary to perceive basic 
emotions in oneself either. In other words, when we see the changes emotions 
bring about in others and we feel the changes emotions bring about in ourselves, 
we perceive the same kind of changes. And the perception of these changes is 
independent of background knowledge in both cases. 
One may wonder whether emotional feelings are always independent of 
the content of background mental states. I will discuss this problem in Section 5. 
For now, I confine myself to the claim that specific emotional feelings are 
perceptions of specific bodily changes, and the ability to perceive these changes 
is independent of background knowledge. This is to say that emotional feelings 
are perceptions of observational properties of changes brought about by 
emotions. 
This account explains why feelings of different emotions are different. 
They are perceptions of changes with different properties. These properties 
explain the phenomenal character of the various emotional feelings. Different 
properties or different arrangements of the same properties are responsible for 
the phenomenal character of different emotional feelings. Specific emotional 
feelings are perceptions of bodily changes with specific properties. 
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This view is supported by empirical evidence. Zajonc and colleagues22 
have performed a series of experiments the aim of which was to prove the 
connection between brain temperature and the formation of emotions.23 The 
hypothesis was that the cooling of some brain areas induced by inhaling a 
bigger volume of air through the nose enhances positive moods, whereas the 
warming induced by a smaller volume of air enhances negative moods. Zajonc 
and colleagues, in the context of research on the vascular theory of emotional 
efference,24 compared the subjective experience of subjects pronouncing various 
phonemes, some of which involve the action of muscles that are dominant in 
emotional expressions. For example, the production of the phoneme e resembles 
the smile. The German phoneme ü has just the opposite action. Repeated 
pronunciation of e resulted in positive feelings as measured by ratings of liking, 
pleasantness, and preferences for the sound, whereas ü was judged unpleasant 
and was disliked, not only by American but by German subjects as well.25 
An explanation why different feelings correlated with the pronunciation 
of different phonemes is that the pronunciation produced different bodily 
changes with specific properties. The changes were essentially located in the 
face. The different feelings can be viewed as perceptions of the different 
changes. This is not quite sufficient on its own to explain why the subjects 
reported to experience not mere feelings, but pleasant and unpleasant feelings 
                                                 
22 ZAJONC et al. 1989. 
23 For discussion see of the experimental results see ADELMANN and ZAJONC 1989, and 
MCINTOSH et al. 1997. 
24 ZAJONC 1985. 
25 Similar results have been obtained in another experiment. Strack and colleagues (STRACK et al 
1988) have used a technique requiring subjects to hold a pen in their mouths in different ways. 
In two initial experiments, subjects held the pen either in their teeth (simulating a smile) or in 
their lips (simulating a frown). Their ratings of cartoon funniness were higher during the ‘smile’ 
and lower during the ‘frown’ patterns compared to ratings in a control condition. 
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like those experienced in emotions. A possible means of extending the 
explanation is to say that, although the subjects were not actually emotional, the 
changes they produced by pronouncing the phonemes were very similar to the 
changes people normally produce when they express positive or negative 
emotions.26 On this view, changes in the arrangement of facial muscles are part 
of the spectrum of changes emotions bring about when they act upon the body.27 
This view is confirmed by self-reports from subjects suffering from 
acquired conditions that prevent the movements of facial muscles. The 
neurophysiologist Jonathan Cole reports the case of a young man suffering from 
bilateral Bell’s palsy that immobilised his facial muscles for a few months. 
Before suffering from palsy, the subject had normal emotional feelings. During 
the palsy, he became unable to move his facial muscles and to make any facial 
expression. This affected his capacity to feel emotions. He described his state 
this way: “I feel almost as if I am in a limbo between feelings. I still feel happy to 
see or hear something I like, but I don’t think that I feel it as much because I am 
not actually smiling.”28 
                                                 
26 My account of the experiment differs from the interpretation of the experimental results given 
by Zajonc and colleagues who concluded that the reason why subjects experienced different 
emotions is that the pronunciation of the phonemes affected the volume of air inhaled and 
thereby altered the temperature of some brain areas. I do not criticise this conclusion, but I think 
the experiment also shows that there is a relation between specific changes and specific 
emotional feelings. 
27 It is worth noting that this account is in line with what Wittgenstein observes on the relation 
between emotional feelings and facial expressions. He writes: “[T]he personal experiences of an 
emotion must in part be strictly localized experiences; for if I frown in anger I feel the muscular 
tension of the frown in my forehead, and if I weep, the sensations around my eyes are obviously 
part, and an important part, of what I feel.” (WITTGENSTEIN 1958: 103). Wittgenstein seems to 
think that sensations deriving from facial expressions are involved in the formation of the 
overall sensation one experiences when one feels an emotion. 
28 COLE 2000: 62. See also the cases discussed in COLE 1998 and 1999. 
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Further evidence about the relation between specific changes and 
emotional feelings is provided by another experiment.29 The experiment 
measured the changes associated with six different emotions. Subjects were 
instructed to make faces that had been independently found to co-occur with 
emotions. Subjects were then asked to report any feeling they experienced. 
During this process, heart rate, finger temperature, and electrical conductivity of 
the skin were measured. Researchers found that there were differences between 
the changes that accompanied happiness and those that accompanied negative 
emotions. Heart rate acceleration was greater for anger and fear than for 
happiness. Prima facie, the results seem to suggest that specific emotional 
feelings do not correlate with specific bodily changes. Jesse Prinz, however, gives 
an alternative reading of the data.30 He thinks the experiment actually shows 
that each of the six emotions has its own pattern of changes. Prinz points out 
that the results were obtained using a small group of physiological responses. If 
researchers had measured other physiological responses, further differences 
might have emerged. 
Let us recap the situation: both experimental evidence and single subject 
case studies show that specific emotional feelings are perceptions of specific 
changes. The changes are the objects of which emotional feelings are 
experiences. On this account, how a certain emotion feels when it manifests 
itself in experience depends on the kind of change the emotion brings about. 
This is to say that the phenomenal character of emotional feelings is determined 
by the properties of the changes.  
 
                                                 
29 LEVENSON et al. 1990. 
30 PRINZ 2004: 73-4. 
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3.3 Emotional Feelings and Misperceptions 
 
It is a characteristic of perception that it can be mistaken. In particular, there are 
two kinds of perceptual mistakes: misperceptions and hallucinations. 
Misperceptions are experiences in which objects seem to have properties they do 
not actually have. For example, if we see a circular object as elliptical, or a 
rectangular object as square, we have experienced a misperception. 
Hallucinations are experiences of objects that do not actually exist. A 
hallucination is seeing a square object when there is no square object at all. If 
emotional feelings are perceptions, then they must allow for the possibility of 
being mistaken. This is confirmed by the fact that there are three ways, at 
minimum, in which emotional feelings can go wrong. 
The first kind of mistake occurs when one misperceives a change that 
does not manifest an emotion for one that does. For example, someone feels 
anxious when she is actually tense because she had too many coffees. In cases 
like this, the person misperceives the change because its appearance is similar to 
that of a change caused by an emotion. This is analogous to the visual case 
where a rectangular object looks square because the difference between the two 
sides is so small that they seem to be of equal length. 
The experiment carried out by Zajonc and colleagues, in which subjects 
pronounced different phonemes, is another example of this kind of 
misperception. There is no reason to suppose that subjects in the experiment 
actually became emotional about anything. Nevertheless, they reported pleasant 
and unpleasant feelings like those that typically correlate with emotions. The 
explanation I proposed is that the changes the subjects produced by 
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pronouncing the phonemes were similar to the changes that positive and 
negative emotions typically bring about. Because of the similarity, subjects 
misperceived the changes produced during the experiment for the changes that 
positive and negative emotions typically bring about when they are expressed. 
The second kind of mistake occurs when one misperceives a change that 
manifests an emotion for one that does not. This is the opposite of the previous 
case. For example, someone may mistake a feeling of nausea that manifests 
anxiety for the symptoms of stomach upset. In this case, the person misperceives 
the change because its appearance is similar to that of a change caused by a 
physical condition.31 It is worth noting that this kind of error is more 
problematic than the previous one because it implies poor understanding of 
one’s mental life. Emotions are reactions to objects. When someone mistakes a 
change that manifests an emotion for one caused by a physical condition, she 
fails to understand that she is reacting to something. 
Panic attacks are another example of this kind of perceptual mistake. 
Some people, upon suffering their first panic attacks, misrepresent the dramatic 
changes they undergo as symptoms of heart attacks. This means that they fail to 
understand that what they feel is a reaction to objects, situations, or events in 
their lives.32 Psychologists explain this misrepresentation as the result of beliefs 
                                                 
31 Literary examples of this phenomenon are given by the following passages from two rather 
different novels. In Emma, Jane Austen writes: “[T]his sensation of listlessness, weariness, 
stupidity, this disinclination to sit down and employ myself, this feeling of everything’s being 
dull and insipid about the house! – I must be in love.” (AUSTEN 1816/1966: 266). In Brokeback 
Mountain, Annie Proulx writes: “‘That summer,’ said Ennie. ‘When we split up after we got paid 
out I had gut cramps so bad I pulled over and tried to puke, thought I ate somethin bad at that 
place in Dubois. Took me about a year a figure out it was that I shouldn’t a let you out a my 
sight. Too late then by a long, long while.” (PROULX 1999: 299, quoted in JONES 2007b 
forthcoming). 
32 For more detailed discussion on this example see Chapter VI.  
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people with panic disorder have about the meaning of what they feel. These 
beliefs lead them to misrepresent changes produced by emotions for symptoms 
of heart conditions. 
It is worth noting that panic attacks are often associated with 
alexithymia.33 This condition is characterised by a deficit in the ability to 
experience, describe, and identify emotions.34 As a result, people suffering from 
alexithymia say that they do not feel anything or do not know how they feel. 
Alexithymia is a further example of perceptual error in which a change 
produced by an emotion either goes unnoticed or is not taken to be one that 
manifests an emotion. What is puzzling about alexithymia is that, even though 
sufferers are not aware of the changes or the nature of the changes, they behave 
emotionally. This has led some researchers to draw an analogy between 
alexithymia and blindsight.35 Blindsight is associated with lesions in the primary 
visual cortical receiving area, V1. Patients with such lesions claim that they are 
blind. Yet, when presented with complex visual tasks, their behavioural 
responses are appropriate. This indicates that they perceive the visual stimuli at 
some level but are not aware of what they perceive. Similar phenomena have 
been described in other sensory modalities such as touch and smell. The 
common feature of these conditions is the absence of phenomenal awareness of 
objects despite the presence of appropriate behavioural responses. Similarly, 
people suffering from alexithymia say that they do not feel anything or do not 
know how they feel, even though they behave emotionally. This suggests that 
they form emotions which produce the same kinds of changes emotions 
                                                 
33  COX et al. 1995. 
34 LARSEN et al. 2003. 
35 LANE et al. 1997.  
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produce in normal subjects. The difference is that people with alexithymia fail to 
perceive the changes or fail to perceive them for what they are – i.e. 
manifestations of emotions. 
The third kind of mistake occurs when one seems to perceive a change 
that does not actually occur. This is analogous to hallucinations and to the 
phenomenon of pain in phantom-limbs. An example of illusory emotional 
feeling is briefly described by James in a footnote to his paper What is an 
Emotion? He writes: 
 
It must be confessed that there are cases of morbid fear in which 
objectively the heart is not much perturbed. These however fail to prove 
anything against our theory, for it is of course possible that the cortical 
centres normally percipient of dread as a complex of cardiac and other 
organic sensations due to real bodily change, should become primarily 
excited in brain-disease, and give rise to an hallucination of the changes 
being there, an hallucination of dread, consequently, coexistent with a 
comparatively calm pulse, &c.36  
 
According to James’ description, the person experiences an illusory increase in 
her heart rate. This illustrates that emotional feelings can be as illusory as other 
perceptions. When they are illusions, they are perceptions of changes that do 
not actually occur. James and Damasio explain this phenomenon in terms of 
brain states. In particular, Damasio argues that the brain can enter the kind of 
state it would enter if bodily changes occurred, even when the changes do not 
                                                 
36 JAMES 1885, footnote 4.  
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actually occur.37 This is an explanation of how illusory emotional feelings may 
arise. 
But, there is a sense in which the explanation above is unnecessary 
because bodily changes can be viewed as the intentional objects of emotional 
feelings. 
This claim is supported by the following consideration. It is fairly 
uncontroversial that objects of perception are the objects of which perception is 
an experience. The table over there is the object of which my visual perception 
of a table over there is an experience. The same argument carries over to 
emotional feelings. Emotional feelings are perceptions of bodily changes. These 
are the objects of which emotional feelings are experiences. Some philosophers 
claim that the objects of perception are intentional objects.38 The argument for 
this claim is as follows. Perception can be accurate or inaccurate. It is accurate 
when the objects of which perception is an experience exist and have the 
properties they seem to have. It is inaccurate when the objects do not exist or do 
not have the properties they seem to have. It is a characteristic of intentional 
objects that they may or may not exist. Since perception can be experience of 
objects that exist or do not exist, it follows that the objects of perceptions can be 
viewed as intentional. The same argument applies to emotional feelings because 
they are perceptions of bodily changes which can be accurate or inaccurate. It 
follows that the bodily changes are the intentional objects of emotional feelings. 
                                                 
37 DAMASIO 1994. 
38 TYE 1995. This view is not uncontroversial. Some philosophers (MARTIN 2002, CRANE 2006) 
argue that perception is factual. This means that the objects of perception must exist. 
Experiences like hallucinations that do not relate to existing objects are not perceptions but 
another kind of state. My argument does not actually require taking a position in this debate. It 
is sufficient to claim that bodily changes are the objects of emotional feelings. For discussion see 
CRANE 2005.  
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It is a characteristic of intentional objects that they may or may not exist. On this 
account, it is not a mysterious fact about emotional feelings that, from time to 
time, they seem to be perceptions of bodily changes that do not actually occur. 
James’ case is interesting also for another reason. One may wonder why it 
is the emotion of fear and not anger, for example, that the person seems to feel? 
The most natural explanation is that she feels afraid because she is afraid. On this 
account, the fact that she is in a state of fear explains why she seems to perceive 
a specific kind of change – i.e. the kind of change she would perceive if she were 
afraid. It is plausible to think that if she were not afraid, she would not seem to 
perceive the kind of change that typically correlates with fear. This suggests that 
having a certain emotion may make one experience changes that do not actually 
occur, but that are characteristic of the emotion one has. This is similar to the 
perceptual case where having dispositional states like desires may make one 
experience objects that do not actually exist but fulfil one’s desires. For example, 
the desire of receiving an important phone call may make me hear a ring even 
though my phone is not, in fact, ringing. This suggests that, like other 
dispositional states, emotions may affect the content of perception. In particular, 
the perceptual content may deploy concepts that are made available by the 
underlying emotions that one has. I have more to say on this phenomenon in 
Section 5. 
What I have so far observed confirms that emotional feelings are 
perceptions because they can be mistaken like ordinary perceptions. There are 
two kinds of perceptual mistakes. They are misperceptions and hallucinations. 
A misperception is exemplified by seeing as square an object that is rectangular. 
A hallucination is exemplified by seeing a square object where there is no square 
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object. Emotional feelings can be mistaken in the same ways. They are 
misperceptions on two occasions: when one misperceives a change that 
manifests an emotion for one that does not; and when one misperceives a 
change that does not manifest an emotion for one that, in actuality, does. 
Emotional feelings are hallucinations when one seems to perceive a change that 
does not actually occur. 
 
4. The Metaphysics of Emotional Feelings 
 
One may object that, on the account above, there is no difference between 
feelings that manifest emotions, and feelings that only seem to manifest 
emotions. For example, the feelings people experienced in the experiment 
carried out by Zajonc and colleagues did not manifest emotions. Nevertheless, 
they felt like emotional feelings – the subjects involved in the experiment 
described them as experiences of positive and negative emotions. This confirms 
that emotional and non-emotional feelings may feel alike. This is analogous to 
the visual case where an experience of a rectangular object that looks square is 
identical to an experience of a square object. It is a trivial fact about perception 
that, insofar as the phenomenology is concerned, two experiences with the same 
content are indistinguishable even though one is accurate, while the other is not. 
It follows from this that, as perceptions, two feelings can be indistinguishable 
even though one manifests an emotion, while the other does not. This does not 
mean that they are the same kinds of experiences. One is what I called an 
emotional feeling – namely, perception of a specific change brought about by a 
specific emotion – while the other is not an emotional feeling. But, what is the 
best way of cashing out this apparently elusive difference? 
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A possible way to approach this issue is in terms of the essence or nature 
of the change of which each feeling is an experience. Considerations about the 
essence of something aim at determining what kind of thing that it is. It follows 
that considerations about the kind of change of which each feeling is an 
experience may help to draw a distinction between emotional and non-
emotional feelings. In Chapter I, I have shown that things may look the same 
without being the same kinds of things. For example, gold and fool’s gold may 
look the same, even though one is gold, while the other is pyrite. Gold and 
pyrite are different kinds of substances because they have different 
microstructures.39 The same argument may apply to bodily modifications. Two 
changes that feel the same are not of the same kind when they have different 
microstructures. So far it seems that the only way of distinguishing emotional 
and non-emotional feelings is by means of considerations about the 
microstructure of each specific change. But it is not obvious that an investigation 
into the microstructure of bodily changes is the only way of determining when 
two changes are of the same kind, and when they are not. There is a more 
intuitive way of cashing out the difference. It says that, even though the two 
changes feel the same, they are different in kind because one is brought about by 
an emotion, while the other is not. In this sense, we can determine what 
difference there is between the two changes by considering the role that emotion 
plays in the characterisation of one of them. 
How might we go about this? The issue at stake is what distinguishes an 
emotional feeling from a non-emotional one which resembles an emotional 
feeling. This question is analogous to what distinguishes perception of an object 
                                                 
39 PUTNAM 1973, 1975; KRIPKE 1980. 
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from hallucination of the same object. Some philosophers describe the difference 
in terms of what constitutes perception.40 They say that perception is constituted 
by the object of which it is an experience. This is because it is in the nature of 
perception that it provides awareness of objects in the world. When a state looks 
like perception but does not provide awareness of objects, it is not perception. 
Rather, it is another kind of state such as hallucination. A similar argument 
applies to emotions. One may argue that the change of which an emotional 
feeling is an experience is a kind of change constituted by the emotion that it 
manifests. In contrast, the change of which a non-emotional feeling is an 
experience (e.g. the feelings experienced in Zajonc et al.’s experiment) is not 
constituted by the emotion it seems to manifest. On this account, emotion is a 
constitutive part of the change of which an emotional feeling is an experience in 
the same way as objects are constitutive of perceptions. This means that two 
feelings that look alike are different kinds of feelings when one is perception of a 
change partly constituted by the emotion it manifests, while the other is not.41 
The constitutive claim is relevant to the epistemology of emotions. In 
general, knowledge can be described as awareness of how things are in the 
world. Experience is often source of knowledge because it is awareness of 
objects in the world. But it is in the nature of experience that it can get things 
wrong. In contrast, knowledge is obtained only when experience gets things 
right. This means that we need a description of the circumstances under which 
experience gets things right. A constitutive claim about perception provides 
such a description. Perception yields knowledge when it is accurate and 
constituted by the objects of which it is an experience. 
                                                 
40 MARTIN 2002, 2004.  
41 I will further develop this view in Chapter V.   
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The same argument carries over to emotions. In the previous chapter, I 
have shown that one of the reasons why we say that emotions are states we feel 
in the body is that, in many cases, we know our emotions from the fact that we 
feel them. This confirms that emotional feelings are relevant to self-knowledge 
of emotions.42 I have argued that emotional feelings are perceptions of changes 
that are partly constituted by the emotions they manifest. It follows that we 
know what emotions we have when our bodily experiences are emotional 
feelings. On this account, the relationship between emotions and changes is the 
same as that between objects and perceptions. They are constitutive parts of the 
changes like objects are constitutive of perceptions. This account gives us a way 
of telling emotional feelings apart from those feelings that resemble emotional 
feelings, but that are not constituted by the emotions they seem to manifest.   
 
5. Emotional Feelings and Higher Emotions 
 
In Section 3.2, I have shown that emotional feelings are perceptions of specific 
changes, the phenomenal character of which is determined by the physical 
properties of the changes of which they are experiences. In other words, specific 
emotional feelings are perceptions of specific changes. There is reason to believe 
that this is not true of higher emotions such as envy, jealousy, guilt, regret, and 
resentment. In particular, there is reason to doubt that feelings of higher 
emotions are perceptions of specific changes. The doubt is supported by the 
following considerations. The experiment by Zajonc and his colleagues shows 
that when people arrange facial muscles in fashions similar to expressions of 
                                                 
42 I will say something more about this subject in Chapter VI. 
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positive and negative emotions, they experience pleasant and unpleasant 
feelings. My explanation of this phenomenon is that the changes produced in 
the experiment are similar to the changes people normally produce when they 
express positive and negative emotions. The similarity is explained by the fact 
that the changes in the experiment are similar to those involved in ordinary 
expressions of emotions. This is analogous to the visual case where a rectangle 
may look like a square when the difference between the two sides is too small to 
notice. The experiment suggests that changes in the face may be an important 
part of the overall change of which emotional feelings are experiences. This is 
consistent with the fact that most emotions have characteristic expressions as 
well as characteristic feelings. This view is supported by an argument I briefly 
outlined in the previous chapter and in Section 3.1 above. Emotions produce 
changes in the autonomic nervous system which affect the inner organs as well 
as the outwardly observable part of the body such as the face. The emotional 
feelings are how these changes appear to the subjects, while expressions are 
how the same changes appear to the observer. 
These considerations bear on the supposition that higher emotions do not 
produce specific changes in the body. For instance, higher emotions do not seem 
to have characteristic facial expressions. This is consistent with the fact that 
these emotions do not seem to have characteristic feelings either. On the view I 
advocated, this is explained by the fact that they do not produce specific 
changes and, therefore, fail to produce characteristic feelings. This may be 
because higher emotions are cultural constructs we acquire through social 
interactions, while basic emotions are phylogenetic constants that we find across 
cultures, and also in animals. 
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The view that higher emotions do not produce specific changes is 
consistent with the affect program theory that only basic emotions produce 
complex, coordinated, and automated responses that involve: (a) facial 
expressions, (b) musculoskeletal changes, (c) vocal changes, (d) endocrine 
changes, and (e) autonomic system changes. Higher emotions, by contrast, do 
not seem to have the same kind of effect on the body. As Griffiths remarks: “[i]n 
many instances of guilt, envy, or jealousy the subject does not display a 
stereotypical pattern of physiological effects.”43 On this basis, one may conclude 
that higher emotions do not produce specific bodily changes and, consequently, 
they do not manifest themselves in characteristic emotional feelings.  
Clearly, this conclusion is in tension with the fact that we do feel jealous, 
envious, guilty, and resentful. How is that possible if higher emotions do not 
produce specific changes? The answer I propose is as follows. The kind of 
experience we have when we feel (say) jealous is different from the kind of 
experience we have when we feel sad or angry. The latter is perception of a 
specific change, while the former is perception of an unspecific change we 
perceive as one of jealousy. To put it in terms of the distinction between 
observational and non-observational properties I introduced in Section 3.2, a 
feeling of jealousy is perception of non-observational properties of a change. We 
can see this clearly by considering the visual case again. 
We often see things as desirable, expensive, useless, or important. When I 
see something as valuable, the content of my experience deploys a concept that 
does not correspond to any physical property of the object. Imagine that I am a 
coin collector and I see an old coin as valuable. The physical properties of the 
                                                 
43 GRIFFITHS 1997: 100. 
 164 
coin are features like its shape and size. They are observational properties 
because it is a necessary condition for perceiving these features that my visual 
system is sensitive to them. In contrast, the properties of being a coin and being 
valuable are non-observational because it is not sufficient for perceiving them 
that my visual system is sensitive to physical properties of the coin. I perceive 
the object as a coin when I know what coins normally look like. This is to say 
that when I see the object as a coin, the content of my visual experience deploys 
a concept that does not correspond to any physical property of the object. The 
concept of being a coin is one my visual experience deploys because I have 
knowledge about coins and the round object before my eyes meets the 
appearance conditions for coins. 
What about the property of being valuable? Again, the content of my 
visual experience deploys a concept that does not correspond to any physical 
property of the coin. The concept is made available to me by a mental state of 
mine that represents the coin as valuable. This does not need to be knowledge. It 
may be merely a desire. On this account, we see things as having certain non-
observational properties when the perceptual content of our visual experiences 
deploys concepts that are made available to us by concomitant mental states 
such as knowledge or desires. These states form the psychological context in 
which perception occurs. When perception occurs in a specific psychological 
context it is likely that it will be affected by concepts – the concepts that form the 
states involved in the psychological context. This is exemplified by many 
ordinary experiences. Sexual desire, for example, may make me see a person as 
sexually desirable. 
How do these considerations bear on feelings of higher emotions? I have 
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shown that there is reason to believe that these emotions do not produce specific 
bodily changes. This is, prima facie, at odds with the fact that we feel jealous, 
envious, guilty, or resentful. How do we explain this phenomenon? When we 
feel a higher emotion such as jealousy, the emotion produces unspecific changes 
that we perceive as manifestations of jealousy because we are in a state of 
jealousy. The perceptual content deploys a concept – that of jealousy – that is 
made available to us by our concomitant state of jealousy. In other words, the 
perception occurs in a specific psychological context – that of jealousy. This 
affects the way in which we perceive the unspecific change jealousy brings 
about. This is analogous to what I observed earlier about James’ case of morbid 
fear, where the person seems to perceive a change characteristic of fear because 
she is in a state of fear.  
The difference between feelings of basic emotions and feelings of higher 
emotions is that the former are similar to perceptions of observational 
properties, while the latter are similar to perceptions of non-observational 
properties. Put another way, feelings of basic emotions are perceptions of 
specific changes that determine the phenomenal character of the feelings. A 
feeling of anger, for example, is perception of a specific change that feels like 
anger. The properties of the change are determinant of how the change feels. If 
the change had different properties – i.e. if it were a different change – it would 
not feel like anger but like another emotion. In contrast, feelings of higher 
emotions are perceptions of unspecific changes. The perceptual content of these 
perceptions deploys some concepts that do not correspond to specific properties 
of the changes. These concepts are, instead, made available by the concomitant 
emotions that bring about the changes. On this account, emotions, like desires, 
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contribute to determining the psychological context in which perception of 
unspecific changes occurs.  
This account of how higher emotions determine the content of emotional 
feelings is supported by empirical evidence on the relation between emotions 
and unspecific bodily changes. In the early 1960s social psychologists Stanley 
Schachter and Jerome E. Singer devised an experiment to disprove James’ 
theory that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes.44 The experiment 
succeeded in showing that bodily changes alone are not sufficient to produce 
emotions. The results have, however, been the object of serious criticisms.45 I am 
not concerned with this debate here. I consider the experiment interesting 
because it is based on the induction of non-specific changes that are experienced 
as manifestations of specific emotions. 
Schachter and Singer recruited subjects for an experiment billed as testing 
the effect of a vitamin on vision. The participants were given an injection of 
either adrenaline or a placebo, which was actually a saline solution with no side 
effects. The effects of adrenaline are an increase in blood pressure, heart rate, 
blood sugar level, respiration rate, and blood flow to the muscles and brain, 
with an accompanying decrease in blood flow to the skin. This is often 
experienced as palpitations, tremors, flushing and faster breathing. The effects 
                                                 
44 SCHACHTER and SINGER 1962. 
45 Jesse Prinz points out that the experiment rests on the fallacious assumption that the drug 
administered to the subjects is thought to entail the same physiological changes throughout the 
experiment. This conclusion is far from being correct. Physiological arousal may be modified by 
further states that occur over the social interaction. In this view, the main weakness of 
Schachter’s and Singer’s conclusions is the assumption that the physical underpinning remains 
constant over the development of the interaction. By contrast, it is perfectly possible that the 
emotional episode develops over time in response to further stimuli. Social interaction typically 
involves the manifestation of emotions through bodily, facial and linguistic expressions. This 
may enrich the underpinnings involved in the development of the emotional episode. For 
discussion see PRINZ 2004: 71-2. 
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begin after three minutes and last from ten minutes to an hour. The participants 
were then put in one of the following four experimental conditions. First, 
(adrenaline ignorant) participants were given an adrenaline injection and not 
told of the effects of the drug. Second, (adrenaline informed) participants were 
given an adrenaline injection and warned of the side effects of the drug (shaking 
hands, heart pounding, dry mouth etc.). Third, (adrenaline misinformed) 
participants were given an adrenaline injection, told to expect side effects, but 
misled into believing these would be numb feet and headache. Fourth, (control 
group) participants were given an injection that would have no effect and were 
given no instructions of what to expect. Participants were then allocated to 
either ‘euphoria condition’ or ‘anger condition.’ In the euphoria situation a 
stooge in a waiting room carried out a number of silly tasks designed to 
entertain and amuse the participant. In the anger situation, the stooge behaved 
in a manner designed to annoy the participant. 
The researchers then made observational measures of emotional response 
through a one-way mirror, and also took self-report measures from the 
participants. In the euphoria condition the misinformed participants were 
feeling happier than all the others.  The second happiest group was the ignorant 
group. The informed group felt the least happy. In the anger condition, the 
ignorant group felt the angriest. The second angriest group was the placebo 
group. The least angry group was those who were informed. Schachter and 
Singer concluded that bodily changes in different emotions are entirely the same 
and that people label these changes as different emotional feelings on the basis 
of the cognitions available to them. 
I do not share these conclusions because, as I have shown in the previous 
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chapters, I am sceptical about the relevance of cognition to emotion. But I 
believe the experiment shows that emotions may affect how we perceive 
unspecific bodily changes. In particular, it shows that the same bodily changes 
were experienced differently according to which emotions subjects formed in 
response to the situations they experienced. When subjects were amused by the 
stooge, they perceived the changes as a feeling of happiness. When they were 
annoyed, they perceived them as a feeling of anger.46 In other words, the same 
bodily changes were interpreted according to the psychological context in which 
perception occurred. Although the experiment does not draw on higher 
emotions, it does show that specific emotions dispose subjects to perceive 
unspecific changes as manifestations of specific emotions. This is because 
perception of bodily changes may deploy concepts that are made available to 
the perceivers by the specific states (i.e. emotions, desires, and knowledge) that 
form the psychological context in which perception occurs. This phenomenon is 
particularly noticeable with higher emotions where unspecific changes are 
perceived as manifestations of specific emotions. 
Spinal injury patients have been another long-running source of interest 
to emotion researchers. The position that I am advancing has the potential to 
explain how such subjects can possibly have emotional feelings. The claim that 
emotional feelings are perceptions of bodily changes implies that any disruption 
                                                 
46 This does not imply that the subjects who were aware of the effects of the injection did not 
form any emotion at all. It is perfectly possible that, like other participants, they also became 
happy or angry at the stooge’s behaviour. The difference is that they did not feel particularly 
happy or angry. This may be for two reasons. First, the informed subjects knew that the 
modifications they experiences were induced by a drug. This may have prevented them from 
perceiving the modifications as the manifestations of happiness or anger. Second, the 
modifications were not specific to happiness or anger. This, in combination with the belief that 
the modifications were induced by a drug, may have prevented the informed subjects from 
experiencing emotional feeling. 
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to the perceptual system (i.e. interoception) leads to alterations in emotional 
feelings. This is analogous to ordinary perception where disruptions to sight or 
hearing lead to alterations in visual and aural experiences. Most interoceptive 
stimuli from inner organs travel through the spine. This means that serious 
spinal injuries may compromise one’s ability to perceive changes and 
modifications in one’s body. It follows from this that subjects with spinal 
injuries should become totally or partly unable to perceive changes in their 
bodies and thereby have emotional feelings. James makes exactly the same 
prediction when he writes:  
 
[I]f I were to become corporeally anaesthetic, I should be excluded from 
the life of the affections, harsh and tender alike, and drag out an existence 
of merely cognitive or intellectual form.47     
 
That said, there is some evidence of the contrary. Subjects with serious spinal 
injuries do experience emotions. I have already mentioned the study carried out 
by Hohmann on 25 people with spinal cord injuries.48 He found reductions in 
emotional feelings throughout the group, and those reductions became more 
acute with injuries higher in the cord. However, he also found that these 
patients tended to experience an increase in ‘sentimentality,’ characterized by 
crying and feeling choked up. When Hohmann asked 25 spinal patients to 
compare their present emotional feelings to their past feelings, they reported a 
significant decrease in overall levels. The decrease was greatest for those whose 
injuries were highest in the cord. In sum, the data show that, even though the 
                                                 
47 JAMES 1884: 194. 
48 HOHMANN 1966. 
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ability to perceive changes is compromised by the injury, spinal subjects can still 
perceive some changes. 
How is that result possible given that spinal patients’ ability to perceive 
changes in their bodies is compromised?49 The answer draws on the view I have 
been outlining. It is plausible to think that spinal subjects can still perceive some 
changes, although it is likely these changes will not appear to be as specific as 
before the injury. This is analogous to cases of partial loss of sight or hearing 
where the perceptual stimulus appears less defined then before the loss. When 
spinal subjects form emotions and the emotions produce changes, the latter are 
perceived as manifestations of specific emotions because the perceptual content 
deploys concepts that are made available by the emotions that subjects have 
formed. On this account, spinal subjects can feel specific emotions because they 
can perceive changes, the appearance of which is now unspecific as 
manifestations of the emotions they have. Put differently, loosing the ability to 
accurately perceive changes does not imply loosing the ability of forming 
emotions. This is because emotions are not feelings. 
One may suppose that, given the unspecific character of the changes 
produced by higher emotions, they are likely to be mistaken for changes that 
manifest other emotions or for changes caused by states that are not, in fact, 
emotions at all. Recall our visual analogy: a rectangle with sides of almost equal 
length is likely to be mistaken for a square because its appearance is not as 
                                                 
49 Damasio thinks that information about the autonomic state of a spinal subject’s body can 
travel through the blood stream, the vagus nerve and cranial nerves that remain intact after the 
spinal injury. This possibility may explain why the subjects interviewed felt emotions despite 
the injury. Damasio also argues that spinal patients can still undergo normal autonomic changes in 
the body part not affected by the spinal injury. These changes include modifications in the throat and in 
the face. This explains why Hohmann’s patients could still experience some feelings, such as the 
urge to cry and the feeling of being choked-up. (DAMASIO 1999). 
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specific as it would be if the sides were clearly uneven. It follows that 
knowledge of higher emotions is more difficult to obtain because 
misperceptions are more likely to occur. This objection, however, does not take 
into account the fact that emotions may produce thoughts with the contents that 
are in some way linked to the emotions. Thoughts are episodic states that, like 
perceptions, can deploy concepts made available by underlying emotions. For 
example, someone’s obsessive thoughts about her partner cheating on her may 
serve as clues to the fact that she is jealous of her partner. This suggests that, 
even though higher emotions produce unspecific changes, they make 
themselves manifest in conscious thoughts that may serves as clues to the 
emotions. This is because the thought contents deploy concepts made available 
by underlying emotions.50 In this case, a certain degree of self-understanding is 
required in order to work out the connection between a thought or thoughts 
(e.g. obsessive thoughts of infidelity) and the emotion to which they are linked 
by deploying the same concepts. Nevertheless, this is a way in which, given 
sufficient reflection, the person can come to know that she is jealous, even in the 
event that she misperceives the unspecific changes jealousy brings about. This 
procedure is also available for basic emotions, the difference being that basic 
emotions produce specific changes which are less likely to be misperceived in 




                                                 
50 The relation between emotions and thoughts in self-understanding is discussed by TAYLOR 





As we have seen, emotional feelings are perceptions of changes in the body. 
What distinguishes emotional from non-emotional feelings is that the former 
have emotions as constitutive parts of the changes of which they are 
experiences. Basic emotions produce specific changes. Characteristic emotional 
feelings like sensations of anger or fear are perceptions of specific changes. 
Higher emotions, by contrast, do not produce specific changes. Yet, we feel 
them. This is because the perceptual content deploys concepts that are made 




EXPRESSIONS OF EMOTIONS 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that emotional feelings can be viewed as the 
way specific bodily changes appear to the subject. A similar account can be 
given for emotional expressions such as smiles of joy and scowls of anger. 
Emotions do not occur only inside the body, they also affect the outwardly 
visible part of the body like the face, skin, posture, and hair. When this is the 
case, the same change that the subject experiences as a certain emotional feeling 
may appear to the observer as the expression of a certain emotion. This suggests 
that emotions have perceivable manifestations in virtue of which they can be 
perceived by others. Since accurate perception is a source of knowledge, it is 
plausible that we can know other people’s emotions by perceiving the 
manifestations of their emotions. 
This view implies a major philosophical claim: we have perceptual 
awareness of other people’s emotions. It is possible to explain this form of 
awareness in terms of ordinary perceptual experience. Experiences occur when 
two conditions are met. One is that objects have properties in virtue of which 
they can be perceived. The other is that perceivers are endowed with a 
perceptual system that functions to detect such properties. An explanation of 
how we perceive other people’s emotions, then, needs to show that emotions 
have properties in virtue of which they can be perceived, and that the 
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perceptual system functions to detect these properties of emotions. This is 
analogous to the visual case where we see (say) squares because they are made 
of vertical and horizontal lines which, in turn, are things the perceptual system 
functions to detect. 
The claim that we see other people’s emotions is open to two main 
objections. One is that we see people’s emotions in their expressions because we 
know the meaning of the expressions. This, so the argument goes, would show 
that we do not really perceive people’s emotions in other people’s expressions; 
instead, we interpret what we perceive according to what we know about the 
meaning of the expressions. I will refer to this as the meaning view. The other 
objection is that expressions can be pretended or staged in such a way that we 
cannot tell whether they are genuine or not. It follows that we cannot really 
know people’s emotions. I will refer to this as the illusion view. 
I will show that both objections are ill-grounded and that we perceive 
other people’s emotions like we perceive square or round objects. I will reject 
the meaning view by showing that we perceive emotions not because we know 
the meaning of the expressions, but because emotions have perceivable 
manifestations in virtue of which they can be perceived and because the 
perceptual system functions to detect them. This does not mean that expressions 
do not have any meaning for us. Rather, it means that it is not in virtue of this 
meaning that we perceive other people’s emotions. 
I will reject the illusion view by demonstrating that there is a substantial 
difference between expressions that show emotions and bodily changes that 
only seem to show emotions, such as when we pretend or stage emotions. I will 
argue that genuine expressions have emotions as their constitutive parts. This is 
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to say that they are necessarily caused by the emotions they show. When they 
are not caused by emotions, they are not expressions of emotions, but other 
kinds of bodily changes which only look like expressions of emotions. On this 
account, we perceive and subsequently know other people’s emotions when the 
expressions are constituted by the emotions they show. 
This view faces a further problem. There is a difference between knowing 
that one has a certain emotion and knowing what one is emotional about. In 
other words, there is a difference between knowing the emotion kind and 
knowing the emotion object. We have full knowledge of another person’s 
emotion only when we know both the kind and object of the emotion. I will 
show that perception can provide full knowledge of emotions when we can 
jointly attend to an object and to the emotion that arises in response to that 
object. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I will discuss the notion 
of expression. I will argue that emotions have perceivable manifestations (i.e. 
expressions), and that it is therefore plausible that we can perceive emotions. 
Secondly, I will discuss the kind of experience that occurs in perception of 
another person’s emotion. I will argue that it is a characteristic of perceptions of 
emotions that they are experiences with a non-conceptual content. This content 
consists of observational properties of emotions that the perceptual system 
functions to detect. Finally, I will argue that perception of emotions yields direct 
and non-inferential knowledge of emotions when the expressions are constituted 





2. Emotions and Perceivable Manifestations  
 
It is a fairly uncontroversial claim that we see people’s emotions in their 
expressions. For example, we see them smiling in happiness, scowling in anger, 
or frowning in concern. What is far less uncontroversial is the relation between 
emotions and expressions. The notion of expression1 is often ill-understood.2 
People generally agree that expressions are movements of some sort like smiling 
in delight or scowling in anger. This view does not account for expressions that 
do not literally occur in the face like sighs, screams, or tremors of the voice. This 
is problematic as there is no doubt that ordinary folk would say that sighs or 
screams express emotions. This suggests that expressions are not limited to 
movements in the face. One might say that expressions are involuntary 
movements that occur all over the body. This view has, however, two 
undesirable consequences. First, it includes all involuntary movements in the 
class of expressions. This does not seem plausible because there are involuntary 
                                                 
1 The notions of expression and expression of emotion are discussed by several philosophers and 
psychologists. The most important contributions are DARWIN 1872, THALBERG 1962, ALSTON 1965, 
BENSON 1967, EKMAN 1993, GOLDIE 2000, DÖRING 2003, BAR-ON 2004, and GRIFFITHS 2004c.  
2 I will consider solely bodily expressions of emotions like smiles of delight, scowls of anger, 
frowns of worry and the like. The most intuitive objection to this notion of expression is that 
linguistic expressions are expressions too and they must be part of a general account of 
expressions of emotions (BAR-ON 2002). The reason for ruling linguistic expressions out of my 
account is as follows. Expressions (bodily and linguistic) convey information about the emotions 
they show. This must not obscure an important difference. Most philosophers agree that 
linguistic expressions are reports of emotions. The practice of reporting mental states and, in 
general, states of affairs requires the ability to preserve the information reported. This is possible 
only when the information has a syntactic and semantic structure. This allows me to draw a neat 
distinction between linguistic and bodily expressions. In order to explain linguistic expressions, 
one will need an account of linguistic understanding. In contrast, an explanation of bodily 
expressions requires an account of how we see, hear, or feel people’s emotions by observing 
their expressions (for example, by touching one’s cold and sweaty hands). This is the kind of 
account that I present here. 
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movements (e.g. twitches) that do not express emotions. Second, it evicts 
voluntary movements like crossing arms or drumming fingers from the class of 
expressions. In some cases, these movements also express emotions. 
These considerations show that we lack a clear understanding of what an 
expression of emotion is. The only point of agreement seems that expressions 
are movements. But this is also questionable. Emotions can be expressed by 
bodily changes that do not involve moving any body part – going pale, having a 
dry mouth, having cold hands, and having goose pimples. This suggests that, 
perhaps, the best way of characterising expressions of emotions is as bodily 
changes, broadly construed, that show emotions by making them perceptually 
available to others. This is consistent with the view that emotions produce 
patterns of change in the body. 
Now that we have a clear notion of expression, let us review the position 
for which I have thus for argued. In the previous chapter, I argued that 
emotional feelings are perceptions of bodily changes. Empirical evidence shows 
that such changes do not occur only inside the body;3 they also affect the 
outwardly visible part of the body like the face, skin, posture, and hair. When 
this is the case, the same kinds of changes of which emotional feelings are 
perceptions may appear to the observer as expressions of emotions. For 
example, when I see someone crying, I perceive part of the same change that she 
experiences as sadness. On this account, expressions are nothing else than 
specific changes affecting the outer part of the body. 
So far I have, for the sake of convenience, been talking in term of visual 
perception of expressions of emotions. This does not mean that vision is the only 
                                                 
3 STRACK et al. 1988; ZAJONC et al. 1989. For discussion see ADELMANN and ZAJONC 1989.  
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sense involved. It is in principle possible for any sense to convey information 
about other people’s emotions. Just as we can see someone else’s fear in her face, 
we can also hear the same emotion in her voice and feel it in her trembling 
hands. Prima facie, two senses – taste and smell – do not seem to be involved in 
perception of other people’s emotions. But this is not entirely correct. The sense 
of smell, for example, is involved in perception of chemical signals like 
pheromones and other substances that humans and animals produce when they 
have certain emotions. On the other hand, the fact that taste and smell are not as 
prominent as other senses in perception of other people’s emotions can be 
viewed as the result of our evolutionary history as well as of social conventions. 
Animals, by contrast, perceive emotions in other animals through the sense of 
smell and taste. On this account, we perceive other people’s emotions through 
the senses, even though some senses are more prominent than others. 
Expressions are features of emotions that the senses detect. 
This view has interesting philosophical implications. It is a general claim 
about perception that, when an object is perceived, it must have properties in 
virtue of which it is perceived. For example, the stew simmering in the pot has 
properties in virtue of which I perceive it. It has a distinct smell. It makes a 
typical bubbling noise. It has a typical colour as well as texture, thickness, and 
flavour. These are properties in virtue of which the stew becomes the object of 
my experience. The same considerations apply to emotions. Emotions produce 
inner and outer changes in virtue of which they can be perceived. So, when I 
feel a certain change in my body, I feel (say) sadness. When I perceive the 
outwardly visible part of the same kind of change in another person, I perceive 
her sadness. Expressions are the outwardly visible part of the changes that 
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emotions produce; they are perceivable manifestations of emotions. This means 
that when emotions are perceived, it is in virtue of their manifestations. 
One may object that we do not really perceive the emotions but the 
changes they bring about; that is, the effects of emotions. This is in principle 
correct, but does not entitle the conclusion that we do not perceive other 
people’s emotions. There are three main arguments against the objection. 
The first is that emotions are dispositional states. This means that when 
one has a certain emotion, one has a certain mental property that is 
dispositional. It is a characteristic of dispositional properties that we can 
perceive them only when they manifest themselves. For example, crystal glasses 
have the dispositional property of being brittle. We perceive this property only 
when it manifests itself through the breakage of the glasses. The same is true of 
emotions which, as dispositions, can be perceived only when they manifest 
themselves through bodily changes that we perceive in the form of either 
emotional feelings or expressions. It follows that it is of the very nature of 
emotions that we do not attend to them directly, but to their manifestations. In 
other words, we perceive the manifestation of an emotion, and that really is 
perceiving the emotion because a manifestation is an aspect of the emotion. 
The second argument is that objects may reliably produce specific 
phenomena which enable us to track the objects. Consider the stew example. 
There is a sense in which the bubbling noise is not an intrinsic property of the 
stew; it is something the stew produces. Yet, when I hear it, the stew is the object 
of which I become aware through the noise. This is consistent with the fact that 
in perception we can shift attention from the object to its properties and from 
the properties back to the object. So, I can listen to the stew bubbling in the pot 
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or I can listen to the bubbling noise the stew produces. This is because my 
experience can represent the world in different ways. The bubbling noise is a 
phenomenon that the stew reliably produces in certain conditions. This enables 
me to perceive the stew. We perceive many objects by means of the phenomena 
they produce. We hear the rain dripping on the thin roof, even though we do 
not directly hear the rain but only the noise that the rain produces. We hear the 
approaching storm by listening to the thunders it produces. This shows that we 
can perceive objects with which we are not directly acquainted by perceiving the 
phenomena they reliably produce and which count as contingent properties of 
these objects. On this account, we perceive our own and other people’s emotions 
by perceiving the inner and outer changes that emotions typically produce. 
They are contingent or superficial properties of the emotions. 
The third argument is that we cannot give an exhaustive description of 
what we see or hear when we perceive another person’s emotion in her 
expression without making reference to the emotion expressed. In other words, 
if we described what we see only in physical terms by detailing, for example, 
the specific changes in her face, we would fail to account for a characteristic 
feature of our experience, namely, that ours is an experience of the person’s 
emotion as it appears to us in her facial expression. This is true of any 
experience of specific objects. I cannot describe the content of my olfactory 
experience of the stew only in physical or chemical terms without failing to 
account for what makes my olfactory experience an experience of the stew. On 
this account, emotions are part of what we perceive when we look at or listen to 
someone’s expression of emotion. 
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These three arguments show that it makes perfect sense to say that we 
perceive other people’s emotions in their manifestations – i.e. expressions. This 
view is also supported by a close scrutiny of how expressions change along with 
the emotions they manifest. Emotions have the characteristic of varying over 
time. For example, my present state of anger may slowly fade away until I no 
longer look angry. This is explained by the fact that my body undergoes 
different changes that vary along with my emotion. Expressions show, at least, 
two properties of emotions. They reveal the intensity and the affective character of 
emotions. 
The intensity appears in various expressions such as the tone of voice, 
complexion, arrangement of the facial muscles and posture. These expressions 
vary along with the emotion intensity. Consider when a person is first inflamed 
by anger and then slowly calms down. The emotion intensity changes over time 
and may vary from intense to mild or moderate. The variation is shown by 
various bodily modifications. The person first goes red in the face, screams her 
head off and waves her hands. As the emotion intensity decreases, other 
expressions occur. Her red complexion lessens, tone of voice becomes lower, 
and her whole body is less agitated. 
The other feature is the affective character. This is the fact that emotions are 
positive or negative, pleasant or unpleasant. The facial expression as well as the 
tone of voice, complexion, and posture shows that one has an emotion with a 
certain affective character. This appears in the fact that, sometimes, I can 
perceive the variation of someone’s emotional life by noticing how she shifts 
from positive to negative emotions and vice versa. 
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In summary: emotions produce characteristic bodily changes; the 
outwardly observable parts of these changes are what we call ‘expressions.’ 
Expressions are perceivable manifestations of emotions in virtue of which 
emotions are perceptually available to others.  
 
3.1 Emotions and Observational Properties  
 
What I have so far observed shows that emotions are perceivable because their 
manifestations are perceivable. One may object that we infer what emotion 
someone is feeling on the basis of how she looks. My claim is that we do not 
infer the emotion; we simply perceive it through its manifestation. The 
argument for this claim is that emotions are manifested in ways that are 
perceivable, and that it is plausible that we perceive them. The task is then to 
explain in what sense we perceive emotions. 
In Chapter III, I showed that basic emotions are states adult humans have 
in common with infants and animals. This has consequences for an adequate 
characterisation of how we perceive emotions. It is plausible that the ability to 
perceive emotions is not peculiar to adult humans. Infants and some higher 
animals seem to have the same ability. There is evidence that ten-week-old 
infants already respond to adults’ expressions of emotions. We have evidence 
also that higher animals like chimpanzees recognise emotions in other primates 
and humans.4 If we combine this piece of evidence with the fairly 
                                                 
4 Research carried out by Lisa Parr (PARR 2001) provides evidence that chimpanzee facial 
expressions are processed emotionally, as are human expressions. It is also plausible that 
expressions of emotions in humans and great apes share morphological and physiological 
similarities. Darwin (DARWIN 1872) was one of the first to speculate that human and non-human 
primate facial expressions share similar mechanisms for production and similar functions in 
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uncontroversial claim that infants and animals do not have psychological 
concepts, it then becomes clear that it is not a necessary condition for perceiving 
emotions that a perceiver has the relevant emotion concepts. In other words, it is 
plausible that an infant can perceive (say) joy in an adult even thought she does 
not have the concept of joy and thereby has no knowledge about joy. This 
suggests that an explanation of how we perceive emotions must be one that 
does not account for what we perceive (i.e. emotions) in terms of concepts, but 
in terms of properties that can be perceived independently of concepts. 
Properties of this kind are features that can be detected solely on the basis 
of how the perceptual system works. These kinds of properties are also known 
as observational properties.5 Paradigms of observational properties are features of 
the visual field like shape, size, distance, mutual location, colour, speed, and so 
on. Examples of observational properties can also be drawn from perceptual 
modalities that are not intrinsically spatial like smell and hearing. They differ 
from non-observational properties which are features perceivers can experience 
because they have the relevant concepts. Examples of non-observational 
properties are the property of being a strawberry, a dog, a television, a car, a 
rose, or a cathode ray tube. 
Each kind of property features in different kinds of experiences. 
Experiences of observational properties are states perceivers have simply 
because they are endowed with a perceptual system which is sensitive to 
                                                                                                                                                
expressing emotion. In recent years, primatologists Suzanne Chevalier-Skolnikoff (CHEVALIER-
SKOLNIKOFF 1973) and William Redican (REDICAN 1982) have concluded that the same facial 
configurations can be observed in humans and a number of other primates. Further evidence is 
discussed in PARR 2003.  
5 PEACOCKE 1992, 2003a, 2003b; FODOR 1998. 
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observational properties. I will call these kinds of experiences observations.6 Since 
concepts are not a condition for experience of observational properties, 
observations are non-conceptual states. It is plausible that mature perceptual 
experiences have observations as their components. For example, an experience 
of a white paper sheet involves the observation of something with specific 
observational properties such as a certain shape, colour, size, location, and 
orientation in space. 
The idea that observations can be part of mature experiences is generally 
expressed in terms of the divide between conceptual and non-conceptual content of 
the experience.7 On this account, experiences can be viewed as comprising two 
types of contents. One is non-conceptual and consists of information delivered 
by the perceptual system. Since features that are experienced solely on the basis 
of how the perceptual system works are observational properties, it is plausible 
that the non-conceptual content of experience consists of observational 
properties. The other type of content is conceptual and it originates from the 
application of concepts upon the non-conceptual content. This is the case, for 
example, when we represent the non-conceptual content of the experience of a 
white paper sheet as perception of an object that is a white rectangular paper 
sheet. In this case the non-conceptual content is represented in terms of the 
observational concepts ‘white’ and ‘rectangle.’ This content is then further 
conceptualised in terms of the non-observational concept ‘paper sheet.’ So, 
experiences have non-conceptual and conceptual content. The latter can be 
structured out of observational and non-observational concepts. 
                                                 
6 PEACOCKE 1992: Ch. 4. 
7 CRANE 1992. 
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The notion of non-conceptual content plays in important role in 
explaining how perceivers with different conceptual repertoires may display 
agreement in perceptual judgements as well as in perception-guided behaviour. 
I will illustrate this point with an example borrowed from Thomas Kuhn.8 
Imagine two perceivers – a child and a scientist – who are presented with the 
same object: a cathode ray tube. Suppose that the child is very young and 
masters neither the non-observational concept ‘cathode ray tube’ nor 
observational concepts for shapes, colours, and sizes. What difference is there 
between the child’ and scientist’s experience of the same object? Clearly, we 
cannot say that the child does not see anything because she has a perceptual 
system and she is therefore capable of perceptual experiences. It seems clear that 
she perceives those properties of the cathode that her perceptual system 
functions to detect. So, she sees something that has square and curved surfaces 
and is composed of different colours and sizes. But, since she lacks the relevant 
observational concepts, the child does not see or represent the object as being 
square or white; nor does she see or represent it as being a cathode ray tube. In 
other words, she does not see that the object has certain observational 
properties. She simply sees an object that looks a certain way to her. How it 
looks to her is the result of the object having specific observational properties 
that impinge upon the child’s perceptual system. This is to say that the child has 
an experience of the cathode ray tube the content of which is non-conceptual. 
This content consists of observational properties of the cathode ray tube which 
she experiences simply because her perceptual system functions to detect them. 
                                                 
8 The same example is discussed by Tim Crane in CRANE 1992.  
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In contrast, the scientist has an experience that represents the object as a 
cathode ray tube. In other words, she sees the object as a specific kind of entity 
with specific kinds of properties. This is because she masters the relevant 
concept and thereby knows what cathode ray tubes look like. She also sees or 
represents the object as having square and curved surfaces, and parts composed 
of different colours and sizes. This is because, beside the non-observational 
concept of a cathode ray tube, she masters all the relevant observational 
concepts for shapes, colours, and sizes. On this account, the scientist’s 
experience comprises two types of contents. One is non-conceptual and consists 
of observational properties of the cathode ray tube. The other is conceptual and 
consists of observational and non-observational concepts. 
Now imagine that the child acquires the concept of a cathode ray tube. 
She has the opportunity to see the object anew. She then recognises that the 
object she saw before acquiring the concept is what she now knows to be a 
cathode ray tube. How do we explain the fact that she recognises that the same 
object she saw in the past is a cathode ray tube? The explanation is that the 
experiences she has before and after mastering the concept must have 
something in common; something that enables her to recognise that the object 
she saw in the past is the same object that she now knows to be a cathode ray 
tube. The natural explanation is that the common element consists of how the 
object looked and still looks to her. One may suppose that such a common 
element is a non-conceptual content. The argument for this claim is as follows. 
The common element has to be something the child could experience before 
acquiring the concept of a cathode ray tube. At that time, all she could 
experience were observational properties of the cathode. These are features 
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perceivers can experience even when they lack the relevant concepts. So, 
experiences of observational properties – as opposed to experience that objects 
have observational properties – are non-conceptual. It is then reasonable to say 
that what is common to the child’s young and mature experience of the cathode 
is a non-conceptual content. 
The same consideration applies to the scientist’s experience. Since both 
the child and the scientist have the same perceptual system that functions to 
detect observational properties, it is plausible that their experiences have a 
common non-conceptual content which consist of observational properties of 
the cathode. Imagine that the child has only superficial knowledge about the 
cathode; she simply knows that the strange looking object before her eyes is a 
cathode ray tube – whatever a cathode ray tube may be. In contrast, the scientist 
has very accurate knowledge about the object. Despite the asymmetry in 
knowledge, they agree in judging that the object is a cathode ray tube. This is 
explained by the fact that the perceivers have experiences with a common 
content that is totally independent of their knowledge of the object; that is, a 
non-conceptual content which consists of observational properties of the 
cathode. 
What I have so far observed has direct bearing on the question of what 
kind of experience one has when one perceives another person’s emotion. 
Should we think of perception of emotions as like the scientist’s perception of a 
cathode ray tube or like the child’s perception of shapes and other observational 
properties of the cathode? In other terms, should we think of perception of 
emotions has having a conceptual or a non-conceptual content? I will argue that 
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perception of emotions has non-conceptual content that consists of 
observational properties of emotions. 
I believe that many philosophers will be uneasy with this claim, 
suspecting instead that perception of emotions is like the scientist’s perception 
of the cathode ray tube. This is because they assume that we have background 
knowledge about the relation between expressions and emotions. In other 
words, we perceive other people’s emotions because we know the meaning of 
the expressions that show them. This is what at the outset I called the meaning 
view. The view implies that when we perceive people emotions we do the same 
thing we do when, for example, we see the age of a tree by looking at the tree 
rings. That is, we interpret what we see on the basis of what we know about the 
relation between a tree’s age and the number of rings in the trunk (assuming we 
know the meaning of the rings). This notion of meaning is what Paul Grice 
called ‘natural meaning.’9 The same notion is implied by the claim that we 
perceive emotions in people’s expressions because we know the meaning of the 
expressions. This view does not deny that perception is involved in the 
acquisition of information about emotions, but it maintains that what we 
perceive depends on what we know about the relation between specific 
expressions (e.g. smiles) and specific emotions (e.g. happiness). 
So far this seems like a good account. But it loses its grip as soon as we 
consider some of its implications. It is a characteristic of the notion of meaning – 
also of that of natural meaning – that what a certain sign signifies is subject to 
changes across cultures. In particular, the body of knowledge that a given 
culture or community attaches to a certain sign is likely to be different from the 
                                                 
9 GRICE 1957. For discussion see GREEN 2003. 
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body of knowledge that another culture will attach to the same sign. This is a 
direct consequence of the fact that the two cultures are different cultures. For 
example, a culture whose community life is based on growing and trading trees 
is likely to attach a richer meaning to the phenomenon of tree rings. This will 
enable community members to see in the rings information that we, as members 
of another culture, cannot see. For example, they may see the rings as showing 
not only the age of the tree, but also the seasons the tree went through and if 
they were warm or cold, dry or rainy. 
This has consequences for the claim that we perceive other people’s 
emotions in the expressions because we know the meaning of the expressions. It 
is reasonable to expect that the same sorts of variations we would observe in the 
meaning of the tree rings will also affect the meaning of expressions of emotions 
as we move across cultures. For example, we should expect that the same 
expressions that in Western society shows (say) anger would show a different 
emotion in another society. This is true of some expressions that are cultural 
constructs. In Japan, for example, hissing is a polite act of deference to a social 
superior, while in Western societies it is an expression of irritation. Another 
example is an anecdote from Wittgenstein’s life. Once, on a train to Cambridge, 
the Italian economist Piero Sraffa asked Wittgenstein whether he knew the 
meaning of a gesture, familiar to Neapolitans, meaning something like disgust 
or contempt. The gesture involves brushing the underneath of one’s chin with 
an outward sweep of the fingertips of one hand. Wittgenstein was confused and 
could not understand the meaning of the gesture. These are expressions the 
meaning of which changes or gets lost as we move across cultures. 
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There is evidence, however, that not all expressions of emotions have 
culturally relative meaning. In particular, there is evidence that expressions of 
six basic emotions have the same meaning across all human cultures. In the 
1960’s, psychologists Paul Ekman10 and Carroll Izard11 interviewed members of 
diverse Western and non-Western literate cultures. The subjects were asked to 
choose the emotion terms which, in their language, corresponded to 
photographs of Caucasian individuals who expressed emotions with their faces. 
Izard and Ekman each showed different photographs, gave the subjects 
different lists of emotion terms, and examined people in different cultures. They 
obtained consistent evidence of agreement in the labelling of the facial 
expressions of six basic emotions: anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, and surprise. 
To rule out the possibility that such agreement could result from imitations and 
cultural contamination, Ekman and Friesen extended the findings to a 
preliterate culture in New Guinea whose members could not have learned the 
meaning of expressions from other cultures.12 He found that New Guinean 
aboriginals were capable of recognising the six basic emotions in pictures of 
Caucasian individuals who expressed these emotions in their faces. These data 
show that the same arrangements of facial muscles express the same six basic 
expressions in all cultures, and that individuals across cultures see these specific 
arrangements of facial muscles as showing the same six basic emotions. 
Now, if advocates of the meaning view were right and expressions 
showed emotions in virtue of their meaning, we should find that individuals of 
different cultures perceive the same expressions as showing different emotions 
                                                 
10 EKMAN et al. 1969, 1971. 
11 IZARD 1971. 
12 EKMAN and FRIESEN 1971. 
 191 
because, as members of different cultures, they attach different information to 
the expressions. But, as we have just seen, evidence collected by Ekman, Izard 
and Friesen shows that this is not the case. Individuals of totally different 
cultures perceive the same basic emotions in the same expressions. This 
suggests that knowledge about the meaning of expressions is not as important 
to perception of emotions as the meaning view supposes. The ability to perceive 
other people’s emotions is not influenced by variations in the body of 
knowledge that different perceivers attach to emotions and expressions. 
This shows an interesting analogy with the cathode ray tube example. In 
that case, congruence in judgements is explained by the fact that the child and 
scientist have experiences with the same non-conceptual content. An analogous 
argument applies to the evidence collected by Ekman, Izard and Friesen. The 
fact that individuals of different cultures make converging judgements about 
basic emotions suggests that perception of basic emotions is not influenced by 
conceptual differences. So, congruence in judgements is explained by something 
independent of concepts. An explanation of this phenomenon is that perception 
of emotions has a non-conceptual content which is constant across perceivers 
and across cultures. In other to show that this is not only a possible explanation, 
but the best explanation available, we need to demonstrate that the perceptual 
system actually functions to detect emotions. This will show that perception of 
emotions has a content that solely depends on the perceptual system which, as 
we know, is non-conceptual. What sort of argument would show that the 
perceptual system functions to detect emotions? One way to this question is to 
ask how we know that the perceptual system functions to detect properties like 
shapes. The answer is straightforward. When the functioning of the perceptual 
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system is in some way compromised, the ability to perceive these properties is 
also compromised. This is clear in cases of visual agnosia where subjects are 
unable to experience features of objects like surfaces.13 This suggests that, in 
order to support the claim that the perceptual system functions to detect 
emotions, we need to see whether alterations of the system would prevent 
people from perceiving emotions.  
 
3.2 Emotions and the Perceptual System 
 
Evidence in this direction is provided by the case of autism spectrum disorder. 
Autistics are often described as lacking understanding of other people’s minds.14 
In particular, they seem to have a specific problem in understanding other 
people’s emotions. Moreover, autistics show problems in processing facial 
expressions. This suggests that autism may be the sort of condition we are 
looking for to support the claim that the perceptual system functions to detect 
emotions. 
There has been much empirical work detailing the problems and 
difficulties that people with autism and Asperger’s syndrome have with faces 
and facial recognition. Difficulties with eye gaze have been considered among 
                                                 
13 Subjects with visual agnosia are not blind, but are unable to perceive or recognise objects; they 
can detect visual features, but they do not experience features like surfaces. In some cases, they 
do not experience objects as grouped into categories. The most prevalent pattern of this deficit is 
difficulty in recognising living things while recognition of non-living things is preserved. 
Warrington and Shallice (WARRINGTON and SHALLICE 1984) report the case of four patients who 
showed inability to identify living things and foods.  Hart and colleagues (HART et al. 1985) 
report a case of a patient with very selective disability in naming fruits and vegetables. Dixon 
and colleagues (DIXON et al 2000) studied a group of subjects who did not show impairment in 
naming artefacts but showed severe impairment in naming musical instruments and biological 
objects. 
14 BARON-COHEN 1995. 
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the most striking characteristics of autism.15 Some autistic children can recognise 
emotions of ‘happy’ and ‘sad,’ though they have more difficulties with complex 
facial expressions.16 Adults with Asperger’s have been shown to have profound 
defects in recognising faces as being famous or not.17 It is therefore clear that 
subjects with autism spectrum disorder have complex problems with facial 
information processing. What is less clear is the reason for this and whether 
there is any relation between this problem and their poor understanding of 
other people’s emotions. The core problem in autism spectrum disorder has 
been characterized as a lack of a theory of mind,18 or of interpersonal 
relatedness,19 of sensory overload,20 or of a defect in non-verbal learning.21 
A new trend in psychological research has shown that autism is often 
accompanied by perceptual deficits or abnormal perceptual abilities.22 The 
argument for a perceptual alteration view is based on the observation that 
individuals with autism spectrum disorder are particularly attentive to local 
details and, concurrently, fail to perceive the gestalt of the input. The 
impairment for faces in autism might then result from the tendency to process 
perceptual information locally, rather than holistically.23  Further evidence 
confirming perceptual alterations in people with autism spectrum disorder 
                                                 
15 RUTTER and SCHOPLER 1987. 
16 BARON-COHEN et al. 1993. 
17 ELLIS et al. 1994; ELLIS and LEAFHEAD 1996. 
18 BARON-COHEN 1995. 
19 HOBSON 1993. 
20 DELACATO 1974. 
21 ROURKE 1987.  
22 DAKIN and FRITH 2005. 
23 There is evidence that a specific brain area known as ‘fusiform face area’ is more engaged by 
human faces than any other category of image. This is of special relevance to autism, because 
recent studies have shown that the fusiform face area is hypoactive in subjects with autism 
spectrum disorder. See SCHULTZ et al. 2000. 
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concerns impairments in processing the kinematics of human motion. Facial 
expressions are kinds of bodily movements whose production is extremely fast. 
There is evidence that autistic children perform relatively well in recognition of 
emotional and non-emotional expressions when the expressions are displayed 
slowly on video, but less well when they observe expressions displayed at 
normal speed.24 
It is not clear what conclusion one should draw from these data. Do they 
show that autistics do not perceive emotions, or that widespread and systematic 
perceptual deficits compromise autistic subjects’ ability to gather accurate 
evidence from which to infer the meaning of the expressions? I will refer to the 
latter view as the misperception view. My interpretation of the data is that it 
shows that people with autism spectrum disorder do not perceive emotions 
because their perception lacks the non-conceptual content that is characteristic 
of perception of emotions. This is due to the fact the perceptual system in people 
with autism fails to detect emotions. But, before discussing this view, I will 
consider a major argument against the misperception view. 
The main argument against this view is that it is difficult to explain why 
the perceptual anomaly is confined to faces. If autistics cannot gather accurate 
evidence because their perception is generally inaccurate, they should have the 
same problem with all sorts of objects and properties, not only with emotions. 
There is, in fact, evidence to the contrary. Some studies show that individuals 
with autism do not show deficits on complex object perception tasks.25 
Moreover, there is overwhelming anecdotal and non-anecdotal evidence that 
                                                 
24 GEPNER, DERUELLE, and GRYNFELTT 2001. 
25 SCHULTZ 2005.   
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autistics possess extraordinary drawing and painting skills.26 Their drawings are 
generally extremely accurate not only in the reproductions of details but also in 
rendering properties of the visual field like perspective, distance, size, and 
orientation. Some autistics are also very good at recognising specific kinds of 
objects like car brands.27 This is a first reason for concluding that it is false that 
autistics do not perceive other people’s emotions because they cannot accurately 
perceive the world. Their perception of the world is not only accurate, but often 
more accurate and rich in detail that normal people’s perception.28 
This suggests that the deficit does not concern objects in general, but 
rather emotions in particular. This account is confirmed by some self-reports 
from autistics. Donna Williams, for example, is an autistic who has written 
several books about her condition. Moreover, she has collaborated with the 
neurologist Jonathan Cole who has been researching the role of the face in 
human interactions, and the social and psychological consequences of facial 
problems.29 This is how Cole describes Williams’ problems with expressions and 
emotions: 
 
Part of the way in which she had begun to know of our world seemed to 
include observation of the face and facial expression. A repeated theme 
                                                 
26 SACKS 1995. 
27 SACKS 1995. 
28 It is worth mentioning evidence (BEHRMANN 2006) showing that some autistics suffer from 
perceptual deficits that compromise their ability to experience objects other than emotions. 
Adults with autism spectrum disorder discriminate non-face objects more slowly than their 
comparison group; deciding that two different instances of a duck are ‘different’ and that a chair 
and a duck are ‘different’ takes significantly more time for subjects with autism spectrum 
disorder than for control groups. These data are, however, quite marginal and can be explained 
as the result of forms of visual agnosia associated with autism. Moreover, these data do not 
explain why autistics have profound defects in recognising other people’s emotions.  
29 COLE 1998, 1999, 2000. 
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was that face represented person-hood and feelings. So, through letters 
and faxes, I asked her to tell me about her problems with faces: 
 
My difficulties in looking at faces were a) to stand looking, b) to comprehend 
what I saw. 
 
A. To stand looking. 
These were based on several things. 
Fear based on learning that looking would cause people to attempt to engage 
me in interaction — the fear of this was for three reasons in turn. 
a. Such interaction would engulf my selfhood in a flood of ‘other’. 
b. Such interaction would evoke body sensation caused by intense emotion 
that would be beyond my ability to process, and therefore be confusing and 
frightening, and also be physically intolerable. 
c. Such interaction would generally be only inconsistently comprehensible and 
would soon cause information overload after a few minutes and be poured 
down onto to me with a total absence of my own social interest or want. 
 
B. To comprehend what I saw. 
I also avoided looking at faces because of the meaninglessness of their 
component parts, [which] led to non-interpretable sensory-based behaviours 
and curiosity which were generally not welcomed. I also did not like the shock 
of finding I had touched or stared at a part of someone’s face and then realised 
that these parts belonged to the person. The jolt always disturbed me. I did not 
learn to stop touching or staring at people though I learned to stop touching 
hair, comparing noses and staring at blemishes… 
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C. About mood. 
I could tell mood from a foot better than from a face. I could sense the slightest 
change in regular pace and intensity of movement of foot. I could sense any 
asymmetry in rhythm that indicated erraticness and unpredictability. Facial 
expression, by comparison, was so overlaid with stored expression, full of so 
many attempts to cover up or sway impression that the foot was much truer. I 
used sound in the same way, even breathing. You ask about the back and forth 
flow. [I had asked about conversation, about the relatedness between people 
talking to one another]. For me there is none. One thing that people find with 
me is that expression, rather than being constantly present, breaks through, in 
bursts, and this probably reflects system shifts and its effect on body 
connectedness and emotion. On a receptive level, my comprehension of the 
expression of others through their faces fluctuates in a similar way, though less 
so now with the lenses. [Irlen lenses which she has found helpful in improving 
the processing of visual information]. Facial expression in my presence may be 
like bouncing a ball off a wall. The ball bounces back but nobody threw it.30  
 
The report suggests that Williams may have a problem in making sense of other 
people’s expressions of emotions. She finds it less difficult to infer one’s mood 
from a piece of behaviour that does not typically express an emotion, like pace 
or the movement of a foot, than understanding what a certain facial expression 
shows. This does not seem to depend on perceptual deficits as her perception of 
face details appears to be extremely accurate. 
Williams’ description of what it is like for her to perceive other people’s 
expressions of emotions recall the third argument I presented in Section 2 
against the claim that we do not perceive emotions but their effects. I observed 
                                                 
30 COLE 2000: 250-1. 
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that we cannot give an exhaustive description of what we see when we perceive 
another person’s emotion in the expression without making reference to the 
emotion thus expressed. In other words, if we describe what we see only in 
physical terms by detailing, for example, the specific changes in the face, we fail 
to account for the fact that we are having a visual experience of another person’s 
emotion. This seems to be the case with Williams’ description. It is, in fact, clear 
that emotion concepts do not feature in her description of what it is like for her 
to perceive another person’s expression of emotion. 
This phenomenon is open to two interpretations. One is that Williams 
lacks the relevant emotion concepts. The other is that her experience lacks the 
common non-conceptual element that is a feature of any perception of emotions 
across cultures as well as across different stages of cognitive development, as 
was illustrated by the cathode tube ray example. The first interpretation is 
consistent with the hypothesis that autism is a developmental disorder in which 
people do not acquire a theory of mind. The problem with that view is that it 
runs counter to the fact that Williams has some rudimentary understanding of 
emotion concepts. If this were not the case, she could not infer someone’s mood 
from pace or foot movement. So, it is very unlikely that Williams totally lacks 
some understanding of emotion concepts, nor does she seem to totally lack a 
theory of mind. 
The second interpretation – the one I advocate – is that something is 
missing from Williams’ perception of other people’s expressions of emotions. 
This is likely to be the non-conceptual content that is a characteristic of 
perception of emotions. Since the non-conceptual content is the result of 
information delivered by the perceptual system, one may suppose that autistics 
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like Williams have a perceptual system that fails to detect emotions. Lack of a 
common non-conceptual content can also explain why Williams and other 
autistics fail to apply emotion concepts to expressions, even though they have 
some rudimentary understanding of these concepts. The idea is that autistics do 
not apply these concepts because their experience lacks the non-conceptual 
content on which full mastery of such concepts is built. This is consistent with 
the fact that many autistics talk of themselves as having mere intellectual 
understanding of emotion concepts, but they do not actually experience them. 
As I observed earlier, we can learn about processes in normal subjects by 
studying subjects with impairments. What I have so far observed tells us 
something about perception of emotions in normal subjects. If perception of 
emotions has a non-conceptual content that results from information delivered 
by the perceptual system and this system does not seem to work in subjects with 
autism spectrum disorder, then it is likely that, in normal subjects, perception of 
emotions does indeed depend, as I have claimed, on the perceptual system. The 
system provides a common non-conceptual content that explains why 
individuals of different cultures perceive the same emotions in the same 
expressions, even though they are divided by profound conceptual differences.  
I opened my discussion with the question of whether we should think of 
perception of emotions as analogous to the scientist’s experience of the cathode 
ray tube or as like the child’s experience of observational properties of the 
cathode. I showed that mastery of emotion concepts is not a condition for 
perceiving emotions in others. It follows that perception of emotions does not 
resemble the scientist’s perception of the cathode ray tube which requires 
mastery of the relevant concept. This suggests that we should think of 
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perception of emotions as being like the child’s perception of observational 
properties of the cathode ray tube such as its shape, colour, and size. 
One may wonder how this view can explain how perception of emotions 
generates mutual understanding. Empirical evidence suggests that mirror 
neurons may be involved in this process. When we observe other people having 
emotions as well as performing intentional actions, mirror neurons fire in the 
same way as they do when we ourselves have the same emotions31 or perform 
the same actions.32 It is possible that an explanation of how understanding of 
other people’s emotions works can be pinned down to the activity of mirror 
neurons and their functional role in the production of higher-level mental 
states.33 There is also evidence that the activity of mirror neurons is subnormal 
or absent in autistic subjects when they perceive other people’s emotions.34 
Mirror neurons may provide the basis for an explanation of how perception of 
other people’s emotions may lead to understanding of emotions, and of what 
goes wrong when such understanding is missing like in autism. 
Let us quickly recap: emotions have perceivable manifestations in virtue 
of which they can be perceived – these are expressions. Perception of other 
people’s emotions has a non-conceptual content which consists of information 
delivered by the perceptual system. It is a function of the system that it detects 
emotions. When this function is compromised, people do not perceive emotions, 
as shown by the case of subjects with autism spectrum disorder.  
 
 
                                                 
31 Particularly well studied is the case of disgust. See WICKER et al. 2003.  
32 GALLESE 2001. 
33 HURLEY 2007.  
34 DAPRETTO et al. 2005.   
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4. From Perception to Direct Knowledge of Emotions 
 
Some philosophers contend that experiences of observational properties, on the 
one hand, and experiences of non-observational properties, on the other, lead to 
the acquisition of two forms of knowledge.35 Experiences of observational 
properties yield knowledge that is direct and non-inferential. In contrast, 
experiences of non-observational properties yield knowledge that involves some 
form of inference from background knowledge.36 This distinction is clear in the 
cathode ray tube example. Imagine that the child acquires observational 
concepts like ‘square.’ She is therefore in a position to judge that the object 
before her eyes has square surfaces. The scientist, on the other hand, has 
mastery of the non-observational concept ‘cathode ray tube.’ She is therefore in 
a position to judge that the object before her eyes is a cathode ray tube. Are the 
two judgements on the same level? There is a sense in which they are because 
they are both based on perceptual evidence. This does not mean that they are 
the same kinds of judgements. Judgements of observational properties are more 
likely to be true and, when they are, yield direct non-inferential knowledge. This 
                                                 
35 PEACOCKE 1983, 2003a, 2003b. See also PRYOR 2000 and BURGE 2003. 
36 A similar distinction is drawn by James Pryor who observes: “Some propositions are such that 
we see or seem to see that they are so in virtue of seeming to see that other propositions are so. 
For instance, I seem to see that there’s a policeman ahead partly in virtue of seeming to see that 
there’s a blue-coated figure ahead, and partly in virtue of having certain background evidence 
about the ways that members of our society typically dress. Perhaps we ought strictly speaking 
to deny that my perceptual experiences themselves have the content: There is a policeman ahead. 
Much of our use of locutions like ‘It looks as if...’ and ‘I (seem to) see that...’ is influenced not just 
by what representational contents our experiences have, but also by what further conclusions 
we take those experiences to make obvious…I will call those propositions we seem to perceive 
to be so, but not in virtue of seeming to perceive that other propositions are so, perceptually 
basic propositions, or propositions that our experiences basically represent…The propositions 
that there is a policeman ahead, and that a certain person passed a test, are not perceptually 
basic. I think it is only perceptually basic propositions which purport to be justified just by the 
deliverances of our current perceptual experiences.” (PRYOR 2000: 338-9).  
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is because the only condition for an experience of an observational property to 
be accurate is that the property is as it appears to be. For example, the only 
condition for an experience of a square object to be accurate is that the object is 
actually square. As Peacocke observes:  
 
It is not epistemically possible for someone who has the concept of 
squareness that: from all the different angles from which an object may 
be seen, it is seen as square, his perceptual mechanisms are operating 
properly, the circumstances of perception (the environment in which the 
causal processes take place) are normal, the object is constant in shape, 
and yet that presented object not be square.37   
 
The same does not apply to non-observational judgements. It is not sufficient for 
an experience as of a cathode ray tube to be accurate that the object looks like a 
cathode ray tube. This is because the object could be a perfect replica of the 
cathode. This shows that a further condition for the experience to be accurate is 
that the concept ‘cathode ray tube’ is applied to an object that is, in fact, a 
cathode ray tube. This implies that the scientist draws an inference from what 
she knows about cathode ray tubes to how the object she has before her eyes 
looks to her. On this account, experiences of observational properties yield 
knowledge that is direct and non-inferential, while experiences of non-
observational properties yield knowledge that involves some form of inference 
from background knowledge. 
                                                 
37 PEACOCKE 1983: 99. 
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This applies to knowledge of other people’s emotions. I have shown that 
perception of emotions is an experience of observational properties. It follows 
that it is the kind of perception that grounds direct and non-inferential 
knowledge. This does not mean that it always yields knowledge. This is the case 
when we seem to perceive emotions that are not actually there – for example, 
when people contrive or pretend to be delighted or happy. This shows that we 
cannot really know people’s emotions because it is always possible that we seem 
to perceive emotions that people do not actually have. This is what I called the 
illusion view. A satisfactory account of how we perceive and subsequently know 
other people’s emotions needs to say when we actually perceive emotions and 
when we only seem to do so. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the change of which an emotional 
feeling is a perception is a kind of change which is constituted by the emotion it 
manifests. In contrast, the change of which a non-emotional feeling is an 
experience is not constituted by the emotion it seems to manifest. On this 
account, emotion is a constitutive part of the change of which an emotional 
feeling is a perception in the same way as objects are constitutive parts of 
perception. Two feelings that feel alike are different kinds of feelings when one 
is a perception of a change partly constituted by the emotion it manifests, while 
the other is not. 
The same argument applies to expressions of emotions. Expressions are 
the outwardly visible part of the overall change that an emotion brings about 
when it manifests itself. An emotional feeling is how the change appears to the 
emotion subject, while an expression is how the same change appears to an 
observer. It follows that the constitutive claim about changes occurring inside 
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the body carries over to expressions. This is to say that expressions are the 
outwardly visible part of changes that have emotions as their constitutive parts. 
On this account, expressions show emotions when they are constituted by the 
emotions they manifest. When changes in the outer part of the body resemble 
expressions of emotions, but they do not have emotions as their constitutive 
parts, then they are not expressions of emotions; they are other kinds of changes 
that resemble expressions. 
The same argument can be phrased in terms of properties. The properties 
of the observable manifestations of mental states that are not emotions may 
resemble the properties of the observable manifestations of emotions. There are 
many states with properties which resemble those of the observable 
manifestations of emotions. Ordinary examples are the properties instantiated 
when people fake or stage emotions. Less common examples are pathological 
cases. For example, tetanus may produce facial spasms with properties that 
resemble those of expressions of delight or amusement – which gives rise to the 
name ‘sardonic smile.’ Facial spasms produced by cerebral palsy or stroke may 
have properties that resembles those of observable manifestations of disgust. 
Similarly, linguistic expressions like swearing and coarse language in people 
with Tourette’s syndrome have properties that resemble those of genuine 
linguistic expressions of anger. The pictures that the French neurologist 
Guillaume Duchenne made in the late 19th are another example of bodily 
changes with properties that resemble those of the observable manifestations of 
emotions.38 Duchenne induced involuntary contractions of facial muscles by 
applying electrodes to the faces of subjects with facial palsy. The pictures he 
                                                 
38 DUCHENNE 1862/1990. 
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took show people who seem delighted, afraid, terrified, or worried, although 
they are not. These are examples of states whose manifestations have properties 
that resemble the properties of the observable manifestations of emotions. Yet, 
they are different kinds of states from emotions. It follows that the changes they 
produce are not observable manifestations of emotions (i.e. expressions), but 
other kinds of changes. Perception of any of these states would not be 
perception of emotions, but of states whose manifestations only resemble those 
of emotions. 
This bears on the question of when we really know other people’s 
emotions. Perception yields knowledge when it is the perception of an 
observable property that is the manifestation of the emotion. It is possible that 
this kind of perception is very similar to perception of a property that is not 
actually the manifestation of the emotion, but this does not undermine the claim 
that perception of a property that is, indeed, the manifestation of an emotion 
amounts to knowledge of the emotion. The illusion view is thus defused. We 
can know other people emotions by perceiving them in the perceivable 
manifestations of the emotions, that is, in the expressions. 
This account does not suffice to provide full knowledge of emotions 
though. Properties of emotions show the emotion kind. For example, an 
expression of sadness shows that one has the kind of emotion we call ‘sadness.’ 
But, as reactions, emotions are essentially directed at objects. This means that we 
have complete knowledge of another person’s emotion only when we also know 
what she is emotional about. A way of getting to grips with this problem is to 
consider in which circumstances the emotion object is perceptually available. 
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In Chapter IV, I argued that emotions are reactions to objects that are 
either presented in perception or represented in thoughts. It is clear that when the 
object is represented in thoughts it is not perceptually available. In contrast, 
when the object is presented in perception, it is possible for an observer to 
perceive it. In particular, it is plausible that we are in a position to perceive both 
the emotion kind and the emotion object, when we can observe the relation 
between the emotion we perceive in another person’s expression and the object 
in reaction to which the emotion arises. For example, I may see my friend’s fear 
of a dog when I see her fear arising as the dog comes forward. This suggests that 
we perceive the object of the emotion when we jointly attend to the emotion and 
to the object to which the emotion is a reaction; in other words, when we 
observe the causal connection between the object and the emotion. When the 
expression is constituted by the emotion it shows, and the object perceived is the 
object in response to which the emotion is formed, we have direct and full 
knowledge of another person’s emotion. 
The fact that joint visual attention is essential to obtaining full knowledge 
of emotions may provide a further explanation for the fact that subjects with 
autism spectrum disorder do not detect other people’s emotions. Evidence 
shows that joint visual attention is particularly deficient in autistics.39 This 
suggests that the inability to understand other people’s emotions characteristic 
of autism may result from lack of information on two levels. One is the level of 
the emotion kind as autistics do not seem to perceive emotions. The other is the 
level of the emotion object. This suggests that, because of the deficit in joint 
                                                 
39 NABER et al. forthcoming. 
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visual attention, autistics do not perceive the relation between a given object and 
the emotion the object may produce in other people. 
To conclude, it is worth noting that the fact that we can perceive the 
emotion object only when the emotion is caused by an object presented in 
perception can be viewed as a feature that human emotions have in common 
with animal emotions and, probably, that we have inherited from our ancestors. 
Emotions are states that creatures form in response to environmental conditions 
and that indirectly signal these conditions to other animals. Imagine an animal 
in the grip of fear due to seeing a snake lurking in the grass. The fact that its fear 
can be perceived by other animals creates the conditions for them to become 
aware of the danger and adequately respond to it. In particular, the possibility 
of jointly attending to the emotion and its object provides them with 
information about the character of the object (e.g. that it is dangerous) and its 
nature (e.g. that it is a predator). This enables the other animals to choose 
between two coping strategies like fleeing and fighting and, hopefully, 
overcome the danger. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
We have seen that emotions produce bodily changes. Perception of the outer 
visible part of these changes is perception of the perceivable manifestations of 
emotions. This perception typically has a non-conceptual content. This yields 
direct knowledge of emotions when the manifestations are constituted by the 









On the account that I have been defending, emotions are enduring non-episodic 
states that may or may not manifest themselves in emotional feelings. A 
satisfactory account of self-knowledge of emotions needs to explain how we 
know emotions when we feel them as well as when we do not. It needs to 
explain how we know what kinds of emotions we have. And it needs to tell us 
the objects at which they are directed. 
Emotions are not the only non-episodic mental states we have; beliefs, 
desires, and wants are also non-episodic states. Of these, beliefs are particularly 
important to the task of explaining self-knowledge of emotions. Many 
philosophers have argued, and still argue, that emotions are some sorts of 
beliefs or judgements.1 This may tempt one to say that an account of self-
knowledge of emotions should have important similarities with how we 
account for self-knowledge of beliefs. This view’s appeal is that when we know 
beliefs we also know their objects. So, an explanation of self-knowledge of 
emotions modelled on self-knowledge of beliefs has the potential to explain how 
we know emotion objects. There is a further reason for trying to model self-
knowledge of emotions on knowledge of beliefs. It is fairly uncontroversial that, 
even though beliefs are non-episodic states, we mostly know them. This may 
                                                 
1 I have discussed this view in Chapter II.  
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tempt one to hope for a strong similarity between beliefs and emotions, and for 
an explanation of how we know emotions that draws on how we know beliefs. 
It is not obvious, though, that we can explain self-knowledge of emotions 
in exactly the same terms as knowledge of beliefs. Judgments and beliefs aim at 
truth. Emotions, by contrast, do not. They are reactions to how things appear.2 
This is a first reason for doubting that one could explain self-knowledge of 
emotions on the model of self-knowledge of beliefs. Another reason is that 
emotions do not manifest themselves in judgments – they manifest themselves 
in emotional feelings. This may give us a clue as to how we know emotions. It is 
plausible to think that we know what kinds of emotions we have on the basis of 
which emotional feelings we experience. So, for example, a feeling that feels like 
anger may give me a clue to the fact that I am angry. The problem with this 
view is that it does not explain knowledge of emotion objects. Secondly, it does 
not explain knowledge of emotions in the event that we do not feel them. These 
are features that a satisfactory account needs to explain. I will show that 
knowledge of the emotion objects is mostly acquired through self-
understanding. I will also show, however, that testimony from other people 
plays an essential role in knowledge of emotions when we do not feel them. An 
account that takes into account all of these elements has a good chance of 
providing an exhaustive explanation of how self-knowledge of emotion works. 
 
2.1 Peacocke’s Account of Self-Knowledge of Beliefs  
 
There are various accounts of self-knowledge of beliefs. Some philosophers 
                                                 
2 I already presented and developed this view in Chapter III.  
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argue that knowledge of beliefs is the result of some sort of inner perception of 
which beliefs are the objects.3 Others deny the perceptual model and argue that 
knowledge of beliefs is not obtained by directing our attention at beliefs 
themselves as objects of inner perception, but at the objects of beliefs.4 Some 
philosophers argue that rationality can justify belief self-ascriptions.5 They think 
that no rational person who had the concepts ‘belief’, ‘desire’, ‘pain’, and so on, 
could be incapable of self-knowledge. Others argue that self-knowledge of 
beliefs is a matter of commitment to the truth of our beliefs.6 Finally, some 
philosophers think that self-knowledge of beliefs should be explained in a way 
that combines the role of rationality and the commitment to truth. This view is 
defended by Christopher Peacocke.7 I will focus on his account for the following 
reason. Many philosophers have described and still describe emotions as some 
sorts of judgements. I have shown that many arguments stand against this view. 
One, in particular, is relevant to the issue of self-knowledge of emotions. If 
emotions were judgements, we could easily come to know them by explaining 
how we know judgements. Peacocke’s view provides such an explanation and 
accounts for the role of judgements in belief self-ascriptions. So, it is plausible to 
expect that, if emotions were judgments, this view should also explain how we 
know emotions. In Section 2.2, I will show that this expectation is misplaced 
because emotions have no similarity with the kinds of states that judgements 
and beliefs are. I will first discuss Peacocke’s view and explain the role 
judgements play in self-knowledge of beliefs. This will provide a basis for 
                                                 
3 For discussion see SHOEMAKER 1994.  
4 This view is introduced by Gareth Evans (EVANS 1982). 
5 This view is defended by Sydney Shoemaker (SHOEMAKER 1994). 
6 MORAN 2001.  
7 PEACOCKE 1992, 1996, 1998, 1999.  
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showing that the same model does not apply to emotions. 
Peacocke’s account draws an analogy between knowledge of conscious 
states like experiences and knowledge of beliefs. He observes that, in general, 
conscious states can provide a thinker with reasons for performing certain 
actions. A pain experience, for example, can give a thinker a reason for pulling 
her hand back from a hot stove; a visual experience of a car rushing towards her 
can give her a reason for moving out of the way. Judgements are mental actions 
because they are states by which a thinker assents to contents. So, if conscious 
states give reasons for actions, and judgements are mental actions, then it is 
plausible to think that conscious states can also give reasons for making 
judgements about those states. On this account, an experience of pain may give 
a thinker reason for judging that she is in pain. This will provide her with a true 
and justified belief about her pain experience. 
Peacocke observes that we cannot gloss this procedure in terms of the 
experience causing a belief, which gives me reason for making the judgment. He 
writes: 
 
An experience of pain can be a thinker's reason for judging that he is in 
pain. To try to construe this as a case of judgement reached by inference 
would make it impossible to give an epistemology of the self-ascription 
of sensations. (Am I supposed to rationally reach the conclusion that I am 
in pain from the premiss that I am in pain?) The pain case shows too that 
the model need not be that of perception, either. The conscious pain itself, 
and not some alleged perception of it, is reason-giving.8 
                                                 
8 PEACOCKE 1998: 72. 
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The case of pain is a specific form of self-ascription. Peacocke calls it 
‘consciously-based self-ascription’ because it is the conscious state that provides 
the thinker with reason for self-ascribing the state. One may object that beliefs 
are not conscious states and this account cannot explain self-ascriptions of 
beliefs. Peacocke, however, thinks that the procedure also applies to beliefs. He 
thinks that judgements are conscious states by which beliefs are made 
consciously available to thinkers. This view is, though, controversial. Peacocke’s 
reason for holding it is that both judgements and beliefs aim at truth. The 
difference is that while judgements are episodic, beliefs are non-episodic states. 
He also thinks that judgements are prerequisites for beliefs, but this is a view we 
do not need to buy into in order to understand his account of self-knowledge. 
So, given the belief that p, the corresponding judgement can be viewed as the 
conscious manifestation of the belief that p. 
Peacocke supports this view with the following example. Someone is 
asked who the Czech Prime Minister was in 1956, during the Soviet invasion. If 
the person knows it, she has a specific belief stored in her memory. So, by 
remembering who the Prime Minister was, she makes the belief consciously 
available in form of a conscious recollection that Dubcek was the Czech Prime 
Minister in 1956. This is a conscious state that gives her reason to judge that 
Dubcek was the Czech Prime Minister in 1956. The judgement, in turn, is a 
conscious state that manifests the belief and gives the person reason for judging 
she believes that Dubcek was the Czech Prime Minister at that time. So, the 
thinker makes a consciously based self-ascription of belief and this provides her 
with knowledge of what she believes about the identity of the Czech Prime 
 213 
Minister in 1956. 
It is worth noting that the role judgments play in self-ascriptions of 
beliefs does not carry over to self-ascriptions of other mental states. One may 
self-ascribe the memory that Dubcek was Prime Minister in 1956 only on the 
basis of the memory itself. In this case what is self-ascribed is not a belief but a 
memory. Similarly, one may come to self-ascribe pain on the basis of a pain 
sensation. This is because, on Peacocke’s account, a conscious mental state may 
give one reason to self-ascribe that state. There are all sorts of conscious states 
and they may all give one reason for self-ascribing them. In the case of beliefs, 
the conscious states are judgements because beliefs are non-episodic states that 
manifest themselves in judgements. So, first-order judgements or beliefs give 
the subject reason for self-ascribing those states. This procedure enables one to 
know one’s beliefs because judgments make the content of beliefs consciously 
available. 
Peacocke observes that this account is consistent with Gareth Evans’ that 
we know beliefs by attending not to the beliefs themselves, but to their objects. 
Peacocke regards this procedure as special way of knowing some beliefs. Evans 
writes: 
 
The crucial point is [that] in making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes 
are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward – upon the 
world. If someone asks me ‘Do you think there is going to be a third 
world war?’, I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same 
outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the 
question ‘will there be a third world war?’ I get myself in a position to 
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answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation 
whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p.9 
 
Evans’ view is interesting because it identifies a fundamental feature of 
judgments: they aim at truth. Beliefs have the same aim with the difference that, 
unlike judgments, they are non-episodic states. The point of Evans' remark is 
that, since both judgments and beliefs aim at truth, we can come to know them 
by attending to the world. For example, in order to answer the question whether 
there will be a third world war, one seeks the truth about whether there will be 
a third world war; the answer as to the truth of this question will be what one 
believes given that our beliefs aim at truth. In turn, we come to know what we 
believe about the world through the relevant judgements because judgments 
make beliefs consciously available. As Peacocke points out, Evans' procedure is 
only one of the many different ways we know beliefs. Memory is another way in 
which we know them. 
What matters to my argument is that, on Peacocke’s view, we come to 
know beliefs by making judgments, that is, by forming conscious states that aim 
at truth. Evans’ point is that, in some cases, it is sufficient to attend to the belief 
objects, namely to objects and situations in the world, in order to form 
judgments and subsequently know what we believe. This is because judgments 
aim at truth and one way of knowing truth is to look at the world. So, in general, 
we come to know our beliefs by making judgments. Looking at the world is a 
specific way of making judgments.  
 
                                                 
9 EVANS 1982: 225. 
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2.2 Self-Knowledge of Emotions 
 
While it may be tempting to extrapolate Peacocke’s account of knowledge of 
beliefs and apply it to emotions, we must resist this temptation. The reason is 
that, unlike beliefs, emotions do not aim at truth. This makes emotions similar to 
perceptions. To make this point clear, I will first consider the case of perception. 
Sometimes, the content of perceptions consists of propositions. For example, I 
can see that there is a table in the room, or hear that someone is knocking on my 
door. Prima facie, this makes perceptions with propositional content similar to 
the equivalent perceptual beliefs. However, this is far from saying that beliefs 
and perceptions are states of the same kind. This view is summarised by Tim 
Crane: 
 
Perceptions (unlike desires, for instance) are representations of how the 
world is, and thus ‘made true’ by the facts. […] Perceptions seem to ‘aim’ 
at truth in something like the way beliefs do. But the way perceptions 
aim at truth is not the same as the way beliefs do. For part of what it is for 
belief to aim at truth is shown by Moore’s so-called ‘paradox’: the 
absurdity, for all p, of asserting ‘I believe that p but not p.’ Yet as the 
Müller-Lyer Illusion shows, there are values of p for which asserting ‘I 
perceive that p but not p’ is perfectly coherent. There is thus no Moorean 
‘paradox’ of perception.  
So one clear reason perceptions are not beliefs – and there are 
others – is that they are not revisable in the light of either other 
perceptions or beliefs that the perceiver has. Although perceptions do 
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normally involve inclinations to believe, they cannot be identified with 
these inclinations, since unlike inclinations to believe, they are resilient to 
conclusive counter-evidence.10 
 
So, perceptions do not aim at truth in the same sense beliefs do because when 
we combine, in the same sentence, the propositional content of a perception and 
its negation as occurs in the sentence “Under this light the fabric looks red, but it 
is not”, what we say makes perfect sense. This depends on the fact that the first 
conjunct “Under this light the fabric looks red” does not have assertoric force, 
that is, it does not state how things are; it says how they appear to the perceiver. 
In contrast, the second conjunct states how things are and, therefore, has 
assertive force. If this were not the case and the propositional content of 
perception had assertoric force, the sentence would then be absurd because it 
would say that the fabric is and is not red. 
The same is not true of beliefs. Consider the classic version of Moore’s 
paradox: “It rains but I do not believe it.” The paradox is open to various 
alternative interpretations.11 Here, I commit myself only to the idea that, given 
that the sentence is uttered, the first conjunct can be viewed as an assertion 
about the weather, while the second can be viewed as a negation of the first 
conjunct. On this account, the sentence is absurd because we expect someone to 
believe what she recognises to be true. So, when she asserts p, we take her to 
believe that p, and yet she denies that p. This can be viewed as the result of the 
fact that beliefs aim at truth. Making an assertion that p implies the aim to say 
something true. Sentences of the form “p but I do not believe that p” are absurd 
                                                 
10 CRANE 1992: 16. Quoted from manuscript.  
11 For discussion see Moran 2001: 69-77. 
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because if we accept that the first conjunct states how things are, then it is clear 
that the second conjunct, which appears to be a belief, fails to behave as beliefs 
ought to behave, that is, to aim at truth. In other words, the first conjunct state 
how things are, while the second fails to take notice of how things are and, as a 
consequence, fails to behave as a belief even though its linguistic appearance is 
that of a belief. The sentence is therefore absurd. 
The same argument does not carry over to emotions. Like perceptions, 
emotions may have propositional contents. So, for example, I can be happy that 
a friend is visiting me or I can fear that my neighbour’s dog is dangerous. Not 
every emotion has a propositional content, though. Often, emotions are directed 
at objects, rather than at propositions. Emotions with propositional contents 
may help to show that emotions do not aim at truth. Consider the sentence “I 
fear that my neighbour’s dog is dangerous even though it is not.” The sentence 
is of the form “I fear that p but not-p.” As for the case of perception, asserting the 
conjunction does not commit one to say anything absurd because it is perfectly 
possible for someone to fear something even though she knows it is not actually 
dangerous. This depends on the fact that emotions do not asset their content, 
that is, they do not aim at truth. Rather, they entertain contents like thoughts 
and perceptions do. 
On this account, emotions and beliefs are totally different states. Beliefs 
are open to further evidence because they aim at truth. This explains why a 
sentence like “It rains but I do not believe it” is absurd. The claim “It rains” 
states how things are and thereby provides evidence in light of which the belief 
in the second conjunct should be revised given that it is uttered by the same 
person who claims that it rains. But the sentence fails to meet this requirement 
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and credits the same person with knowledge of evidence about the state of 
things, namely that it rains, and a belief that does not take notice of this piece of 
evidence. In contrast, emotions are not open to further evidence because they do 
not aim at truth.12 This explains why a sentence like “I fear that my neighbour’s 
dog is dangerous even though it is not” is not at all absurd. 
This is not to say that emotions cannot possibly be sensitive to evidence. 
Richard Moran observes:  
 
The fact that mere beliefs about my emotions can alter what I feel would 
be surprising if the emotions themselves were not attitudes directed 
toward something. Coming to believe that some fear of mine is 
unfounded will normally change my emotional state […].13 
 
Moran’s idea is that emotions are in some ways judgement-sensitive.14 This is 
clear in psychotherapeutic settings where patients reshape their emotions by 
changing their background beliefs. This is also clear in the treatment of phobias 
where the judgement that (say) spiders are not dangerous may help people 
overcome their fear. This is perfectly compatible with the claim that emotions do 
not aim at truth. The possibility for judgement to affect the content of states that 
are not truth-apt is well known in the case of perception. Peacocke makes the 
following example:  
 
                                                 
12 I discussed this point in Chapter III.  
13 MORAN 2001: 54.  
14 Thomas M. Scanlon (SCANLON 1998: Ch. 1) uses the notion of judgement-sensitivity with 
reference to attitudes like desires. The same view is defended by Moran (MORAN 2001: 54) with 
reference to emotions.   
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You may walk unto your sitting-room and seem to hear rain falling 
outside. Then you notice that someone has left the stereo on, and realize 
that the sound you hear is that of applause at the end of the concert. It 
happens to many people that after realizing this, the sound comes to be 
heard as applause: the content of experience is influenced by that 
judgement.15  
 
This shows that perceptions are also judgement-sensitive. The same 
phenomenon seems to occur in the case of perceptual illusions like the Müller-
Lyer diagram where, sometimes, perceivers see that the two lines are of equal 
length after measuring them. 
The same considerations apply to emotions. It is clear that we can try 
and, sometimes, succeed in changing our emotions by means of judgements. As 
reactions to how things appear, emotions can be inappropriate. In such cases 
judgements may help us to reshape emotions according to what we know to be 
the case. In other words, we may try to make emotions coherent with our 
judgements. Sometimes we succeed and overcome the emotions. At other times, 
we do not and continue to have emotions that run counter to beliefs. 
A further reason for claiming that emotions do not aim at truth is that we 
can have epistemic attitudes such as beliefs or disbeliefs to emotions, in a similar 
manner to how we can have epistemic attitudes to perceptions. Consider the 
perceptual case first. You dip a stick into water and seem to see that the stick has 
bent. You do not endorse the content of your perception because you know that 
sticks do not bend as soon as you dip them into water. So you do not form the 
                                                 
15 PEACOCKE 1983: 6. 
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perceptual belief that the stick is bent. Rather, you disbelieve or suspend 
judgment about what you seem to see. That is, you take an epistemic attitude to 
the perceptual content.16 
The same phenomenon occurs in emotions. Sometimes, we realise that 
our emotions are not appropriate reactions to their objects. This is the case, for 
example, when we become aware of over-reacting to a certain situation. We can 
then attempt to distance ourselves from how things appear to us in the emotion 
and judge that the emotional response is not appropriate to how things are. This 
is similar to what we do when we disbelieve the content of perception. 
The reason why we can take epistemic attitudes to our perceptions and 
emotions is that they do not present (in the case of perceptions) or represent (in 
the case of emotions) how things are, but only how things appear to the subjects. 
It follows that, on some occasions, we are entitled to suspend judgement about 
how things appear and await further evidence before drawing any conclusions. 
This happens, for example, when we advise people to see how serious things 
actually are before panicking or behaving emotionally. 
What I have so far observed lends support to the idea that we cannot 
know emotions through judgements. Judgements are states that aim at truth 
while emotions do not. This means that judging that (say) flying is dangerous 
does not give me any direct non-inferential reason for believing that I fear flying. 
This is because I may well judge that flying is dangerous and, nonetheless, enjoy 
it or not fear it at all. Similarly, judging that flying is not dangerous does not 
give me any direct non-inferential reason for believing that I do not fear flying. 
This is because it is perfectly possible for me to judge that flying is not 
                                                 
16 MARTIN 1993. 
 221 
dangerous and yet fear it. Therefore, judgements do not provide direct non-
inferential evidence about emotions. 
One may wonder whether judgements can provide at least indirect 
inferential evidence about emotions. For example, can the judgement that flying 
is not dangerous give me reason for believing that I enjoy flying? There is a 
sense in which I can try to predict my emotional reactions on the basis of 
background beliefs. But this procedure is more a way of making plausible 
predictions about the emotions I am likely to form than a way of knowing the 
emotions that I actually have. Plausible predictions may always turn out false. 
So, they are not reliable ways of gaining knowledge. Consider the following 
example. I book a holiday in a certain locality because I believe it to be a nice 
holiday destination. On this basis, I make the prediction that I will enjoy my 
holiday. Later, it turns out that the locality is not as nice as I expected and I do 
not actually enjoy my holiday. I am thus disappointed because the emotions I 
expected to experience (e.g. enjoyment) on the basis of what I believed about the 
holiday destination are not the emotions I actually experience (e.g. boredom or 
disappointment). This shows that predictions based on background beliefs do 
not yield knowledge of emotions. And, in turn, it suggests that judgments such 
as the one that I make about my holiday destination do not provide indirect 
inferential evidence about emotions either. 
What I have so far observed shows that Peacocke’s account of self-
knowledge of beliefs and judgements does not apply to emotions. This is 
because emotions do not represent how things are, but how things appear. 
Nevertheless, Peacocke’s account can still help us understand how we come to 
know emotions. He argues that conscious states play an essential role in self-
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ascriptions of those states. So, for example, pain experiences can give people 
reasons for believing that they are in pain. Along these lines, one may argue 
that, in order to understand how we know emotions, we need to look at how 
they manifest themselves in conscious states. I will address this issue in the next 
section. 
 
3.1 Varieties of Self-Knowledge of Emotions 
 
Emotions produce bodily feelings like pangs of fear or anxiety, feelings of rage 
or elation, of disgust or boredom, of love or hatred. It is plausible to think that 
emotional feelings play an essential role in self-knowledge of emotions. This 
must not obscure the fact that there are other ways of knowing emotions. 
Sometimes, the content of thoughts and the observation of one’s own 
expressions and behaviour are reliable and fairly direct ways of knowing 
emotions. Yet, they are not as specific as emotional feelings. There are two 
arguments for this claim. One is that emotions manifest themselves in feelings, 
while they do not manifest themselves in thoughts even though they can 
influence the content of thoughts. The other is that emotions are states humans 
share with animals. Given that animals are capable neither of conceptual 
thought nor of observation of their own expressions and behaviour and yet are 
capable of feeling emotions, then it is reasonable to suppose that emotional 
feelings are characteristic of emotions in a way that thoughts are not. This 
justifies the claim that feelings are the most important way of gaining 
knowledge about emotions. In the next section, I will show how emotional 
feelings feature in the knowledge process. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 I will discuss 
two alternative ways of knowing emotions. They are self-understanding of 
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thought contents and self-observation of expressions and behaviour.  
 
3.2 Emotional Feelings 
 
In Chapter IV I showed that there are two ways of understanding the notion of 
emotional feeling, namely the sensation and perception views. Here I will 
summarise the two views and show that only one is relevant to self-knowledge 
of emotions. The sensation view comes in two brands. One is the so-called ‘act–
object’ view.17 It claims that, in having feelings, there is a genuine object of 
awareness, even if it depends for its existence on the subject’s awareness of it. 
On this view, the objects of awareness are mental entities. A version of the act–
object view is the sense-datum theory. An account of bodily feelings in line with 
this theory says that feelings are mental objects the existence of which depends 
on their being felt by a sensing subject. This view also accounts for emotional 
feelings which are taken to be inner mental entities present to one’s 
consciousness. What distinguishes them from feelings and sensations that do 
not manifest emotions is how they feel. So, for example, a feeling of anger is a 
mental object that feels different from other feelings and sensations. 
Some philosophers reject the idea that feelings are states of awareness of 
mental objects. This view is also known as the no-object view.18 A specific 
version of the view is known as adverbialism. An adverbialist account of 
feelings and sensations says that they are modifications of the subject that can be 
characterised in terms of specialised adverbs. If a sensation of pain is just a 
painful sensation, then feeling pain may just be to have a certain sort of 
                                                 
17 For discussion see CRANE 2000 and MARTIN 2002, 2004.  
18 For discussion see MARTIN 1998a.  
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sensation, a painful one, or to feel in a certain way – painfully, for example. On 
this construal, feelings are states of awareness of properties of the experience 
itself. This view also applies to emotional feelings. A feeling of anger, for 
example, is a sensation in which one is aware of feeling angry-ly. This property 
distinguishes a feeling of anger from other emotional feelings in which one is 
affected differently. 
The sensation view raises the following problem. Bodily feelings and 
sensations are experiences. A natural way of understanding experience is as 
states of awareness of objects in the world. The sensation view, by contrast, 
conceives of feelings as states of awareness of mental objects or of properties of 
experience. The view, therefore, fails to do justice to the idea that, as 
experiences, feelings provide one with awareness of objects that exist 
independently of one’s awareness of them. This view appears even more 
problematic when it comes to determining what we know through bodily 
feelings and sensations. Experience is often a source of knowledge about the 
world. But if we conceive of bodily feelings as experiences in which one 
becomes aware only of objects and properties internal to one’s mind, it follows 
that they do not provide knowledge of anything in the world. At best, they 
provide knowledge of one’s own mind. This challenges the idea that experience 
is a source of knowledge about the world. The perception view offers an 
alternative to these problems. Its core commitment is the idea that the body and 
what happens within the body are parts of the physical world like chairs, 
houses, and mountains. Just as we perceive chairs, houses, and mountains, we 
also perceive our body and what goes on in it. 
On the perception view, emotional feelings are perceptions of changes 
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brought about by emotions. Empirical evidence suggests that specific changes or 
patterns of changes are peculiar to specific emotions.19 On this account, each 
emotional feeling is an experience of a specific change, that is, a change with 
specific properties. These properties are responsible for the phenomenal 
character of emotional feelings. In other words, specific emotional feelings are 
perceptions of bodily changes with specific properties. This is analogous to the 
visual case where specific shapes produce specific shape experiences. When I 
see a square object, the content of my experience is determined by the fact that 
there is a square object before my eyes. 
On this construal, a specific emotional feeling is a specific kind of 
experience; one that feels like a specific emotion. This lends room to an account 
of self-knowledge of emotions inspired by Peacocke’s notion of consciously-
based self-ascriptions. He employs the example of a specific experience – a pain 
sensation – that gives the thinker reason for self-ascribing that experience. The 
same idea can be expressed by saying that the pain experience gives the thinker 
reason for self-ascribing a psychological predicate corresponding to the 
psychological concept that the experience instantiates – i.e. the concept of pain. 
The same procedure is available in the case of emotions. Emotional feelings are 
specific kinds of experiences not only because they differ from other bodily 
experiences, but also because they have characteristic felt qualities. A feeling of 
anger has a different felt quality from a feeling of sadness; a feeling of joy has a 
different felt quality from a feeling of fear, and so on. On this account, having a 
given emotional feeling may give a thinker reason for self-ascribing an emotion 
predicate corresponding to the specific emotion concept the feeling instantiates. 
                                                 
19 ZAJONC et al. 1989. For discussion see of the experimental results see ADELMANN and ZAJONC 
1989, and MCINTOSH et al. 1997. 
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So, for example, feeling angry may give me reason for self-ascribing anger. 
Self-ascriptions yield knowledge of emotions when they meet two 
requirements. One is that the emotion concept deployed in the ascription is the 
same emotion concept that the feeling instantiates. For example, a self-ascription 
justified by a feeling of anger must deploy the concept of anger in order to 
provide knowledge of the emotion that motivates the ascription. The other 
condition is that the feeling must be an accurate perception. Emotional feelings 
are perceptions of changes produced by emotions. I showed that they are 
vulnerable to three kinds of perceptual error. The first kind occurs when one 
misperceives a change that does not manifest an emotion for one that does. The 
second kind occurs when one misperceives a change that manifests an emotion 
for one that does not. The third kind occurs when one seems to perceive a 
change that does not actually occur. An emotional feeling is accurate when none 
of these errors occur. When these conditions are met, the feeling is an accurate 
perception of a change that has the emotion as its constitutive part. A self-
ascription based on such feeling amounts to knowledge because it attributes to 
the thinker an emotion property that is true of her. 
This account of self-knowledge of emotions rests on the idea that specific 
emotions produce specific changes of which emotional feelings are perceptions. 
This is not, however, true of every emotion. In Chapter IV, I highlighted 
evidence that higher emotions like jealousy or envy do not produce specific 
changes.20 It follows that they are not accompanied by characteristic emotional 
feelings, but by feelings that are in some way unspecific. An account of self-
knowledge of higher emotions must take into account this feature and explains 
                                                 
20 GRIFFITHS 1997: 100. 
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how we know higher emotions. It is unquestionable that, in most cases, we 
know when we are jealous or envious. But it is plausible that the way in which 
we know this is not exactly the same as for basic emotions. This is because the 
sorts of changes these emotions produce are not as specific as those that basic 
emotions produce. This gives one reason to suspect that these non-specific 
changes alone may not suffice to provide one with knowledge of higher 
emotions. The challenge is to explain how such unspecific feelings factor in self-
knowledge of higher emotions, and which other elements contribute to it. 
There is a substantial difference between the kind of experience we have 
when we perceive changes brought about by basic emotions, and the kind of 
experience we have when we perceive unspecific changes brought about by 
higher emotions. The former is an experience of the observational properties of 
the changes. It is a feature of this kind of experience that it is independent of 
background knowledge, and it solely depends on the perceptual system – 
interoception in this case. For example, a feeling of anger is an experience of the 
observational properties of a specific bodily change that directly impinges upon 
the subject’s perceptual system. It is not a condition for experiencing this change 
that the subject knows what anger is or feels like. Such knowledge is only a 
condition for the subject to make the judgement that what she feels is anger. 
The kind of experience we have with higher emotions is quite different. 
As we know, these emotions produce unspecific changes that the subject 
experiences as feelings of higher emotions. This is to say that when we feel higher 
emotions we do not simply experience the observational properties of the 
changes. We represent these properties as feelings of higher emotions. Consider 
the example of jealousy. Our starting point is the claim that, as a higher emotion, 
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jealousy produces unspecific changes that, nonetheless, we experience as a 
specific feeling: the feeling of jealousy. How is that possible if the changes are 
unspecific? The explanation I proposed in Chapter IV is that the 
representational content of the feeling of jealousy deploys a concept – that of 
jealousy – that is made available to the subject by her concomitant state of 
jealousy. In other words, the perception occurs in a specific psychological 
context – that of jealousy. This affects the way in which she perceives the 
unspecific changes jealousy brings about. This is analogous to what happen 
when we experience a certain sound as that of a violin in virtue of the fact that 
the perceptual content deploys a concept – that of a violin – that is made 
available to us by the underlying state of knowledge about what violins sound 
like. 
This procedure is not required for basic emotions because they produce 
specific changes that cause characteristic emotional feelings which, in turn, 
justify specific emotion ascriptions. The procedure is instead required for higher 
emotions because they produce totally unspecific changes. It follows that how 
we perceive these changes depends on what emotion concepts are available to 
us when the changes occur. Since the changes are produced by higher emotions, 
the emotion concepts available are those of the emotions that produce the 
changes – that is, higher emotion concepts. 
This account is entirely consistent with Peacocke’s notion of consciously-
based self-ascriptions because it credits feelings of higher emotions with the 
same justificatory role that they have in ascriptions of basic emotions. A self-
ascription of jealousy is justified by a feeling of jealousy. The feeling is, in turn, a 
perception of an unspecific change that is represented as one of jealousy because 
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jealousy is the emotion that produces the unspecific change and subsequently 
makes available the relevant emotion concept. The difference between a basic 
emotion ascription and a higher emotion one is that the latter is more likely to 
suffer from concept misattributions. This is because the feelings that justify self-
ascriptions may not be sufficiently characteristic to give the ascriber evidence as 
to what emotions the feelings actually instantiate. I will show in the next section 
that the possibility of misapplying concepts is in some way limited by the fact 
that emotions often influence the content of thoughts. In the case of higher 
emotions, the ability to track and understand the content and course of one’s 
thoughts often helps to understand what higher emotions one has and thereby 
to avoid concept misattribution.  
 
3.3 Emotional Thoughts 
 
Some philosophers think that it is a necessary condition for having emotions 
that the subject makes certain evaluative judgements.21 I argued that this view is 
too demanding in cognitive terms because creatures that do not master 
evaluative concepts are, nonetheless, capable of emotions. Some philosophers 
have tried to avoid this criticism by arguing that thoughts, and not judgements, 
                                                 
21 I discussed the cognitive view in detail in Chapter II. In brief: philosophers who advocate 
cognitivism about emotions claim that emotions involve cognitive states. This may mean that a 
cognitive state is a necessary condition for, or a necessary concomitant of, emotions. There is no 
agreement over the kind of cognitive state involved in emotions. Different states have been 
proposed as candidates. Jerome Neu suggests that the cognitive elements that matter most are 
thoughts. Robert C. Solomon and Martha Nussbaum defend the view that emotions are 
evaluative judgements. Robert Gordon argues that emotions involve knowledge. The various 
views share the fundamental idea that emotions necessarily involve cognitive states. Judgement 
is the cognitive state most frequently appealed to in the explanation of emotions.  
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are essential to emotions.22 For example, D’Arms and Jacobson make the 
following remark about what they call the quasi-judgementalist23 theory of 
emotions:  
 
The revised theory still type-identifies the emotions by their defining 
propositions, and claims that certain thoughts are partly constitutive of 
being in an emotional state, but it loosens the requirement that these 
thoughts must be affirmed by the agent.24   
 
This theory is also false since conceptual thought does not seem a necessary 
condition for emotions, as shown by the fact that infants and animals have 
emotions, even though they do not have conceptual thoughts. Nevertheless, 
there is a sense in which this view has merit. It points out the important 
connection between emotions and thoughts.  Thoughts are episodic states that, 
like perceptions, do not assert but instead entertain contents. It is plausible that 
the content of thoughts can be influenced by emotions in the same way 
perceptions of bodily changes (i.e. emotional feelings) are. This means that 
thoughts may help in the task of knowing emotions. The idea is that when 
thoughts are influenced by emotions, they deploy concepts that the underlying 
                                                 
22 NEU 1978, 2000. 
23 Quasi-judgimentalism or neo-judgimentalism is form of weak cognitivism. On this view, the 
subject of an emotional experience construes or thinks of an object in an evaluative way; this 
constitutes an evaluative ‘take’ on the situation which falls short of fully-fledged evaluative 
judgement. It is not easy to explain the nature of such evaluative construals or thoughts. 
Nevertheless, there are examples which help to illustrate the kind of thing involved in evaluative 
construal. Construals can involve a number of different elements gathered from perception, 
imagination, conception, and thought. For discussion see D’ARMS AND JACOBSON 2003, and 
BRADY forthcoming.  
24 D’ARMS AND JACOBSON 2003: 130. 
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emotions make available. This gives thoughts a characteristic content that is, so 
to speak, coloured by emotions. Wittgenstein expresses a similar view in the 
following remark:  
 
I am inclined to say: emotions can colour thoughts, bodily pain cannot. 
Therefore, let us speak of sad thoughts, but not, analogously, of 
toothachey thoughts. It is as if one might say: Fear or indeed hope could 
consist only of thoughts, but pain could not. Above all pain has the 
characteristics of sensations and fear does not. Fear hangs together with 
misgivings, and misgivings are thoughts. 25 
 
This is analogous to the view that I advocate. Thoughts may occur in specific 
psychological contexts the character of which is partly determined by the 
emotions and moods one has. When someone is angry, for example, she is likely 
to have thoughts the content of which is influenced by her anger. These 
thoughts may help the person understand that she is angry, even though the 
sort of evidence they provide is not as direct as that provided by a characteristic 
feeling of anger. 
It is plausible that thoughts are important to self-knowledge of higher 
emotions. Many philosophers have argued that what distinguishes higher from 
basic emotions is that the former require the ability of making sophisticated 
judgements.26 This view is denied by a considerable body of evidence showing 
                                                 
25 WITTGENSTEIN 1980: II, 153. In the same vein, Richard Moran observes that “[…] being envious 
requires that the person have a certain range of thoughts about herself and her situation, which 
may or may not include the specific thought that she is envious.” (MORAN 2001: 43). 
26 PRINZ 2004b.  
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that infants are capable of higher emotions like embarrassment and guilt.27 We 
have seen that some philosophers are inclined to think that thoughts and not 
judgements are actually essential to higher emotions. however, evidence about 
higher emotions in infants also proves this view false. Nevertheless, it is 
plausible that higher emotions and thoughts have not only a connection – 
Wittgenstein’s remark shows that this is a feature of emotions in general – but 
that such a connection may play an important role in self-knowledge of higher 
emotions. In particular, it is plausible that the psychological context that 
thoughts create may help one to understand the unspecific changes that higher 
emotions produce. 
Considering higher emotions gives rise to a specific concern – that is, the 
possibility of concept misattribution. Since the changes these emotions produce 
are unspecific, it is more likely that they will be mistaken for changes produced 
by other emotions or states. This is analogous to the visual case where a 
rectangle with sides of almost equal length is likely to be mistaken for a square 
because its appearance is not as specific as it would be if the sides were clearly 
uneven. It follows that knowledge of higher emotions may be more difficult to 
obtain because misperceptions seem more likely to occur. 
Thoughts may help avoid this problem and supplement understanding of 
what kinds of higher emotions we have and experience. This is for two reasons. 
One is that thoughts are episodic states that, like perceptions, may be influenced 
by the underlying emotions. This means that thoughts may provide clues as to 
what emotions one has. The other is that thoughts contribute to forming the 
psychological context in which the unspecific changes occur. When someone is 
                                                 
27 I reviewed these data in Chapter III. 
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capable of self-understanding, she is in a position to appreciate the connection 
between certain characteristic thoughts and her underlying emotions. This 
enables her to understand and subsequently know that the unspecific feelings 
she has are manifestations of certain higher emotions such as jealousy or envy, 
for example.28 
This account is supported by a further argument. Moran observes that 
“someone’s envy and gratitude are themselves attitudes, modes of 
understanding the world as well as oneself.”29 I argued that emotional and 
bodily feelings are perceptions of the body or states of the body, and they are 
part of the physical world in the same way that chairs, tables, and mountains 
are. So emotions can be viewed as modes of understanding physical events that 
occur inside our body. This applies to any emotions, but it is particularly 
important in the case of higher emotions. Given that feelings of higher emotions 
are perceptions of unspecific changes, that is, events that are in some way 
unclear, emotions like envy, gratitude and jealousy are ways of understanding 
these events. However, emotions are non-episodic states and we may not be 
directly aware of having them. Thoughts, by contrast, are episodic states. If we 
accept that thoughts may be influenced by emotions, we see that by considering 
the content of these thoughts, we can understand those unclear events that 
consist of the unspecific changes brought about by higher emotions.  
Let us review the argument: thoughts may help us understand what 
emotions we have because they are episodic states the content of which may be 
influenced by underlying emotions. The claim that the ability of understanding 
                                                 
28 The relation between emotions and thoughts in self-understanding is discussed by TAYLOR 
1985a, MORAN 2001, and JONES 2007b forthcoming.  
29 MORAN 2001: 41. 
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one’s own thoughts may facilitate self-knowledge is true of any emotion. 
However, basic emotions are generally known through specific emotional 
feelings. In contrast, higher emotions produce feelings that do not enjoy such 
specificity. It is for this reason that the ability of understanding one’s own 
thoughts may increase one’s chances of knowing one’s higher emotions.   
 
3.4 Expressions and Emotional Behaviour 
  
What I have so far observed shows that we may come to know emotions by 
experiencing them and by understanding the content of our thoughts. There is 
one last way in which we can know emotions. It is by observing our own 
expressions and behaviour.30 In the previous chapter, I argued that perception of 
expressions may yield direct knowledge of emotions. This explains how other 
people can know my emotions, for example. It is plausible that, on some 
occasions, the same procedure is available to myself with regard to my own 
emotions. For example, I may see and subsequently know that I am nervous by 
noticing that my hands are shaky; know that I am sad by looking at myself in 
the mirror and seeing that I look sad. These are example of emotions that I know 
not by experiencing them from the inside, but by observing them from the 
outside. Although this way of knowing emotions is quite uncommon and 
secondary to the subjective experience of emotions, it is still a way in which we 
can know emotions. 
This source of knowledge o our emotions may also function 
retrospectively. For example, by examining how I behaved in certain 
                                                 
30 For discussion see MARTIN 1997 and PICKARD 2004. 
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circumstances, I may understand that I was emotional even though I was not 
aware of it at the time. This is not to say that given what I remember about my 
behaviour, I draw the conclusion that I was emotional. Rather, I recall specific 
patterns of behaviour and I understand or interpret them as the result of certain 
emotions or moods that I had. 
What I have so far observed explains how we know what kinds of 
emotions we have, but it does not explain how we know the emotion objects. 
Knowing an emotion object is essential to having full knowledge of the emotion 
because it is an essential feature of emotions that they are directed at its objects. 
This means that we have complete knowledge of them only when we know both 
the emotion kind and object. I will now turn to an examination of how such 
knowledge is obtained.  
 
4. Knowledge of Emotion Objects 
 
Emotions are reactions to objects that are either presented in perception or 
represented in thought. When I fear my neighbour’s dog, I either perceive or 
represent it in my thoughts. This picks out a difference between perceptions and 
emotions. Perceptions are directed at objects without the mediation of any other 
mental state. Emotions, by contrast, are directed at objects that are presented or 
represented by other mental states. This is not to say that emotions have no 
intentionality or that they “borrow” it, as some philosophers have argued,31 
from other mental states. Emotions are intentional states the objects of which are 
specific entities. The point is that the way in which emotions acquire their 
                                                 
31 GOLDIE 2002. 
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objects is not as direct as in perception where objects directly cause experiences. 
Like other mental states, emotions acquire their objects through the mediation of 
other mental states – mostly perceptions and thoughts. 
This has some important consequences for knowledge of emotion objects. 
If these objects are entities that are either presented or represented by other 
states, then it seems that, in order to know them, we need to consider the 
content of these states. This suggests that there are two ways of knowing 
emotion objects. When the object is perceived, we may identify it by looking at 
the environment. Sometimes, this is not sufficient as we may see all sorts of 
things without understanding which one is the emotion object. In this case, we 
need to understand the object or situation in reaction to which the emotion 
arose. When the object is represented in thoughts, it is clear that looking at the 
environment does not help to identify it. In this case, we need to consider the 
thoughts in reactions to which the emotions arose and understand the relation 
they bear to the emotions we feel. This is a form of self-understanding that may 
help us identify emotion objects when they are intentional objects. I will discuss 
the two options in detail. 
Consider the following example. I know that the object of my fear is the 
dog because the dog stands right before me and I feel afraid. In this case, I 
simply need to perceive the causal connection between the dog and the feeling 
of fear to know what my fear is directed at. Unfortunately, things are not always 
this simple. We may form emotions in response to objects or situations that we 
have just experienced or that we are still experiencing and yet fail to perceive 
the connection between the emotion and its object. Crane illustrates this 
possibility with the following example:  
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In some cases, although it might not be immediately obvious what the 
intentional object of a mood is, it may have an object which is revealed by 
further examination. So it is with those moods whose objects are their 
causes. For example, you might feel generally irritated and it not be clear 
to you what you are irritated about, but only on reflection do you realize 
that it is the presence of your aged relative who is both the cause and the 
object of the irritation.32 
 
This suggests that, sometimes, in order to identify emotion objects we need to 
do something more than simply perceiving the connection between what we 
feel and what we experience. That is, we need to understand what we experience 
and how this bears on what we feel. In Crane’s example, the person identifies 
what he feels irritated about when he understands that the presence of an aged 
relative is in some way bothering him. Without such understanding, the mere 
perception of the relative would not enable him to identify the object in 
response to which the emotion arose. 
In a similar vein, Hanna Pickard argues that a way of explaining the 
intentionality of emotions is, in fact, in terms of understanding the reason why 
someone has the emotion she feels. She writes: 
 
[O]ne way of explaining emotional intentionality is by appeal to the 
subject’s own understanding of the reason why she is feeling as she is. 
For instance, when you come to realize that you are sad because you miss 
                                                 
32 CRANE 2007: 28. Quoted from manuscript.  
 238 
her still, say, that is what makes your emotion intentional: about the fact 
that you miss her. Of course, our understanding of many of our emotions 
is much easier to come by: it may be palpably apparent to you that you 
are angry at him because he insulted you. Nonetheless, this is a simple 
way to account for emotional intentionality: what makes your emotion 
intentional is that you understand the reason why you are in such a state, 
and so an emotion will not be intentional if you utterly lack 
understanding of the reason why you are in such a state.33  
 
On this account, we need to understand the situation in response to which the 
emotion arises in order to identify the emotion object.34 This view provides the 
basis for an interesting explanation of objectless emotions. If we accept that 
understanding what one experiences is an important element of emotion 
intentionality, we may then say that people experience objectless emotions 
when they do not understand the situations they face. If they lack such an 
understanding, there is no way for them to identify the objects at which their 
emotions are directed. 
This explains how we know emotion objects when they are perceived. 
Things are different when emotions are directed at objects represented in 
thoughts, namely when emotion objects are intentional. In this case, 
understanding the situations we experience is not sufficient to identify the 
objects because they are not things we perceive, but things we think about. This 
is to say that in order to identify the objects, we need to consider the content of 
                                                 
33 PICKARD 2003: 96. 
34 The idea that some emotions may have objects which are revealed by further examination or 
identified as one makes up one’s own mind has been recently defended by Bennett W. Helm 
(HELM 2001).  
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those thoughts in reaction to which our emotions arise. This is a form of self-
understanding and it requires the ability of considering thoughts as objects of 
investigation and their contents as clues to emotion objects, rather than as clues 
to emotions themselves as shown by the case of higher emotions. 
The fact that the content of thoughts may help to identify the emotion 
objects does not rule out the possibility that it may also mislead us. This 
phenomenon illustrated by panic attacks. When people suffer their first panic 
attack, they frequently interpret it as a symptom of a heart condition, rather than 
as a manifestation of emotion. It follows that they misinterpret the nature of 
their experience and fail to grasp the connection between what they feel and the 
objects – presented or represented – in response to which panic arises. 
The misrepresentation typical of people with panic disorder may be seen 
as the result of an inference to the best explanation made in conditions in which 
the subjects have poor understanding of their psychological lives. Panic attacks 
are disruptive emotional experiences that typically occur in concomitance with 
traumatic events. People often refuse to think about these events because this 
would bring more psychological pain. However, by so doing, they also preclude 
themselves from the possibility of understanding that panic attacks are 
emotional feelings. As a consequence, they fail to understand which emotions 
these feelings manifest and what they are about. When self-understanding is so 
limited, people try to explain their panic attacks in the best and, possibly, most 
rational way. An explanation that appeals to heart conditions perfectly suits the 
need to understand what they feel. Moreover, it prevents them from thinking 
about the traumatic events that may have triggered the emotions that panic 
manifests. Clearly, this is a situation in which people fail to grasp the connection 
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between their emotions and what they experience or think. 
Cases like this are quite extreme and they should not be viewed as ruling 
out the possibility of acquiring full knowledge of emotions in more normal 
cases. We know our emotions when we feel them. We know what they are about 
when we perceive or understand the connection between what we feel and what 
we experience or think. This shows that self-knowledge of emotions is a 
cognitive achievement that involves understanding of our bodily experience as 
well as of our mental life. 
This account explains how we come to know our emotions when they 
manifest themselves in experience. However, it is a characteristic of emotions 
that we may have them without feeling them. This may initially seem 
problematic for my position since, prima facie, this is a situation in which we 
have no way of knowing emotions. I will show, however, that in cases like this 
we can still know emotions by listening to what others say about them in the 
form of emotion ascriptions like “You look sad today.” This is not an alternative 
way of knowing our emotions as such – rather, it is how we come to know 
emotions when we do not feel them.  
 
5. Knowledge of Unfelt Emotions  
 
In general we learn many things on the basis of what someone else tells us. This 
is how we learn most things at school or from the news. The source of the 
speaker's knowledge may be of a different nature. It can be direct, as when 
someone attends an event that she later reports to someone else. It can also be 
indirect, as happens when someone learns something from the news, 
newspapers, or from other people. The question of how the speaker acquires 
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knowledge is not the issue at stake here. Answering this question would require 
some general considerations about knowledge and knowledge by testimony.35 
For the sake of argument, it suffices to say that, provided that the speaker 
knows what she is talking about, we can come to know about this by listening to 
her words. 
Some authors argue that two conditions need to be met in order for this 
knowledge to be obtained.36 One condition is that the receiver must understand 
the linguistic content of the message. For example, when the receiver is told that 
the person she is looking for is sitting over there, she needs to understand to 
which location the expression “over there” refers, in order to learn where the 
person is. The other condition is that the receiver understands the force of the 
message. Some philosophers think that information is mostly transmitted 
through assertions.37 So in order to learn something from what others say, the 
receiver needs to understand that what they say are assertions. Assertions are a 
kind of speech act we perform when we say what we believe to be the case. So, a 
proposition conveys information when it is asserted, not when it is asked. 
Consider the proposition “Gordon Brown is the new Prime Minister.” It conveys 
information about a fact only when it is asserted. The same proposition would 
not convey information if it were part of a question like “Do you know whether 
Gordon Brown is the new Prime Minister?” So it is a condition for a message to 
convey information that the receiver understands both the linguistic content as 
well as the force of the message. 
These conditions are necessary but not sufficient as the receiver may 
                                                 
35 COADY 1991; FRICKER 1987, 2004.  
36 BURGE 1993. 
37 UNGER 1975; WILLIAMSON 1996, 2000.  
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understand both the content and force and, yet, refuse to believe the message or 
to take it seriously. In order to learn something through interlocution, the 
receiver needs to believe what she is told.38 This is not a characteristic of 
interlocution. It is a fact about knowledge that it starts from belief. When 
someone learns things through the senses, she believes the content of her 
perceptions. Similarly, when she learns something through interlocution, she 
believes what she is told. The difference between interlocution and perception is 
that, in interlocution, perception alone does not suffice to justify the receiver in 
believing what she is told.39 This is because in order to be justified in believing it, 
she needs to understand the message she hears. The perceptual experience of 
someone telling her something is the basis for her to understand what she is 
told, but it does not justify her in believing it. This is because hearing a certain 
sequence of sounds on its own does not give her any reason to believe anything. 
She needs to understand what those sounds mean in order to be justified in 
believing what the interlocutor says. This shows that, in interlocution, 
justification depends on the fact that the receiver understands the content and 
force of what she is told. 
What I have so far observed also applies to knowledge of emotions 
through ascriptions. When a speaker tells the receiver that she looks unhappy 
and the speaker has knowledge of it, the receiver is then in a position to know 
her emotion (i.e. that she is unhappy) even though she does not feel it. In the 
previous chapter, I have shown that it is perfectly possible for the observer to 
know what emotion another person has by perceiving it in her own expression. 
In particular, I argued that people know other people’s emotions when they 
                                                 
38 BURGE 1993. 
39 BURGE 1993. 
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perceive them in others’ expressions, and the latter are partly constituted by the 
emotions they show. This knowledge can be verbalised in the form of emotion 
ascriptions like “You don’t seem terribly happy.” On this account, if we accept 
that the ascriber knows that the ascribee is unhappy even though she does not 
feel it, then the ascribee is in a position to gain knowledge about her emotion by 
listening to the emotion ascription and believing it. This requires that she 
understands the content and force of the ascription. That is, she needs to 
understand that the sentence “You don’t seem terribly happy” is an assertion 
about her emotional state. 
This is not as obvious as it may seem. Emotion ascriptions often use 
perception verbs. This is because the source of the ascription is perceptual. So 
we say “You don’t seem terribly happy today”, rather than “You are not terribly 
happy today.” This raises a problem. Prima facie, emotion ascriptions convey 
information about the content of the ascriber’s experience, rather than about the 
ascribee’s emotion. This means that, in some cases, the ascribee may interpret 
the ascription as saying how she appears to the speaker, rather than saying that 
she in fact has a certain emotion. It is probably for this reason that we tend to 
dismiss emotion ascriptions and take them as reports about how other people 
see us, rather than as assertions about our mental states. This is consistent with 
the fact that seeming to have an emotion does not entail really having it, given 
that, as shown in the previous chapter, many bodily changes resemble 
expressions of emotions without actually expressing emotions. 
Such factors illustrate that emotion ascriptions have an element of 
ambiguity. They can be interpreted as saying something about the content of the 
ascriber’s perceptual experience or as something about the ascribee’s mental 
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state. Therefore, understanding is crucial to the acquisition of knowledge about 
emotions through ascriptions. When the ascribee does not understand that the 
ascription says something about her emotion, she does not acquire knowledge 
about it. Ascriptions provide the ascribee with knowledge of her emotions only 
when she understands them as saying something about her emotions. When 
they are understood in this way emotion ascriptions link the ascribee’s belief 
that she has a certain emotion to the ascriber’s knowledge of the ascribee’s 
emotion. It is through this procedure that the ascribee comes to know that she 
has an emotion of which she was previously unaware. 
What reason does the ascribee have to believe the ascriber’s words? We 
tend to think that our mental states are transparent to us and that we are the 
highest authority on them. I have illustrated that, in the case of emotions, this 
assumption is mistaken. Emotions are not necessarily transparent to us because 
we may have them without feeling them. I also showed that the ascriber can 
know the ascribee’s emotion from her expression. What still needs to be 
explained is what reasons the ascribee has to believe the ascriber. To begin to 
solve this problem requires articulating the ascribee’s reasons for accepting 
what she is told. To this end, it will help to understand that we believe emotion 
ascriptions on the basis of two different justificatory grounds. In one case, we 
have background reasons to do so. In the other, we have no background reasons, and 
we take at face value what we are told. 
Background reasons for believing people’s words are of two different 
types. The first concerns the content of what we are told. The second concerns 
the authority of the speaker. In ordinary interlocution, the receiver may believe 
the message that Gordon Brown is the new Prime Minister because she already 
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knew he was the favourite. So, she believes the message because it fits in with 
what she previously knew. In the case of emotion ascriptions like “You don’t 
seem terribly happy today”, she may believe the ascription because she knows 
that she is in a bad mood. The problem with this scenario is that background 
reasons may lead the ascribee to accept ascriptions that are incorrect. For 
example, if she believed herself to be a dull person, this would give her reason 
to accept only those ascriptions that confirm what she already believes about 
herself and to reject ascriptions that do not confirm this view, even if the latter 
are, nonetheless, true. This shows that background reasons may prevent the 
ascribee from believing true ascriptions simply because what they say does not 
cohere with what she already believes about herself. 
The second type of background justification concerns the authority of the 
speaker. Sometimes we believe what others say about us because we take them 
to be competent or reliable sources. In ordinary interlocution, the receiver may 
believe what the engineer says about her washing machine because she takes 
engineers to know what they are talking about. Similarly, she believes that 
Gordon Brown is the new Prime Minister because she learns it from the news, 
which she takes to be well-informed about the political situation. In the case of 
emotion ascriptions, she believes what other people say about her emotions 
when they know her very well, when they are perceptive people; or when they 
have some specific skills or expertise as in the case of psychotherapy. These are 
all reasons for the ascribee to believe what she is told about our emotions. 
Believing things because the ascribee has a certain attitude to the ascriber, 
though, makes her vulnerable to credulity. In interlocution, believing everything 
one hears on the news may lead one to accept things that are not correct or 
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accurate. The same applies to emotion ascriptions. Accepting that one is 
depressed because this is what a doctor says may lead the person to believe a 
wrong diagnosis and prevent her from understanding her real emotion. 
The second kind of justificatory ground does not rely on background 
information. In this case, the receiver simply takes at face value what people 
say. She does so when they tell her the time, when they say that it rains outside, 
that it is cold, or that the train is late. In these cases, she has no background 
reasons to believe what she is told. She believes messages conveyed in 
interlocution simply because she understands their content and force, and they 
come from speakers that seem normal and rational.40 This is also true of emotion 
ascriptions. When someone tells her “You look sad today”, she is in a position to 
learn that she is sad simply by taking the ascription at face value. This requires 
her to understand that the message is about her emotion, and not about how she 
looks to the ascriber. It also requires her to understand that the message is an 
assertion, and not a question or another kind of speech act. In these 
circumstances, she comes to know that she is sad simply by taking at face value 
what the ascriber says about her emotion. This way of learning things about 
herself does not expose her to the sorts of problems that affect acquisition of 
knowledge via background reasons. In particular, by taking at face value what 
the ascriber says, the ascribee does not appeal to what she already knows about 
herself, nor does she take the ascriber to be competent or reliable in some special 
way. She simply believes the emotion ascriptions on the basis of her 
understanding of it. When the ascription is an expression of knowledge on the 
ascriber’s part, the ascribee comes to know that she has a certain emotion. 
                                                 
40 BURGE 1993. 
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It is worth noting that this does not provide the subject with knowledge 
of the emotion object. This is because being told that she looks sad does not say 
anything about what she is sad about. Most emotion ascriptions only provide 
knowledge of the kind of state one has, not of its object. It is only in a few cases 
that emotion ascriptions convey information about the emotion object. This 
generally occurs when the context allows the ascriber to identify the object. For 
example, the ascription “You are worrying too much about this thing” makes 
anaphoric reference to an object that has been mentioned during the 
conversation and which is the emotion object. However, evidence from the 
context is not always available. Moreover, some emotions are directed at objects 
represented in thought. This means that the ascriber cannot observe the emotion 
object because it is not a physical object in the environment but a mental content 
of the ascribee. 
There are some exceptions, for instance when the emotion is caused by 
perception. Perception is awareness of objects. Objects of perception are physical 
entities located in the environment. When the emotion is directed at an object 
presented in perception, it is possible for the ascriber to observe it and make an 
ascription that also conveys information about the emotion object. Joint 
attention typically allows for this possibility. Consider the following example. 
The ascribee sees someone to whom she is attracted. A friend observes both the 
emotion in her expression and the person in relation to which the emotion 
arises. Then she says: “You seem to like him.” By listening to the ascription and 
believing it, the ascribee comes to know what emotion she has and also its 
object. This possibility is not always available. In most cases, people can see 
emotions in others’ expressions and yet are unable to comprehend what the 
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emotions are about. So, in most cases, emotion ascriptions form the basis for 
knowing what emotions one has, but not what the emotion objects are. 
It is plausible to say that, when the ascription does not convey 
information about the emotion object, understanding situations or the content of 
one’s own thoughts are essential to gaining knowledge of the emotion objects. 
For example, I understand that the object of my anxiety is tomorrow’s session 
with my dentist because I keep thinking about it and it is then that I feel 
worried. A similar explanation applies to knowledge acquired through emotion 
ascriptions. When the ascribee is told “You don’t seem happy”, she may come to 
know that she is not happy, but not what she is unhappy about. It is when she 
understands either what she is experiencing, or the content of her thoughts, that 




I have shown that we know emotions by experiencing them in the form of 
emotional feelings. These experiences give us reason for self-ascribing emotion 
predicates corresponding to the emotion concepts that the emotional feelings 
instantiate. It is through this procedure that we know what kinds of emotions 
we have. This is not the only procedure available. In some cases, we know 
emotions by understanding the relation between the content of our thoughts 
and what we feel. In others, we know emotions by perceiving them in our 
expressions and by considering our behaviour. 
Emotions are essentially directed at objects. This means that we have full 
knowledge of emotions only when we know the emotion objects. These are 
entities that are either presented in perception or represented in thought. In the 
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first case, we know the emotion objects by perceiving the object or situation in 
response to which the emotions arise. Sometimes perception is not sufficient, 
and so we need to understand the situation. In this case, we know the objects by 
understanding the content of our thoughts. 
Emotions may not manifest themselves in emotional feelings. This does 
not mean that we cannot possibly know them. Other people can perceive 
emotions in our expressions. Perception of the expressions may yield 
knowledge of the emotions that produce them. Such knowledge can be 
expressed by emotion ascriptions which have the potential to inform the 
ascribee about the emotions she has even when she does not feel them. This 
procedure does not necessarily warrant knowledge of the emotion objects. 
Ascriptions convey information about emotion objects when emotions are 
caused by perceptions of objects in the environment. The ascriber then observes 
both the emotion and the object at which the emotion is directed, and conveys 
information about both the emotion kind and object to the ascribee. When 
emotion objects are not located in the environment because they are represented 
in thoughts, ascriptions only convey information about the emotion kinds. In 
this case, the possibility of knowing the emotion objects rests solely on the 
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